Cornell Law Review
Volume 83
Issue 5 July 1998

Article 5

History and State Suability: An Explanatory
Account of the Eleventh Amendment
James E. Pfander

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An Explanatory Account of the Eleventh Amendment , 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1269 (1998)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol83/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

HISTORY AND STATE SUABILITY: AN
"EXPLANATORY' ACCOUNT OF THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
James E. Pfandert
INTRODUCrION .................................................
1270
I. TiE ROLE OF PuBLIc DEBTS AND GOVERNMENT SUABMITY
IN THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION ..................
1281

A. Public Debts and Nationalist Financial Policy ....... 1281
B. Fiscal Policy at the Philadelphia Convention ........ 1288
C. The Relevance of the Constitution's Transitional
Provisions ..........................................

1293

D. Fiscal Policy and Article III's Provisions for
Government Suability ............................... 1299
E. The Anti-Federalist Attack on Jurisdiction over
Retrospective Claims Against the States ............. 1304
II. THE ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT As AN EXPLANATION

OF

ARTICLE III .............................................
1313
A. An Introduction to the Use of Explanatory Statutes
in the Eighteenth Century .......................... 1314
B. The Eleventh Amendment as an "Explanatory"
Amendment to Article III ........................... 1323
1. Retrospective Liability and the Impetus for a
ConstitutionalResponse to Chisholm .............. 1324
2. The Debate over State Suability in FederalQuestion
Cases............................................
1329
3. Evidence That the Eleventh Amendment Was
Explanatory of Article 11I .......................... 1333
4. The Eleventh Amendment's Effectiveness in Protecting
States from Debts Incurred Under the Articles of
Confederation .................................... 1343
ImI.

ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPLANATORY
INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT .........

1352

A. The Explanatory Account and the Current Scholarly
D ebate .............................................
1352
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Evan Caminker,
Bill Casto, Vicki Jackson, John Jeffries, Jr., Kit Kinports, Dan Meltzer, Forrest McDonald,
John Nowak, Bob Pushaw, and Suzanna Sherry for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks
also to the College for research support and to Sue Hemp and Jane Williams for their
patience with my library requests.

1269

2.

The Debate over the Plausibility of Creating Two
Classes of Ineligible Plaintiffs ...................... 1356
3. Suability Issues That the Assignment of State Debt
Raises ...........................................
1358
4. The GallatinAmendment and State Suability in Treaty
Cases............................................
1361
5. The Addition of the Words of Construction, "Be
Construed To" ...... ............................ 1363
6. On the Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment ....... 1365
B. The Explanatory Account and Recent Developments
in Constitutional Federalism ........................ 1367
1. Seminole Tribe and the 'Principle" of Sovereign
Immunity ........................................ 1368
2. The Mistaken Equation of U.S.-Party and State-Party
Immunity ........................................ 1370
3. The Curious Idea of State Consent to Suit........... 1373
4. The Problem of ProtectingState Treasuries .......... 1378
5. The Absence of a Forum-AllocationPrinciple ........ 1379
CONCLUSION ...................................................
1380
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INTRODUCTION

At the heart of debates over the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution lies the question what role history should play in the interpretation of the constitutional text. The
relevant text itself is not in dispute: the Amendment provides that the
'Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 2 A few salient historical points also appear
relatively free from doubt: President John Adams proclaimed the
Amendment to be a "Part of the Constitution" on January 8, 1798,3
1
SIR HENRY SPELMAN, Of Parliaments, in RELIQUIiE SPELMANNiANE: THE POSTHUMOUS
WORKS OF SIR HENRY SPELMAN 57, 57 (Oxford, Printed at the Theater for Awnsham andJ.

Churchill 1698).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3 For the text of the Adams proclamation, see 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 637-38 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994)
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five years after the Supreme Court decided, in Chisholm v. Georgia,4
that its original jurisdiction over State-party cases extended to suits
brought against a state in its corporate capacity.5 But apart from a
consensus that the Eleventh Amendment overturned the "state suability" determination in Chisholm, scholars and judges disagree about
what, if anything, the history of the Amendment can tell us about its
proper interpretation some two hundred years later.
The Supreme Court, of course, bears primary responsibility for
this fascination with history because it has offered a historical justification for its decision to ignore the limited terms of the text of the
Amendment and to create a broader doctrine of state sovereign immunity. The Court's history has become known as the "profound
shock" account-one that sees the Chisholm decision as profoundly
unexpected and unsettling, and that portrays the Eleventh Amend6
ment as a sweeping rejection of state suability by individual plaintiffs.
The Court first tendered this broad view of the Eleventh Amendment
in Hans v. Louisiana,7 holding that the Amendment precludes even
those federal court suits "commenced or prosecuted" by in-state plaintiffs who fall outside the Amendment's literal terms. 8 Although the
[hereinafter DHSC]. Shortly thereafter, in February 1798, the Court held that the Amendment applied to and required dismissal of pending proceedings against State defendants.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 378, 382 (1798).
4 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
5 Technically, one might argue today that the legally effective date of the Eleventh
Amendment arrived well before the Adams proclamation. Under Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
368, 376 (1921), a constitutional amendment takes effect on the date when three-fourths
of the states have ratified it, not on the date of its proclaimed effectiveness. North Carolina
ratified the Eleventh Amendment on February 7, 1795, and thus provided the twelfth vote
for ratification in a union then consisting of fifteen states. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
601. At the time, however, the states had no agreed-upon mode of informing the federal
government of their ratification decisions. Therefore, the Amendment slumbered for a
few years before Congress initiated an inquiry into its status in January 1797. That inquiry
led to the Adams proclamation. See id. at 601-04.
6 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (describing the decision in Chisholm as
creating a "shock of surprise throughout the country" by departing from an original consensus on state immunity from suit in federal court). See generallyJohn J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889,
1893-94 (1983) (criticizing the "profound shock" theory of the Eleventh Amendment as
the Court developed in Hans and as Professor Charles Warren popularized in subsequent
writing).
7 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
8 Id. at 9-12, 19-21. For instances in which the Court has held that the Eleventh
Amendment applies as a flat ban on state suability by individual plaintiffs, see Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-74 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that admiralty suits are not "suits in law or equity," but concluding that the
principle of sovereign immunity, if not the language of the Eleventh Amendment, bars
such claims); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (concluding that the principle of state immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits by foreign
states, despite the fact that such plaintiffs are nowhere mentioned in the text of the
Amendment); Ex parteNew York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921) (holding that general Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits in admiralty as well as those in law and equity).
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Court has countenanced a variety of exceptions to Hans,9 it has continued to view its rule of sweeping immunity, rather than the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, as the starting point for any analysis of state
suability. 10
Scholars have developed more nuanced accounts of the Eleventh
Amendment that attempt to make sense of its text in light of a richer
and more complex understanding of the history surrounding its ratification in the 1790s. 11 These scholars emphasize that the text of the
Amendment precludes suit by only two kinds of plaintiffs-citizens of
other states and citizens or subjects of foreign nations. 12 These schol9 Four important exceptions to the rule of state sovereign immunity enable the
Court to preserve a measure of state accountability to the rule of law. First, individuals may
challenge the legality of state action by suing state officials to secure injunctive and declaratory relief against threatened violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. See
Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (holding that individuals may obtain prospective relief from continuing violations of federal statutory rights by state officials); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-57 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
suit seeking injunctive relief from a threatened violation of constitutional limits on state
ratemaking authority). Second, individuals may seek compensation for past violations of
federal rights from the responsible state officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991) (reaffirming state officers' amenability to suits for damages, and specifically rejecting Eleventh Amendment immunity for such officers). Third,
another governmental body, the United States itself or another state, may sue a state by
invoking the Court's original jurisdiction. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644
(1892) (asserting original jurisdiction over federal question claims brought by the United
States); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (assertingjurisdiction
over a border contest between two states). Fourth, the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply to proceedings on appeal from the state courts to the Supreme Court. See McKesson
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1990) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)). The Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v.
F/orida reaffirmed these established modes of securing state accountability. Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14, 73-76 (1996) (reaffirming the exceptions for U.S.party litigation and appellate jurisdiction under Cohens, and distinguishing but not overruling Ex parte Young).
10
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (admitting that "the text of the [Eleventh]
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts," but reaffirming that the Amendment stands less for what it says than for the presupposition of sovereign immunity that it confirms).
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-92
11
(1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pt.
1), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a
ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, supranote 6; Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. 1 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 1342 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61 (1989). Good historical treatments also appear in CLYDE E.
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNrrY (1972); JOHN V. ORTH, THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1987).
12 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1060-61 (noting the failure of the text to mention in-state citizens and concluding that such selectivity reveals an intention to retain jurisdiction over federal question suits); Marshall, supra note 11, at 1346-47 (noting that the
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ars also note that the decision in Chisholm did not depart quite as radically from settled expectations as the profound shock account would
have it; in truth, many Americans from the Federalist ranks supported
state suability, and many understood Article III to have subjected
states to suit in federal court to some degree.1 3 According to this account, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment by a Congress that
Federalists controlled represented a compromise between those who
sought to eliminate all state suability and those who sought to ensure
state accountability as to matters of federal law. 14 Two leading revisionist accounts-the so-called diversity and literal explanations of the
Eleventh Amendment-both believe that the Hans Court erred in rejecting suits by in-state plaintiffs to enforce federal-law restrictions
15
against the states.
Hans Court abandoned the Eleventh Amendment's limited text and sought a principle of
immunity in the body of the Constitution).
13
Detailed reviews of the ratification debates on the issue of state suability appear in
Field, supra note 11, at 527-36; Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1902-14. Although Field and
Gibbons find some evidence of a desire to subject the states to suit, others have viewed the
ratification debates as ambiguous. SeeJAcoBs, supra note 11, at 39 (noting the ambiguities
surrounding the suability implications of the diversity head ofjurisdiction); Massey, supra
note 11, at 97 (characterizing the historical evidence as providing support for a range of
views). My own work suggests that Article III effected a relatively clear waiver of state sovereign immunity by declaring that the Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all State-party cases. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
OriginalJurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 581-97 (1994) (arguing that
sovereign immunity would have barred state suability in the federal courts absent the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over claims against the states).
14 Like other aspects of the debate over the Eleventh Amendment, scholars disagree
about the nature of the political compromise entailed in its adoption by Congress. Compare
Gibbons, supranote 6, at 1934-39 (portraying the Eleventh Amendment as "a tub thrown to
the whale" of anti-federalism to prevent the calling of a new constitutional convention, and
emphasizing the Federalists' desire to preserve state suability in matters affecting the
Treaty of 1783), andJohn E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes ofAction
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 1413, 1436-41 (1975) (tabulating the Federalists' broad support for the Eleventh
Amendment and explaining that support as reflecting the Federalists' desire to appear
tough on Great Britain and on the Tories who were pressing claims based on the Treaty of
1783), with Marshall, supra note 11, at 1367-68 (characterizing the Eleventh Amendment as
a compromise between securing state immunity and preserving state accountability in federal question matters).
15 Diversity theorists believe that the Eleventh Amendment narrows the grant ofjurisdiction in Article III over "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State"
and "between a State ... and foreign... Citizens or Subjects," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1, to preclude state suability based on the alignment of the parties; the diversity account
sees the Amendment as leaving intact the provision in Article III for the assertion ofjurisdiction over claims against the states that invoke federal question or admiralty jurisdiction.
SeeAmar, supra note 11, at 1473-92; Fletcher, supranote 11, at 1060-63; Gibbons, supra note
6, at 1934-38. Literal theorists, by contrast, treat the language of the Eleventh Amendment
as an absolute bar to the assertion ofjurisdiction over claims by the two disfavored plaintiffs: out-of-state citizens and foreign nationals. See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1346-49;
Massey, supra note 11, at 65. Under the literal account, only in-state plaintiffs may invoke
federal question jurisdiction in suits against the state.
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Despite their broad agreement that some measure of state accountability survived the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, revisionist scholars have failed to persuade a majority of the Justices to
abandon the sweeping immunity rule of Hans.16 Only two Terms ago
in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,17 the Court reaffirmed Hans and, by a narrow 5-4 majority, refused to permit Congress to abrogate the Hans
immunity through the exercise of its Article I powers. 18 This recent
rejection may have taken some of the life out of the revisionist enterprise. The last spirited debate between the diversity and the literal
accounts of the Amendment took place in 1990,19 and recent Eleventh Amendment scholarship takes Hans as its starting point and focuses on other modes of securing state compliance with rules of
20
federal law.

The Court's dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds of two separate actions aimed
at collecting the value of bonds issued by the State of Louisiana brings the distinction
between the two accounts into sharp relief. In Louisianav.Jume4 107 U.S. 711 (1883), outof-state citizens brought suit against Louisiana, invoking the Contracts Clause of the Constitution and seeking mandamus relief that would have ordered officers of the state to
honor its obligations. Id. at 712-18. In Hans v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1 (1890), an in-state
plaintiff sought damages for the same bond repudiation. Id. at 1-3. However, because this
plaintiff was a citizen of Louisiana, Hans fell outside the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 10-15. According to diversity theorists, both claims presented federal
questions to which the Eleventh Amendment should not apply; for literalists, the Court
rightly decided Jumel but took a wrong turn in Hans by extending the principle of immunity beyond the literal words of the text to block claims by in-state citizens.
16 Forming a third important school of revisionist thought, abrogation theorists portray the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on the judicial power that may leave Congress free to impose suit upon the states through the exercise of its legislative authority. See
Nowak, supra note 14, at 1469; Laurence H. Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARv.
L. REv. 682, 693-99 (1976). The Court has accepted this theory so long as Congress acts
pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), and so long as Congress effects such abrogation in clear
statutory text, see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
'7
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
18
The Court had previously accepted the idea that Congress may subject states to suit
in federal court to enforce rights conferred under the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra
note 16, but ultimately rejected the possibility of abrogation in the exercise of congressional powers conferred by Article I. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (holding that Congress lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its Article I
powers) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). In effect, the
Court followed Hans in viewing the Eleventh Amendment as having restored the Framers'
understanding that states enjoyed constitutionally implicit sovereign immunity from suit
that qualified all grants of power in Article I.
19 SeeWilliam A. Fletcher, The DiversityExplanationof the Eleventh Amendment. A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261 (1989); Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment 57 U. C i. L.
REv. 118 (1990) (collection of letters critical of Professor Fletcher's article, and Professor
Fletcher's rebuttal); see alsoVicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years ofFolly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. RFv. 51 (1990) (arguing that the current confusion in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence stems from Hans).
20 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REv. 47 (1998) (contending that the Eleventh Amendment almost never matters in
light of the possibility that individuals may sue state officers under § 1983); Kit Kinports,
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This Article attempts to revive the revisionist enterprise by offering a new synthesis of the history of the Eleventh Amendment. My
account, which draws on new compilations of primary source materials,21 seeks to situate the state suability discussions of the 1790s in the
broader context of an ongoing national debate over fiscal policy that
had helped to shape the new federal Constitution.2 2 This debate began under the Articles of Confederation and raised two questions:
how to allocate responsibility for the management of the nation's fiscal policy between the central government and the several states, and
how to dispose of the substantial debts that the old (Continental)
Congress and the several states had incurred in fighting the Revolutionary War. As we shall see, the Framers of the Constitution resolved
the first question in favor of broad national competence. 23 The Constitution not only confers broad fiscal powers on the federal government, but also contains provisions in Article I, Section 10 that
explicitly prohibit the states from emitting bills of credit (paper
money), enforcing tender laws, and impairing the obligation of contracts.2 4 Together, these provisions transfer fiscal responsibility to the
national government and do much to prohibit the states from continImplied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MiNN. L. Rxv. 793 (1998) (arguing that Congress
may still secure express and implied waivers of state immunity to suit, notwithstanding the
Seminole Tribe ban on abrogation); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception, "110 Hav. L. REv. 102, 127-28 (1996) (suggesting that the availability of officer suits
in federal court and state suability in state court substantially reduces the impact of Seminole
Tribe); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REv. 539 (1995) (arguing that Congress may authorize individual
plaintiffs to bring suit against the states as delegates of the federal government's authority
to sue them); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 106 YALE L.J.
1683 (1997) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment may do more than allocate litigation
to state courts-it may create absolute immunity from liability-and, exploring the implications of such an immunity, concluding that officer suits provide an effective substitute
for entity liability); cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the
PotentialEvisceration of Ex parteYoung, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 544 (1997) (arguing for the
continuing vitality of the diversity explanation and urging the Court to abandon Seminole
Tribe); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 19 (arguing that the diversity explanation remains the most attractive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
21 In the course of this Article, I have made extensive use of the state suability volume
of the Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States series, supra note 3. This
work, published in 1994, includes both an extensive collection of primary source materials
and a wonderful set of editorial notes that explore in some detail the origins of the various
State-party disputes that appeared on the Court's docket in the 1790s.
22 Today, economists distinguish sharply between fiscal policy-the government's
management of the national economy through the running of budget surpluses and deficits-and monetary policy-the government's manipulation of interest rates and the
money supply. In this Article, I do not incorporate this modem distinction but use the
term fiscal policy as a general description of issues relating to the issuance of paper money
and the payment and funding of public debts.
23
See infra Part I.A-B.
24

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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uing to engage in what historians of the period describe as "agrarian"
25
or "currency" finance.
Although the Constitution sought to make the states fiscally responsible prospectively, the Framers do not appear to have intended
to apply these new fiscal constraints to state debts incurred under the
Articles of Confederation. While the Engagements Clause of the Constitution empowers the federal government to assume existing state
debts from the old regime, 2 6 the Constitution does not otherwise address the manner in which the states were to deal with their existing
creditors. The absence of any relevant constitutional constraint, coupled with the absence of any express grant of legislative power to Congress, suggests that (as Alexander Hamilton observed in his guise as
Publius) the states were to remain "free from every constraint but that
which flows from the obligations of good faith." 27 The Framers of the

Constitution appear to have adopted a temporal compromise; in
short, they imposed federal limits on future state fiscal policy, but left
the states free to manage existing obligations as they saw fit, subject to
federal debt assumption.
I find support for such a temporal compromise in the Framers'
general preference for prospectivity, in the specific transitional terms
of the Constitution itself, and in the terms of the ratification debates. 28 I focus first on the terms of the Ratification Clause of Article
VII, which declares that the triggering event for the "Establishment"
of the Constitution was to be the ratification of the instrument by the
conventions of nine states. 29 The Clause clearly declares the effectiveness of the Constitution as running not from the date of its completion (in September 1787), but from the date of its approval by the
requisite number of states (in June 1788). It also leaves open the possibility that states might join the Union after the Constitution's effectiveness (as did Rhode Island and North Carolina) and subject
themselves to the federal restrictions of Article I as of the date of their

25

For an overview of the tenets of agrarian or currency finance, see infra note 49.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 ("All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under
this Constitution, as under the Confederation.").
27
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
28 For evidence of the Framers' general concern with securing legislative prospectivity, see infra text accompanying notes 345-57. For evidence that the Founding Generation
regarded the Constitution as prospective in application, see infra text accompanying notes
163-98. On the concern with the political viability of retrospective limits on the states, see
infra text accompanying notes 169-72 (quoting William Davie, delegate from North Carolina to the Philadelphia convention).
29 U.S. CONST. art. VII ("The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.").
26
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accession. 30 The Supremacy Clause lends further support to my prospective interpretation of the federal limits on state action. While it
provides for the supremacy of the new Constitution itself and of any
laws passed "in Pursuance thereof," the Clause notably refrains from
making the provisions of the old Articles of Confederation and the
acts of the old Congress supreme and binding upon the states. 31 The
Supremacy Clause thus confirms that the Framers meant to preserve
the status quo with respect to existing state obligations. As those obligations had been under the Articles of Confederation, they were enforceable, if at all, only as a matter of state (or general common)
32
law.
Article III complicates the story by vesting the Supreme Court of
the United States with original jurisdiction over a variety of State-party
cases and controversies. To the extent that this jurisdiction encompasses cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States in which a state appears as a party defendant, Article III
seems to perfect the Court's judicial negative on improper state
laws.8 3 Indeed, many Federalists explicitly defended Article III's provision for state suability on the ground that it would secure judicial
enforcement of these federal restrictions on state authority. 34 Inasmuch as such federal-law limits were not to apply retrospectively to
existing state obligations, jurisdiction over federal questions posed litte threat of judicial enforcement of existing state obligations. But
such a threat did appear in Article III's provision for federal jurisdiction over controversies between a state and the citizens of another
state, as well as those between a state and the citizens or subjects of a
foreign nation. These grants of party-based jurisdiction raised a distinct threat of retrospective state liability because they appeared to
authorize the federal courts to take cognizance of all disputes between
states and nonresidents. It was precisely this threat of judicially imposed liability that Hamilton and many other Federalist defenders of
the Constitution disavowed, that the Chisholm Court nonetheless
threatened to impose, and that the Eleventh Amendment sought to
overturn.
This distinction, between federal question jurisdiction as a mode
for the future enforcement of the new federal restrictions in Article I,
Section 10, and party-based jurisdiction as a potential vehicle for the
30

For a history of the ratification debates in North Carolina and Rhode Island, see

FoaREsr MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 310-40

(1958).
31
32

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

See infra Part L.C (discussing the Ratification Clause and the Supremacy Clause in
more detail).
33
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1.
34 See infra text accompanying notes 162, 191-93.
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judicial enforcement of old state debts, helps to explain much of the
discordant evidence in the historical accounts of the Eleventh Amendment. The Chisholm decision does appear to have fallen upon the
country with a profound shock, and does appear to have touched off a
widespread political reaction leading to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. But Chisholm was shocking (at least among the
Federalists whose support of the Eleventh Amendment was crucial to
its proposal and ratification) less because it contemplated the suability
of the states as corporate bodies than because it threatened to require
the states to honor old obligations to individual suitors in specie, without regard to the states' traditional freedom to adopt strategies of
agrarian finance. In the campaign to ratify the Constitution, many
Federalists had denied that Article III would threaten the states with
suits to enforce existing obligations, following the line taken in Alexander Hamilton's carefully qualified denial of retrospective state liability in FederalistNo. 81.35 Federalists such as Senator Caleb Strong of
Massachusetts, who proposed the language that became the Eleventh
Amendment, could thus join avowed Anti-Federalists in supporting
nonsuability in claims based upon obligations incurred before the
Constitution took effect. 36 My emphasis on the retrospective feature

of Chisholm thus helps to explain how the Eleventh Amendment could
have simultaneously served to reaffirm a form of state nonsuability (in
suits in federal court to enforce obligations incurred under the Articles of Confederation) and also to have left intact the federal courts'
37
power to enforce the Constitution against the states prospectively.
My emphasis on the contrast between the Constitution's prospective focus and the retrospective features of Chisholm also helps to explain what for modem readers has surely been the Eleventh
Amendment's most puzzling feature: its declaration that the judicial
power shall not "be construed to" extend to certain disfavored plaintiffs. As initially proposed in February 1793, the Amendment would
have simply curtailed the judicial power; Senator Strong of Massachusetts added the words of construction "be construed to" in 1794, one
35 See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
36 See 5 DHSC, supranote 3, at 597-600 (identifying Caleb Strong of Massachusetts as
the author of the preliminary draft of the Eleventh Amendment introduced in the Senate
on February 20, 1793, and of the draft later reintroduced on January 2, 1794).
37 I have found only a single, tentative suggestion in the literature to support my
proposed distinction between the prospective application of constitutional restrictions and
the retrospective enforcement of past debts that the Chisholm decision threatened. In an
effort to explain the failure in Chisholm of both the parties and the Court to address the
implications of the Contracts Clause, Professor Amar offers the following: "One possible
explanation is that the clause was not intended to have any retroactive effect on contracts
with states made before ratification. To give state creditors a legally enforceable claim
when they had only bargained for a moral obligation might have been viewed as unjust
enrichment." Amar, supra note 11, at 1470 n.188.
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year after Chisholm.3 8 Modem scholars have offered a host of conflicting explanations for these words of construction, ranging from the
claim that they served to soften the rebuke to the Court, to the claim
that they were meant to emphasize the Amendment's focus on the
judicial power and to leave open the possibility of congressional abrogation.3 9 In contrast to these accounts, my research suggests that the
words indicate that the framers regarded the Eleventh Amendment as
an "explanatory" or "declaratory" amendment. Although they have
now largely disappeared from the legislative scene, explanatory
amendments were more common in the eighteenth century. Typically, they sought to clarify the meaning of a law that a court had inter40
preted (perhaps erroneously), and were often applied retroactively.
By establishing an explanatory rule of construction to govern the
scope of the judicial power, the Eleventh Amendment swept away all
of the claims within its description, not just those filed after its effective date. The framers' concern with the retroactive feature of
Chisholm thus helps to account for the final contours of an Amendment that itself was designed to explain the meaning of Article III and
41
to operate retroactively.
Viewed in this manner, the Eleventh Amendment represents a
rather technical solution to the problem of "state suability" that
emerged from Chisholm's interpretation of Article III's grants of partybased jurisdiction. By treating the problem as one of state suability, I
have consciously chosen to adopt the usage of the generation that
framed and ratified the Eleventh Amendment, and to abandon the
language of state sovereign immunity that modern courts and commentators frequently use to characterize the Eleventh Amendment. 42
Although many contemporary observers spoke of Chisholm's impact in
terms of its challenge to state sovereignty, the Eleventh Amendment
was drafted in terms ofjurisdiction and suability under Article Inl, and
was so characterized by the Founding Generation. 43 This modern talk
38 Scholars have long noted the change in the language of Strong's two drafts of the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 14, at 1436-37.
39 See infra Part IIIA5.
40
See infra Part HA.
41 See infra Part II.B.3.
42 Today, we tend to discuss Eleventh Amendment issues in terms of "sovereign immunity," despite the fact that the Constitution never mentions the word "sovereign" and
does not by its terms confer immunity on any government body. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (addressing the question whether the "State's sovereign
immunity" barred the plaintiff's suit); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as "rooted in a
recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,
including sovereign immunity").
43 The generation that framed and ratified the Eleventh Amendment spoke of the
issue as one of "state suability," at least in their formal communications. See, e.g., Resolution of the United States Congress (Mar. 2, 1797), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 628, 628
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of sovereign immunity suggests that the Eleventh Amendment marked
a complete Anti-Federalist victory in the battle over state suability; in
truth, the two parties appear to have reached a compromise. 44 In any
event, once the Court begins to conceptualize the problem of state
suability in terms of a free-standing principle of "sovereign immunity,"
rather than as a technical problem in the parsing of the language of
judicial power, it unleashes a dangerous and unwieldy restriction on
the federal courts' power to enforce federal-law restrictions against
the states. By returning to the language of state suability, I hope to
cabin the influence of this spurious principle of sovereign immunity.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I looks back at the
framing of the Constitution, paying special attention to the role Revolutionary War debts played in the drafting of prospective rules of government accountability. Part II reviews the history of the Eleventh
Amendment, and places special emphasis on evidence that sheds light
on my interpretation of the Amendment as explanatory of Article III.
(resolving that the President should ascertain whether the states had ratified the amendment proposed by Congress "concerning the suability of States"); Proceedings of a Joint
Session of the New Hampshire General Court (Jan. 23, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
618, 618 (discussing the proposed alteration of the Constitution "respecting the suability of
a State"); Proceedings of the Delaware Senate (Jan. 10, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
614, 614 (expressing opposition to any "Plan that might tend to prevent the suability of a
State"); Letter from John Adams, President of the United States, to the United States Congress (Jan. 8, 1798), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 637, 637-38 (proclaiming the Eleventh
Amendment to be legally effective and describing the Amendment as one relating to "the
Suability of States"). Members of Congress described the amendment in similar terms in
letters to their constituents and friends. See, e.g., Letter from Theodorus Bailey, U.S. Representative, to his Constituents (Jan. 22, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 618, 618 (reporting the consideration of amendments designed to prevent federal courts from
extending the Constitution's construction "to the suability of States by individuals"); Letter
from James Hillhouse, U.S. Representative, to Samuel Huntington, Governor of Connecticut (Mar. 5, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 623, 623 (reporting the vote on the resolution to amend the Constitution "so far as respects the suability of States"); Letter from
Zephaniah Swift, U.S. Representative, to David Daggett, Speaker of the Connecticut House
of Representatives (Mar. 5, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 624, 624 (discussing the
amendment "in respect of the Suability of States"). These usages followed those that had
appeared in the argument and opinions in the Chisholm case. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 469 (1793) (Jay, CJ.) (stating the question for decision as follows: "Is a State
suable by individual citizens of another State?"); id. at 428 (argument of Edmund Randolph for the plaintiff) (admitting that a state might be "suable in some actions" but not in

all).
Admittedly, the suability usage was not universal. Newspaper dispatches from the Federalist ranks tended to speak more in terms of suability; those from the Anti-Federalists, in
terms of sovereignty. Compare "Veritas," Essay, COLUMBIAN CENlINEL (Boston), July 17,
1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 390, 390 (noting that the question "whether a
State is suable or not, will speedily arrest the attention of the public"), with Essay, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 16, 1793, reprinted in5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 415, 415 (describing
the issue of the suability of the state as relating to the "sovereignty, not only of this, but of
every State in the Union"), and"Democrat," Essay, MAss. MERCURY, July 23, 1793, reprinted in5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 393, 393 (stating that Article III of the Constitution "destroys the
sOvEREiGNTy of the states, and renders them no more than corporate towns").
44 See infra notes 293, 452 and accompanying text.

19981

STATE SUABILITY

1281

Part III considers the implications of this new explanatory account of
the Eleventh Amendment in light of recent scholarly and judicial developments. In the final analysis, this Article's explanatory account of
the state suability provisions of the Eleventh Amendment strongly supports revisionist challenges to the sweeping immunity of Hans and
Seminole Tribe.
I
THE RoLE OF PuBLic DEBTS AND GovERNmENT SuABmriy IN
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

In this Part, I first review the origins of the debts that so concerned the Founding Generation-debts that arose when the government(s) of the United States used the printing press to finance the
war for independence from Great Britain. Next, I consider the text
and structure of the Constitution in light of the government accountability issues that these accumulated obligations raise. In brief, the
Framers shifted responsibility for this debt from the states to the federal government and, with that shift, adopted rules meant to secure
state fiscal responsibility. Not surprisingly, the rules of government
suability in Article III track these substantive decisions regarding the
locus of responsibility for public debts. Thus, Article mll mandates a
federal forum for federal-law claims against State parties, but leaves
Congress a measure of discretion as to controversies involving the
United States. Moreover, the Framers did nothing to secure the enforceability of state obligations that predated the Constitution.
A. Public Debts and Nationalist Financial Policy
When Alexander Hamilton became Secretary of the Treasury, his
firstjob was to prepare a report on public credit. 45 The resulting document, issued in January 1790, represented less a novel disquisition
on public finance than a refinement of the fiscal policies that he and
others had pursued on behalf of the Nationalist Party throughout the
1780s. Nationalists had long viewed the public debt as a potential
source of national adhesion. They cited its existence to justify a national taxing authority, they sought to fund it through the issuance of
new securities that would provide a circulating medium, and they intended to provide for its eventual retirement at or near par in order to
attract the support of the wealthy public securities holders to the new
45 For good accounts of Hamilton's appointment as the first Secretary of the Treasury
under the new Constitution, and of his work in preparing the well-known Report Relative to a
Provisionfor the Support of Public Credit, dated January 9, 1790, see E. JAMEs FERGUSON, THE
POWER OF THE PURSE: A HIsToRY OF AMERICAN PUBUC FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 292-96 (1961);
FoRREsr McDONALD, ALEXANDER HAmiLTON: A BIOGRAPHY 143-88 (1979).
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federal government.4 6 All these policies appeared as part of the financial policy that Robert Morris developed in 1782 as the nation's first
47
financial officer, and all reappeared in Hamilton's report in 1790.

These policies had created controversy under the Articles of Confederation for a variety of reasons. Many worried that "high" or "specie" finance in the Morris model would expand the size and influence
of the national government at the expense of the states. These agrarian finance supporters preferred inflationary policies that simplified
the payment of their private debts and their taxes; agrarians saw full
repayment of public debts as likely to impose a stiff tax burden on the
yeomanry, and to benefit the speculators and "bloodsuckers"48 who
had paid less than par for their public securities and who would reap

46 Until 1780, the United States and the states themselves had attempted to finance
the Revolutionary War through the issuance of paper money, or "bills of credit" as they
were then known, and by borrowing from France, Spain, and Holland. When the paper
currency (including the infamous "continental") collapsed, Congress asked the states to
refrain from any further emissions, and issued assorted promissory notes to finance the
remainder of the war effort. See WiLIAM G. ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY. THE PUBLIC
DEBT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-12 (1983).

Robert Morris, the nation's first Superintendent of Finance, took office in 1781 and
immediately began to pursue what historians describe as "nationalist" financial policy.
One feature of Morris's policy was to secure a national tax or impost to provide a more
reliable source of funds for the national government. See id. at 15-18. That measure failed
in 1782, under the then-prevailing requirement of unanimity for amendments to the Articles of Confederation, when Rhode Island refused to consent to its adoption. See id. at 20.
A second feature of nationalist financial policy was the creation of a funded debt, one that
the government created through the issuance of interest-bearing securities that were circulated as a medium of exchange. See id. at 15. A third feature of the plan was to shift
responsibility for the public debt off the accounts of the states and onto the accounts of the
national government, in keeping with the notion that these debts would justify higher national tax rates, and would encourage public creditors and other wealthy members of society to support the central government. See id. at 15-16. Fourth, the nationalists believed
that Congress should "liquidate" its accounts with individuals by inspecting claims, verifying amounts, ascribing a specie value to them, and recording them as interest-bearing
obligations. See id.at 17.
47 For an overview of Hamilton's report, with its provision for a funded debt, see
McDONALD, supra note 45, at 152-71 (acknowledging Morris's influence and the example
of Great Britain in Hamilton's thinking about a funded public debt). For an account that
links Hamilton's vision to evolving federalist financial policy of the 1780s, see Janet A.
Riesman, Money, Credit, and FederalistPoliticalEconomy, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS

OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 154 (Richard Beeman et al.
eds., 1987) (characterizing Hamilton as "very much a man of the late eighteenth century"
in creating his Report on Public Credit).
48 Public discourse frequently included references to "bloodsuckers"-speculators in
public securities who were portrayed as having bought up the debt instruments at a deep
discount from the (more deserving) original owners. Cf FORREST McDoNALD, Novus
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION, at xi-xii (1985) (characterizing the term "bloodsuckers," used to describe traders in public securities, as a stock
phrase of the eighteenth century that revealed the Anti-Federalist political leanings of its
users).
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profits from redemption at par.4 9 Thus, financial policy split the new
Republic along the same fault line that would divide the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists in the debate over whether to ratify the
Constitution.
The debts themselves were staggering in size and fell into a variety of categories. First were the bills of credit or paper money that
Congress and the states had issued throughout the 1770s. Estimates
vary, but historians agree that the Continental Congress alone emitted
roughly $240 million in eleven different emissions between 1775 and
1780.50 The states added another $210 million in emissions, bringing

the total to approximately $450 million by 1779. 5 1 This paper money
depreciated rapidly and eventually became virtually worthless. Congress itself scaled back its "continentals" in 1780 at a 40:1 rate, but
even that massive devaluation failed to reflect the true value of the
paper. 52 Moreover, Congress never regarded these bills of credit as
creating a binding obligation, and thus never took steps to reestablish
the value of the currency; in fact, Hamilton's funding plan rated the
currency at 100:1-a devaluation tantamount to ultimate
53
repudiation.
49
One can briefly summarize the tenets of agrarian or currency finance as relying
upon the issuance of a paper currency or bills of credit, backed by a pledge of the public
faith. Redemption of paper money posed a problem for the states. One strategy was to
accept paper currency in payment of taxes, often at a "scaled" or sub-par value that reflected its (devalued) market value. Another was to accept this currency in the purchase of
public lands and property seized from British loyalists, again at reduced values. These
"agrarian" strategies relied upon the public domain to sink the emission; politicians were
loath to levy heavy taxes on the yeomanry to support specie redemption at par value. The
low-tax, sub-par repayment features of "agrarian" finance differ sharply from the high-tax,
at-par redemption that nationalist financial policies contemplated. For an overview of the
tenets of agrarian finance, see FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 3-24; MERRILLJENSEN, THE NEw
NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 37-43
(1950).
Habitual debtors preferred a paper currency because it had a tendency to depreciate
and thereby lessen the cost of repaying their debts. Creditors had an obvious reason to
oppose agrarian finance because they lost money when debtors repaid obligations with
(devalued) paper currency. Many states responded to the predictable refusal of creditors
to accept this money by promulgating tender laws, which made the currency legal tender
not only for the payment of taxes but also for the payment of all debts public and private,
and force laws, which threatened creditors with criminal sanctions for failure to accept the
tender of a paper currency. See generallyJENSEN, supra,at 41 (describing the end of paper
currency as a circulating medium and Congress's recommendation circa 1781 that the
states end their legal tender laws and retire their emissions of paper).
50
See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 3.
51
See Riesman, supra note 47, at 130.
52
According to leading historians, the real value of the continentals was closer to 75:1
than to the 40:1 figure that Congress chose. See FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 39-40; JENSEN,
supra note 49, at 40.
53 See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 50-51 (summarizing the classes of federal debt instruments that could be exchanged for new federal securities under the terms of the 1790
funding bill, and noting an exchange rate of 100:1 for bills of credit issued by Congress).
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Apart from issuing fiat money, Congress borrowed both at home
and abroad to finance the war effort. Congress treated these relatively
formal loans more seriously than its paper money, and thus strove to
make the interest payments that would uphold its continuing ability to
borrow. The primary foreign lenders-Holland, France, and Spainprovided roughly $11 million to the United States. 54 Several of the
states borrowed from foreign sources as well. On the home front, the
United States borrowed by issuing loan office certificates-relatively
formal instruments of indebtedness made payable to a specified
lender and bearing interest at a specified rate. 55 When it became impossible to service the interest on these certificates, Congress began to
issue interest-bearing "indents"-notes reflecting an obligation to pay
the value of interest due. 56 Because of the devaluation of the paper

money and the certificates, the Continental Army found it difficult to
purchase supplies in the field. In response, Congress experimented
briefly with in-kind collections; however, it soon authorized the Quartermaster and other federal officers to impress supplies from the local
citizenry and to "pay" with such assorted promissory notes as Quarter57
master certificates and Commissary notes.
As the war wound down, Congress began to assess the extent of its
accumulated indebtedness. In addition to the loan office certificates,
which amounted to roughly $11 million, Congress moved in 1782 to
settle its accounts with individuals. 58 Claims of all sorts against the
United States were either liquidated or reduced to a specie value and
recorded as interest-bearing debts, provided, of course, that the expenditures had been duly authorized by Congress and authenticated
to the satisfaction of inspectors. 59 Commissioners serving as claims
inspectors issued $3.7 million in interest-bearing "final settlement certificates. '60 Coupled with substantial settlements by the major government departments, the total consolidated debt settlement amounted
61
to roughly $16 million.
54 See id. at 57 (noting that Hamilton estimated the size of foreign debt at
$11,710,378.62 as of 1789).
55 For an overview of the issuance of loan office certificates as evidence of the United
States' indebtedness to individual creditors, see FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 35-40.
56 On the treatment of indents in Hamilton's funding plan, see McDoNALD, supra
note 45, at 147, 156.
57 On the use of impressment to finance the war and the issuance of Quartermaster
certificates and Commissary notes to "pay" for the goods taken, see FERGUSON, supra note
45, at 59-69.
58
For a description of the congressional decision in February 1782 to issue final setdement certificates in recognition of the "liquidated" (specie) value of the debts that the
nation owed to individuals, see FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 179-93.
59 See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 17; FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 179, 184-86.
60 ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 17; see FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 186.
61
See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 17.
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How Congress planned to pay this debt was far from clear. By
1782, after failing to secure amendments to the Articles of Confederation that would have authorized it to collect imposts on imported
goods, Congress limped along powerless to tax and dependent upon
the states to finance its operations through requisitions. 62 The states,
however, were generally reluctant to furnish supplies of hard money
to Congress; instead, they paid their requisitions through the submission of paper currency and by crediting themselves for the payment of
their citizens' individual claims against the federal government. For
example, many states chose to pay their own Continental Army
soldiers directly instead of furnishing the requisitions that would have
enabled Congress to pay.6 3 Similarly, many States began in the mid-

1780s to assume responsibility for retiring the national debt, thus
threatening to undermine the nationalist plan for using public debts
to join the nation more closely together. 64 If state assumption took
hold, creditors would look to the states (or so the Federalists feared)
as the primary taxing authority and the primary source of government
debt service. State primacy in fiscal matters would leave little for the
national Congress to do but disband.
Like Congress, the states had engaged in a variety of borrowing
tactics to finance their own operations during the war. In addition to
the emission of paper money, states borrowed both at home and
abroad and by issuing certificates. The largest portion of the state
debts consisted of certificates issued to the state regiments, or "lines,"
in the Continental Army.6 5 In theory, all of these state accounts

(which Hamilton later estimated at $25 million) were to be settled at
the conclusion of the war on a system of apportionment. 66 Congress
was expected to calculate the total cost of the war and apportion that
cost among the states in accordance with the rules prevailing under
the Articles of Confederation. 67 States would receive a credit against
62 For the classic critique of reliance upon requisitions, see THE FEDERALIST No. 30
(Alexander Hamilton). See also James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of
1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 539, 547 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (noting that "ordinary requisitions of Congress had only
displayed the inefficiency of the [authority] making them; none of the States having duly
complied with them, some having failed altogether or nearly so").
63 See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 19 (noting Morris's efforts to prevent the states
from paying their soldiers directly, and to require them to send in their requisitions to the
central Treasury for payment of the continental line).
64 For accounts of state assumption of the national debt in the 1780s, see FERGUSON,
supra note 45, at 220-41 (concluding that a plan for distribution of the debt to the states
would have resulted in creditors attaching themselves to state governments and would have
left "little reason" for Congress to claim enlarged powers).
65 See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 26.
66 See id. at 23-36.
67 The Articles of Confederation specified a rule of apportionment in accordance
with the "value of all land [including buildings and improvements] within each State."
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their apportioned share in the amount of their own payments toward
the war effort.68 At the end of the day, some states would owe the
general treasury and others would receive a rebate. This system of
final settlement created obvious incentives for the states to be relatively generous in approving their own citizens' claims, so long as the
69
state would receive credit for the resulting payments.
States responded in dramatically different ways to the pressures to
reduce or retire their debts. Massachusetts took the high, hard road
of specie finance, enacting high taxes on the yeomanry to pay off state
securities in full, and thereby benefiting the monied interests in Boston at the expense of agrarian interests in the western part of the
state.70 The result-Shays's Rebellion and the accompanying demand
for lower taxes by those in western Massachusetts-provided an im-

ARTS. OF CONFED.art. VIII. For a description of the congressional decision to switch from
this land-based apportionment scheme to one based on population, see JENSEN, supra note

49, at 74-75 (describing the adoption of the rule that called for the exclusion of two-fifths
of all "other persons" from the population count). The Constitution would follow the old
Congress in adopting a population-based apportionment system and in counting slaves as
three-fifths of a person. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
68
Under the Articles of Confederation, states were to receive credit at the general
treasury for "[a]ll charges of war" and "all other expenses that shall be incurred for the
common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled." ARTS. OF CONFED. art. VIII. Thus, to claim a credit, the states' expenditures had to
meet both the "general welfare" test and be "allowed" by Congress.
Ferguson reports that not all state expenditures met this dual test. Massachusetts offered unauthorized bounties to raise troops and spent money on naval defense and coastal
fortifications; Virginia sent campaigns into the old Northwest Territory under the leadership of George Rogers Clark without first obtaining congressional authority; and several
southern states incurred costs without preserving records adequate to support a credit at
the treasury. FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 204-07.
69 Virginia, for example, sought a liberalization of the rules of evidence to broaden
the prospect that its expenditures would be credited at the general treasury. SeeFERGUSON,
supra note 45, at 206-08, 211-12. The rules of equity (including the possibility of supporting recovery on the basis of sworn testimony rather than documentary evidence) for which
Virginia argued corresponded, interestingly, to the rules of equity that apparently governed individual money claims against the Commonwealth pursuant to its codification of a
proceeding known as the "petition of right." Virginia's "petition of right" provision permitted any person aggrieved by the administrative denial of a public claim to petition for
redress, either to the high court of chancery or to the general court, and directed that
"'such court shall proceed to do right thereon.'" James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and
the Right to Petition:Toward a FirstAmendment Right to PunuejudicialClaimsAgainst the Govern-

ment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 899, 939-40 (1997) (quoting the relevant statute, which appears in
9 WILLLM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECrION OF THE LAVS OF
VIRGINIA 536-40 (1821)).

SeegenerallyjENsEN, supranote 49, at 378 (describing the manner

in which Virginia entrusted the settlement of public claims to the state courts, and noting
that Virginia succeeded in persuading Congress to empower a board to approve such public claims without supporting documentary evidence and in accordance with "'the principles of general equity'") (quoting 32JouRNALS OF THE CONIINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789,
at 262-66 (Roscoe R.Hill ed., 1936) (records of May 7, 1787)).
70
See FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 245-47.
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portant impetus for the Philadelphia convention of 1787. 7 1 Rhode
Island, by contrast, adopted an agrarian financial policy to retire its
debts. It emitted a large sum of paper money in 1786, which
merchants and other creditors refused to accept following its inevitable loss of value. 72 The legislature responded by enacting force and
tender laws, compelling merchants to sell their wares for paper
money, and requiring creditors to accept the paper as legal tender. 73
Southern states used similar agrarian finance strategies to reduce
74
their existing debts.
Nationalists made much of these repudiations of state indebtedness and urged the creation of a more perfect union to address the
problem. As we shall see, the Framers of the Constitution responded
to these concerns by denying states the power to follow agrarian fiscal
policies in the future. 75 In addition, the Framers conferred broad fiscal powers on the federal government, enabling it to secure the repayment of the public debt on a national basis.7 6 Following the rejected
Morris plan of 1782, the Framers empowered the national government to impose a tax on imports and to collect revenue from other
sources. The transfer of broad taxing powers from the states to the
federal government raised (as it had in 1782) the possibility of federal
assumption of state debts. 7 7 Thus, we shall see that Hamilton's propo71 For a good account of Daniel Shays's Rebellion that emphasizes the conflict between the western debtor yeomanry and the eastern monied class, see DAVID P. SZATMARY,
SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRAIuAN INSURRECTION 19-36 (1980). On the im-

pact of the rebellion on the drive for a constitutional convention, and the thinking of the
delegates at Philadelphia, see RicHARD B. MoRIus, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789,
at 262-66 (1987).
Among other targets of debtor anger, Shays's Rebellion sought to close down the
court system, which was perceived as an instrument of debt-collection that served the interests of creditors and tax collectors. See SZATMARY, supra, at 33-36 (chronicling the courtordered sale of property and jailing of debtors that occurred during the credit squeeze of
the mid-1780s).
72
73

SeeJENsEN, supra note 49, at 323-24.
The emission of paper money in Rhode Island in 1786 differed from that of other

states both in its scope and with respect to the measures the legislature adopted to secure
the acceptance of devalued currency. See MORRIS, supra note 71, at 157-59 (noting these
distinctions and linking the Framers' view of the Rhode Island emission to the constitutional prohibitions against paper money and to Madison's famous disquisition on factional

strife in FederalistNo. 10).
74
75
76
77

See FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 245; JENSEN, supra note 49, at 319-23.
See infra Part I.B.

See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.

The debate over the national impost (or tax) that Congress proposed again in 1783
was linked in the minds of many in Congress to the plan by Robert Morris to have the
national government assume responsibility for state debts. See FERGUSON, supra note 45, at
209-10 (sketching Morris's plan for Congress to assume all state debts and to pay their cost
through the impost); JENSEN, supra note 49, at 74-75 (connecting the assumption of state
debts to the debate over the national impost). As we shall see, a similar linkage of taxation
and debt-management appeared in the debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
See infra Part I.B.
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sal to assume state debts as part of his plan to fund national debts in
1790 was a predictable outgrowth of the Constitution's adoption of
78
nationalist fiscal policies.
B.

Fiscal Policy at the Philadelphia Convention

To see the importance of public debts in the Framers' thinking
about the federal government's fiscal powers, one need look no further than Article I, which empowers Congress "To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
79
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
Although common defense and general welfare were important, an
equally important purpose of a national power to tax was to pay off
the accumulated debts of the United States. This recognition of priorities simply conformed to the fiscal reality confronting a nation with
an accumulated debt of some $40 million.8 0 With the war over, the
size of the government's bureaucracy remained at a relatively constant
level during the last years of the Articles of Confederation and the
first few years of the Washington administration. The bulk of national
tax revenues under the new Constitution went to pay interest on the
debt.81
The provision authorizing Congress to enact a national tax to pay
off the public debts did not stand alone, however, in the Framers'
thinking about fiscal policy. Article I expressly vests Congress with the
power "To borrow Money on the credit of the United States" and "To
coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof."8 2 Article I then proceeds to deprive the states of any power over national fiscal policy.
Section 10 specifically declares that the states shall not "coin Money;
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
78
See Riesman, supra note 47, at 154-55 (linking Hamilton's financial plan of 1790 to
those that Gouverneur Morris and Robert Morris had circulated earlier).
79
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1. For useful summaries of the origins of this provision,
see EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 10608 (1964); 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 407-70 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)

(reprinting various commentaries on, and interpretations of, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1).
80
See ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 41 (reporting that the domestic debt confronting

Hamilton amounted to $40 million, consisting of $27 million in principal and $13 million
in interest as represented by indents); McDoNALD, supra note 45, at 14748 (same). In

addition, Hamilton figured that the country owed over $11 million in foreign debts. See
supra note 46, at 57.
81 See Pfander, supra note 69, at 951 n.189 (contrasting annual expenditures of approximately $380,000 during the period 1785-1788, the last four years under the Articles of
Confederation, with annual expenditures that rose to $4-5 million under the first four
years of the Washington administration, and concluding that the cost of administration
remained roughly constant and that the major component of the increase in the size of the
budget went to service the debt).
82
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, 5.
ANDERSON,
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Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. '8 3 In these provisions, the Framers denied the states the power to follow agrarian fi84
nancial policies of the kind that Rhode Island had recently adopted.
But, similar prohibitions against federal tender laws, federal bills of
credit, and federal impairment of contracts were notably absent.8 5 In
keeping with the notion that future crises and necessities might impinge on the federal government's ability to honor its financial obligations in specie, the Constitution gives the federal government more
freedom than the states to both issue paper money and scale back its
86
debts.
These provisions (except the reference to debts in the taxing
power) were forward-looking; they had no relevance to the accumulated debts Congress and the states had incurred during the war. For
insight into the Convention's attitude toward existing debts, we must
examine the Engagements Clause of Article VI. As ultimately
adopted, the Clause declares that "[a]ll Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation. '8 7 Modem readers see this provision as one of mere
historical importance, inasmuch as it does no more than "leave the
[public] Creditors in statu quo."8 8 Still, the evolution of this provision
sheds light on the Framers' attitude toward the enforceability of ex83 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, ci. 1. See generallyDuMBAULD, supra note 79, at 218-23 (providing a history and interpretation of this clause).
84 On the desire of the Framers to suppress state emissions of paper money, see, THE
FEDERAusr No. 44, at 300 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that the
prohibition of bills of credit must "give pleasure to every citizen in proportion to his love of
justice," and recalling the "pestilent effects of paper money" under the Articles); Charles
Pinckney, Address to the South Carolina Ratifyring Convention (May 20, 1788), in 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-

333, 333 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia,J.B. Lippincott 1876) [hereinafter
ELIuoT's DEBATES] (characterizing Article I, Section 10 as the "soul of the Constitution").
85 The absence of such provisions may reflect in part the Framers' perception that the
regulation of private contracts lay within the scope of the states' retained police power over
internal matters, and that restrictions on the power of the federal government were unnecessary. I am indebted to Forrest McDonald for this suggestion.
86 Drafting history may undermine this argument. The Committee of Detail draft of
Article I would have explicitly empowered Congress to "borrow money, and emit bills on
the credit of the United States." 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 182. Some who participated
TION

in the debate believed that the Convention's decision to remove this provision effectively
foreclosed the possibility for a national paper currency. See 2 id.at 303, 308-10 (recounting
the debate on Gouverneur Morris's motion to strike the emission of bills of credit from
Article I). Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the issuance of paper currency. Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), overrulingHepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603 (1869); see DUMBAULD, supra note 79, at 109.
87
88

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
DUMBAULD, supra note 79,

marks of Mr. Langdon)).

at 441 (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 413 (re-
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isting obligations and toward the judicial role in any such
enforcement.
On the motion of John Rutledge (seconded by Elbridge Gerry,
the largest public security holder at the Philadelphia convention),89 a
Grand Committee was appointed on August 18 to "consider the necessity and expediency of the U[nited] States assuming all the State
debts."90 The Committee responded three days later with a provision
that would have empowered, but not required, the federal government to deal with existing obligations:
"The Legislature of the United-States shall have power to fulfil the
engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge as well the debts of the United States, as the debts incurred
by the several States during the late war, for the common defence
and general welfare." 91
This provision would have permitted the national government to discharge the debts of both the United States and the several states, suggesting the drafters' concern with federal assumption of state debts.
In addition, the provision would have carefully limited the scope of
federal assumption to debts incurred for the common defense and
general welfare. This limitation tracked contemporary congressional
policy and the language of the Articles of Confederation in its refusal
to honor claims for selfish, unapproved expenditures the states had
92
undertaken during the war.
Over the next four days, the Convention first adopted and then
abandoned a provision for mandatory payment of public debts. Appearing on August 22 on a motion by Gouverneur Morris, a vigorous
advocate of creditor interests, this provision declared that the "Legislature shall discharge the debts [and] fulfil the engagements (of the
U[nited] States)."'9 3 Three days later, on August 25, George Mason

objected to the mandatory character of the provision, noting that the
term "shall" might impose an obligation on the United States with
which it would be "impossible to comply. '9 4 Mason also feared that
the provision would "beget speculation," as stock jobbers bought securities from the "ignorant and distressed." 95 Anticipating the 1790
debate over "discrimination," Mason observed that it might prove
inexpedient to provide full payment to speculators, who "did not
stand on the same footing with the first Holders" of the securities. 9 6
89
90

See McDoNALD, supra note 30, at 105.
2 F.mRRAND, supra note 62, at 327.

91

2 id. at 352 (Aug. 21) (quoting the Grand Committee report).

92

See supra note 68.
2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 377.
2 id. at 412.
2 id. at 413.

93
94
95

96

2 id.
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Finally, Mason argued that the mandatory term "shall" might preclude
the government from retiring the debt through open market
purchases, and might revive the (previously devalued) "old continental paper. '9 7 These arguments proved quite persuasive, and ultimately
led to the adoption of language preserving the status quo.
The final version of the Engagements Clause, as quoted above, 98
incorporates both this permissive approach to debt repayment and
two important changes that the Committee of Style made.9 9 The first
change involved the placement of the Clause in the Constitution. Initially, the drafters grouped the Engagements Clause with the powers
of Congress in what later became Article I.100 Later, the Committee of
Style shifted the Engagements Clause into a new Article VI-a shift
that obscures but does not eliminate the connection between its
broad validation of past debts and Congress's power to pay them. 1 1
A second, more subtle change expanded the scope of valid existing debts, and thus broadened Congress's authority to assume all
the existing obligations of the state governments. As initially adopted,
the Engagements Clause referred to debts contracted "by or under
the authority of Cong[ressl."' 0 2 The reference to the authority of
Congress limited the scope of debt validity by making it clear that only
97

2 id.

98

See supratext accompanying note 87.

The Committee of Style, which was selected by ballot on September 8, included
William Samuel Johnson, Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, James Madison, and
Rufus King. See 2 FAuaRND, supra note 62, at 547, 553. The Committee reported a draft
Constitution on September 12. See 2 id. at 590-603.
100 Se DUMBAULD, supra note 79, at 106-07 & n.3, 440 n.5 (linking the Engagements
Clause to the taxing power).
101 The Committee of Style changes tend to obscure the connection by breaking the
direct, clause-specific linkage between the reference to "debts" in the Taxation Clause of
Article I and that in the Engagements Clause of Article VI. But the drafting history and the
language of the two provisions reestablish the link. Additional evidence of the connection
appears in Madison's subsequent arguments on the scope of the spending power:
September 4, the committee of eleven reported the following modification [quoting text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1,] thus retaining the
terms of the Article of Confederation, and covering, by the general term
"debts," those of the old Congress.
A special provision in this mode could not have been necessary for the
debts of the new Congress; for a power to provide money, and a power to
perform certain acts, of which money is the ordinary and appropriate
means, must of course carry with them a power to pay the expense of performing the acts.... [I]t is a fair presumption, from the course of the
varied propositions which have been noticed, that but for the old debts,
and their association with the terms "common defence and general welfare," the clause would have remained as reported in the first draught ....
Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 2 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 79, at 453, 454. Madison thus clearly saw the reference to
"debts" in the Taxation Clause as encompassing the existing debts from the then-recently
concluded war.
102 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 414 (Aug. 25).
99
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authorized state debts were "as valid" against the United States. The
Committee of Style neatly broadened the federal power to assume
state debts by changing the language to include all debts contracted
"before the adoption of this Constitution"-thereby capturing all state
03
and federal debts that the new Congress chose to recognize as valid.'
In the end, the Committee of Style (which included two ardent supporters of nationalist fiscal policy-Gouverneur Morris and Alexander
Hamilton) laid a sound constitutional foundation for the free assertion of congressional policy on the issue of state debt assumption.
To summarize, the Framers chose to give Congress broad powers
to deal with future fiscal crises and with the existing burdens of warrelated debts, both state and national. This congressional authority
included the power to collect taxes, to decide how and when to retire
federal debts, and to determine whether to assume state debts. With
these powers, coupled with the power to coin and borrow money,
Congress enjoyed broad control over fiscal policy as well as broad authority to repudiate or scale its debts free from constraints such as the
Contracts Clause. 10 4 In contrast, the states found themselves more
closely circumscribed. Their power to issue paper money had been
103
2 id. at 603 (Sept. 12). Initially, it may seem implausible that the Committee of
Style made substantive changes to the text of the Constitution, but scholars generally agree

that that is precisely what happened. See McDoNALD, supra note 48, at 272 (describing the

Committee of Style's role in adding the Contracts Clause to the list of federal restrictions
on state action in Article I, Section 10); see also 3 FARRND, supra note 62, at 379 (reporting
Albert Gallatin's charge that Gouverneur Morris changed the punctuation of the General
Welfare Clause in the Committee of Style, and would have succeeded in broadening Congress's powers but for the fact that Roger Sherman discovered the artifice and made the
necessary corrections). On the power of Congress to deal effectively with the accumulated
debts of the nation, see Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the New Constitution
(Sept. 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 275, 275 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1962) (noting that the Constitution would draw support from "the Creditors of the United
States" on the theory that "a general government possessing the means of doing it will pay
the debt of the Union").
104
The Convention's handling of a late motion by Elbridge Gerry further underscores
its reluctance to compel the new federal government to assume state debts or to fully pay
the existing debts of the United States. Madison's journal records the event as follows:
"[Mr.] Gerry entered into observations inculcating the importance of public faith, and the
propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing the obligation of contractsAlledging that Congress ought to be laid under the like prohibitions. [H] e made a motion
to that effect. He was not [seconded.]" 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 619 (Sept. 14). Oliver
Ellsworth later supplied the context in which Gerry's motion appeared and described the
Convention's reaction. Letter from "The Landholder" (Oliver Ellsworth) to Elbridge
Gerry (Dec. 24, 1787), in 3 id. at 170. Ellsworth described the motion as one
respecting the redemption of the old Continental Money-that it should
be placed upon a footing with other liquidated securities of the United
States. As Mr. Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large quantities of this
species of paper, his motion appeared to be founded in ...barefaced selfishness and injustice ....

3 id. at 171. Ellsworth also accused Gerry of refusing to sign and opposing ratification of
the Constitution out of rage at the Convention's rejection of his motion. 3 id. at 171-72.
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curtailed, as was their power to enact tender laws and laws impairing
the obligation of contracts. Importantly, though, these restrictions
would take effect only upon ratification of the Constitution, and
would control the states' actions only after that date. Even though the
Convention briefly considered mandating the payment of existing
debts, the proposed language would have required Congress, and not
the states, to make the payments. In effect, the Constitution left the
states free to deal with their existing obligations in accordance with
local perceptions of political expediency.
C.

The Relevance of the Constitution's Transitional Provisions

The Constitution's two transitional provisions-the Ratification
Clause of Article VII and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI-help to
confirm that the Framers did not intend to impose new federal restrictions on the states' ability to deal with their own creditors in their own
way, at least with respect to existing obligations. Together, the two
provisions clearly illustrate that the new federal restrictions on the
states' power would not become effective until after the states had ratified the Constitution by a vote at the convention.
First, the Ratification Clause sets out the rule governing the effective date of the new Constitution. It provides that "[t] he Ratification
of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same."' 0 5
By its terms, then, the Ratification Clause makes clear that the constitutional limits in Article I, Section 10 were to take effect on the date of
the ninth ratification (or, for such subsequent ratifiers as North Carolina and Rhode Island, on the date of their accession).106 Congress
adopted exactly that interpretation of the Clause. Following its receipt on July 2, 1788, of the news that New Hampshire had become
the ninth state to ratify, the old Congress immediately created a committee to "report an Act to Congress for putting the said constitution
into operation in pursuance of the resolutions of the late federal Convention."' 0 7 Subsequent acts of Congress called upon the states to
choose their electors for the presidency, and specified the date of the
President's election, and the date and place for the meeting of the
new federal Congress-March 4, 1789, in New York, New York.' 0 8
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
106 For an exceptionally rich account of the "bandwagon" process of ratification that
this nine-state rule touched off, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding,62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475, 525-37 (1995). On the initial refusal of North Carolina
and Rhode Island to ratify, see id. at 537-39.
105

107

2 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

1786-1870, at 161 (Washington, Department of State 1894).
108 For a summary of this legislation, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKmTcRK, THE AGE
OF FEDERALISM 32-35 (1993) (noting the importance of the old Congress in lending legiti-
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Thus, the new system took effect only after completion of ratification
and organization of a new government.
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI confirms the message of the
Ratification Clause, that the new constitutional restrictions would
bind the states only after ratification:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
or Laws of any State
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
10 9
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Supremacy Clause accomplishes the important and celebrated
goals of defining the scope of the "supreme Law," and of declaring
that law binding upon state judges, who were expected to hear federal
cases under the terms of the Madisonian compromise. Less obviously,
the Clause addresses in technical and carefully chosen terms the extent to which the old laws of the Articles of Confederation regime
were to bind the states and the federal government under the new
Constitution. The Clause's function in governing the transition between the old and the new systems offers important insight into the
nature of the Framers' attitude toward the enforceability in federal
court of the states' existing obligations to public creditors.
We can best appreciate the transitional function of the
Supremacy Clause by recalling the nature of the constitutional regime
that preceded the Constitution. Under the Articles of Confederation,
the states "enter[ed] into a firm league of friendship with each other"
for purposes of common defense," 0 but only after declaring that each
state was to retain its "sovereignty, freedom and independence," except to the extent of any powers "expressly delegated to the United
States.""' States were obliged, by the terms of the "supremacy clause"
macy to the new government during the transition from the Articles to the Constitution);
JULIUS GOEBELJR., I HisToRY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 413-14 (1971).
Lawmaking under the new Constitution did not commence untilJune 1, 1789, when Congress adopted legislation implementing the oath requirement of Article VI. See Act ofJune
1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23.
109
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2. Shortly after the delegates agreed to shift from a congressional to ajudicial negative on state laws, they adopted the Supremacy Clause as a vehicle
for securing the enforcement of federal rights in state courts. For accounts linking the
Supremacy Clause to the adoption of a judicial negative, see DUMBAULD, supra note 79, at
443-44; Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate theJurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HA~v. L. REv. 17,
46-49 (1981). See als JACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

173 (1996) (concluding that, afterJuly 17, the Framers had

decided that the authority of the national government would depend upon judicial enforcement against the states).
110
ARTS. OF CONFED. art. III.
I1'
Id. art. II.
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of the Articles, to "abide by the determinations of the United States in
Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are
submitted to them." 1 2 But as a practical matter, the confederation
submitted few items to Congress for determination, and the determinations made were notjudicially enforceable. Courts of the union did
not exist (except to hear appeals in prize cases and to settle boundary
disputes), and Congress's legislative initiatives often took effect only
upon the passage of local laws. 113 Congress did have power over war
and peace, and the explicit power to enter into treaties and alliances. 114 But many of the Framers expressed frustration with the
states' failure to abide by and give effect to the admittedly binding
terms of these alliances, particularly the 1783 Treaty with Great
Britain.11 5
Read against this backdrop, the Supremacy Clause of 1787 defines in relatively clear terms which federal laws were to be enforced
following ratification of the new Constitution. 1 6 First in the descrip112 Id. art. XIII.
113 For a useful summary of the nature of the judicial power under the Articles of
Confederation, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalilm, 79 VA. L. REv.
1957, 1967-71 (1993). For an account of prize jurisdiction, see HENRYJ. BOURGUiGNON,
THE FiRsr FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-

TION, 1775-1787 (1977).
114 SeeAiRTs. OF CONFED. art. IX ("The United States in Congress assembled, shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war ... of sending
and receiving ambassadors- [and of] entering into treaties and alliances ....").
115 For an account of the Framers' concern with infractions of the Treaty of 1783, see
Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1899-902.
116 My discussion here recalls an old debate between Professors William Crosskey and
Raoul Berger over what might be called the temporal or transitional character of the
Supremacy Clause. Crosskey sought to refute the claim that the Supremacy Clause lent
support to the doctrine ofjudicial review by declaring "supreme" only those laws "made in
pursuance" of the Constitution; he argued that the "in pursuance" phrasing conveyed a
temporal meaning to distinguish laws enacted under the Articles of Confederation from
those enacted under the new Constitution. 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLrriCs AND
THE CONsTrrrTION IN THE HIsTORY OF THE UNTED STATES 990-1002 (1953) (arguing from
text and drafting history that the Supremacy Clause was carefully framed to define the
"temporal cleavages" between federal laws on the one hand, which were binding only if
enacted after the Constitution took effect, and federal treaties on the other hand, which
had been binding under the Articles and would remain so under the new Constitution).
Berger disagreed, arguing that the "in pursuance" phrasing meant "within" the limits or
bounds of the new Constitution, and thus supported federal judges' power to ignore unconstitutional acts of Congress. RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 234-35
(1969) (agreeing that the Clause sought to secure "the 'desired retrospective application
...of treaties,'" but arguing that no such contingency existed with respect to laws, which
Congress was free to re-enact or not as it deemed expedient (quoting CROSSKEY, supra, at
998)).
For purposes of this Article, I am less concerned with the implications of this debate
for judicial review than with the apparent agreement between Crosskey and Berger that
issues of temporality informed the phrasing of the Supremacy Clause, and in particular
that the Framers must have intended old treaties but not old laws to remain binding under
the new regime. I make no claim that either Crosskey or Berger would subscribe to my
thesis, although Berger's assessment of the Eleventh Amendment parallels my own in some
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tion of the "supreme Law" comes "[t]his Constitution," a usage sufficiently definite to exclude any claim of supremacy for the old Articles
of Confederation. 117 Next come the "Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof." This description includes all
statutes that the new post-ratification Congress might choose to enact
(within constitutional limits), but it excludes laws that the old Congress had enacted under the aegis of the Articles of Confederation.
Finally, the Clause includes "all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States." The evident purpose of this provision was to include as "supreme Law" not only any
treaties adopted and ratified in the future, but also the existing Treaty
of 1783, which had been adopted not in pursuance of "[t] his Constitution," but "under the Authority of the United States" pursuant to the
11 8

old "constitution."

The phrasing of the Supremacy Clause thus confirms the Framers' expectation that the constitutional limitations placed upon the
states in Article I would take effect, if at all, only following ratification
of the document by the requisite nine states, and would apply prospectively to state actions taken after that date. The Clause makes its
prospective operation clear by ruling out supremacy for the old Articles of Confederation and for any laws that the old Congress had
passed; the continuity of these old rules of law would require either
their translation into binding law of the states themselves, or their reenactment by the post-ratification Congress. The one exception that
proves the rule of prospectivity relates to the Treaty of 1783.1 19 Even
there, the Supremacy Clause affirms the principle that new rules of
respects. E.g., id. at 326-28 (criticizing the Court's expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment along lines the diversity critics later adopted).
117 For examples of instances in which contemporaries referred to the Articles of Confederation as a "constitution," see DUMBAULD, supra note 79, at 26-27.
118 The Supreme Court eventually adopted this view, holding that the retrospective
language of the treaty provision of the Supremacy Clause gave binding effect to treaties
concluded before the Constitution took effect, and thus rendered the Treaty of 1783 binding and enforceable. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
In light of its temporal function, the language of the treaty provision of the Supremacy
Clause may not bear the meaning ascribed to it by Justice Holmes in the famous case
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Holmes distinguished the (relatively broad)
treaty power of the national government from the (more narrow) lawmaking power of
Congress in part on the ground that the Supremacy Clause distinguished between treaties-supreme if "made under the authority of the United States"-and laws-"supreme
...only when made in pursuance of the Constitution." Id. at 433. To the extent that the
Framers used this language (authority vs. pursuance) to clarify a temporal distinction, they
may not have meant to distinguish the breadth of the two powers along the lines Holmes
suggested. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (making this point).
119 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 417 (reporting Madison's opinion that the addition
of the words, "or which shall be made" to the treaty provision of the Supremacy Clause was
meant "to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting,... as the words
inserted would refer to future treaties").

STATE SUABILITY

1998]

1297

law ought generally to apply prospectively. As we have seen, the
Treaty already had binding effect under the terms of the Articles of
Confederation; the Supremacy Clause simply carried that binding fea120
ture into the new regime.
Support for this temporal or transitional interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause appears in a variety of sources. First, the Articles of
Confederation had themselves defined the binding quality of obligations undertaken before the Articles became effective, and had
grouped those transitional assurances at the end of the document,
12 1
along with the Confederation's version of the Supremacy Clause.
The Constitution followed this arrangement by placing the Engagements Clause and the Supremacy Clause in succeeding clauses of Article VI, also near the end of the document. The textual and structural
similarity of the two sets of provisions lends further support to the
transitional interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. Second, James
Iredell's remarks to the North Carolina ratifying convention portrayed
the Supremacy Clause as simply securing the execution of the powers
conferred on the new federal government. 22 He continued: "It is saying no more than that, when we adopt the government, we will maintain and obey it." ' 123 Iredell's comments clearly reflect his expectation
that the Constitution would become effective only upon its adoption,
120

The same continuity appears to have been contemplated in connection with mat-

ters of admiralty and maritimejurisdiction. Under the Articles, Congress instituted a court
of appeals in cases of prize and capture that enjoyed final appellate jurisdiction over such
matters coming to it from state admiralty courts. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 113, at 112-

16. The Supreme Court later ruled in the case of Gideon Olmstead that decisions of the
prize court established the rights of the parties and remained valid and enforceable under
the new Constitution. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); see also
Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795) (enforcing an admiralty
judgment against the State of New Hampshire rendered by the national prize court under
the Articles of Confederation).
121 Article XII of the Articles of Confederation declared that "[a ] ll bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed and debts contracted by, or under the authority of Congress, before
the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be
deemed and considered as a charge against the United States." ARrs. OF CONFED. art. XII.
Article XIII declared that "[e]very State shall abide by the determinations of the United
States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted
to them." Id. art. XIII. The two provisions apparently seek to accomplish much the same
goal as their successors, the Engagements Clause and Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
the Constitution. Like the Engagements Clause, Article XII addresses the viability of debts
contracted "under the authority" of Congress "before" the effectiveness of the Confederation. Like the Supremacy Clause, Article XIII renders decisions of Congress taken within
the limits of its authority binding upon the states. That the two-step treatment in the Articles of Confederation evidently sought to provide transitional rules to govern the effectiveness of old obligations helps to confirm the transitional function of Article VI of the
Constitution.
122

See 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supranote 84, at 178 ("This clause is supposed to give too

much power, when, in fact, it only provides for the execution of those powers which are
already given in the foregoing articles.").
123

4 id. at 179.
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and apparently he was understood in those terms. Mr. Bloodworth,
the first speaker to respond, characterized the Supremacy Clause as
likely to destroy the state's existing tender laws and paper money. He
squarely presented the question of retrospectivity, which the convention debated at length. 124 I summarize those debates in Part I.E below; for now, I simply note that they arose from Iredell's
characterization of the Clause's prospective effect.
In the end, the rules of prospective applicability in the
Supremacy Clause point toward the same conclusion as that contemplated by the Engagements Clause, with which the Committee of Style
grouped it in Article VI of the Constitution. 12 5 By limiting supremacy
to "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws ...made in Pursuance thereof,"
the Supremacy Clause omits any binding effect for any of the laws of
Congress passed in the Articles of Confederation era. 126 This result
would prove inconvenient in some respects, and would require the
post-ratification Congress to reenact some laws that needed no repair,
such as those governing the Post Office. 127 But the Clause adroitly
sidestepped any argument that public creditors might make to enforce obligations of the United States in the new federal courts following ratification. The Supremacy Clause did not validate the laws that
supported those obligations, and the Engagements Clause declared
the obligations to be only "as valid . . .under this Constitution, as

under the Confederation." The Convention's decision to refrain from
mandating congressional payment of existing debts thus appears to
have left public creditors without any enforceable legal rights against
the post-ratification Congress.
The same conclusion would appear to follow, at least as a matter
of supreme federal law, with respect to the states' creditors. Under
the Articles, the states had been left free to emit bills of credit and to
borrow money on their own public faith. When Congress proposed to
limit the emission of paper money by the states in 1781, it could not
rely upon any constitutional authority of its own; instead, it passed a
resolution that sought to persuade the states to sink existing emissions
See 4 id. at 179-91.
125 Indeed, the Framers of Article VI appear to have followed the structure of the
Articles of Confederation in grouping a provision governing the validity of existing debts
124

with a provision governing the supremacy and binding effect of the Articles themselves. See
supra note 121.
126
By remaining silent as to the effect of congressional adjudications under the Articles, the Supremacy Clause leaves open the possibility that a future federal court might give
binding effect to the decisiong of the old court of appeals in cases of prize and capture,
and to those of Congress in boundary disputes between the states.
127
SeeAct of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70 (enacting that the regulations of the post
office "shall be the same as they last were under the resolutions and ordinances of the late
Congress").
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and to refrain from future ones. 128 Similarly, the Articles left the
states free to follow their own policies with respect to the payment of
public creditors; not surprisingly, those policies varied widely.129 Finally, the machinery of collection varied, with each state relying to a
greater or lesser degree on judicial and legislative modes of claims
determination.'3 0 Although the Supreme Court would eventually
3
construe the Constitution as depriving the states of this control,' ' it
did not threaten them with federally enforceable liability on their existing obligations; the prospective operation of the constitutional restrictions preserved state control of those matters. The only threat to
state control would come from the diverse-party provisions of Article
III.
D. Fiscal Policy and Article III's Provisions for Government
Suability
Sandwiched between the debate over payment of the war debts
and the debate over limitations on the states' power to emit bills of
credit, the Convention considered the judiciary provisions of Article
III. Not surprisingly, the terms of Article III that emerged from the
August 27-28 debates provide a mechanism for the judicial enforcement of State action limitations to which the delegates had agreed.
This mechanism was the provision in Article III declaring that the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over all cases "in which
a State shall be Party."' 32 By contrast, Article III contains no
mandatory provision for the adjudication of proceedings against the
United States. This distinction between the mandatory suability of the
states and the permissive suability of the United States (effectuated
through enabling legislation) parallels the Framers' decision to place
133
few constitutional restraints on Congress's fiscal authority.
Before examining the debates of August 27, we must first recall
the Convention's decisions about the nature of the judiciary power.
First, the Convention agreed without much dissension that the new
government should include a judicial branch with at least one
128
129

SeeJENSEN, supra note 49, at 41.

See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 (describing the reaction to these policies
in Massachusetts and Rhode Island).
130 See, e.g., supranote 69 (discussing Virginia).
131
See infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
132 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
2; see Pfander, supranote 13, at 598-640 (arguing that
the Court's originaljurisdiction lay at the center of the Framers' plan to secure the judicial
enforcement of the prohibitions on state action in Article I, Section 10).
133 See Pfander, supra note 69, at 950-52 (suggesting the outlines of this linkage between the suability provisions of Article III and the Framers' handling of war-related
debts).
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supreme court.13 4 Second, in the Madisonian compromise, the Framers agreed to refrain from mandating lower federal courts. This compromise meant that Congress could, if it chose, leave original
jurisdiction over many federal matters to the state courts, subject only
135
to appellate review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Third, the reliance upon state courts entailed in the Madisonian compromise gave rise to the adoption of the Supremacy Clause, which
required state judges to give effect to the paramount authority of the
Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States whenever
they conflicted with state law.136 Fourth, the Framers decided to give
the judiciary the responsibility for policing state compliance with federal restrictions. This judicial negative took the place of Madison's
proposed congressional negative, and it necessitated a provision for
federal jurisdiction over "all Cases ... arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws .... and Treaties [of the United States] "-tracking the
language of the Supremacy Clause. 137 Finally, the completion of the
judicial negative required an effective source of original jurisdiction
over suits brought against the states. Such a grant appeared in the
Article III provision mandating that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party. The
structure finally agreed upon thus secures an original docket on
which an individual could sue a state for overreaching the limits defined in Article I, Section 10, and elsewhere in the Constitution, laws,
138
and treaties of the United States.
Apart from the provisions empowering the Court to hear Stateparty cases arising under federal law, Article III contains a variety of
jurisdictional provisions that authorize federal courts to hear "controversies" involving State parties. The final Committee of Detail draft
included three such heads ofjurisdiction: "controversies between two
or more States," those "between a State and Citizens of another State,"
and those "between a State . . . and foreign States, citizens or subjects." 139 All these heads ofjurisdiction appear in the final version of
134

See Pfander, supra note 13, at 591 n.149 (noting widespread acceptance of the need

for a federal judiciary with one supreme court).

135
See id. at 592-94 (noting that the Madisonian compromise allowed Congress to decide whether to create inferior federal courts and so prevented the Framers from relying
upon the Court's appellate jurisdiction to secure state compliance with federal law).
136
See id. at 590-91 (collecting evidence that establishes a link between the Framers'
rejection of the congressional negative on state laws and the adoption of the Supremacy
Clause, requiring state courts to give effect to supreme federal law).
137 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Pfander, supranote 13, at 590 n.141, 591 (noting
Madison's support for a congressional negative on state laws and the Framers' eventual
adoption of the judicial negative as an alternative).
138
See id at 598-617 (arguing that the text of Article III provides for the Court to
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States in which a state appears as a party defendant).
139
2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 186.
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Article III, together with a provision authorizing jurisdiction over disputes "to which the United States shall be a Party.' 40 Although their
purpose remains somewhat obscure, the Framers may have intended
these "controversy" heads of jurisdiction to facilitate debt-collection
proceedings. For example, today, the provision for jurisdiction over
disputes between "two or more States" appears to be designed primarily for the resolution of boundary disputes between the states; indeed,
that has proven to be its most durable function throughout our history. 141 But at the time of its framing by the Committee of Detail, the
draft Constitution did not contemplate judicial cognizance of border
disputes, and thus must have had other kinds of controversies in
mind. 142 The contemplated disputes may have included the settlement of state accounts following the final accounting of Revolutionary
War costs. 143 Other State-party heads of "controversy" jurisdiction,

such as those between the states and foreign nations and foreign citizens, might also have been intended to facilitate the resolution of existing debt claims.' 4 4
The Framers' attitude toward the suability of the federal government appears to have differed materially from that toward the suabilU.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 312 (4th ed. 1996).
142 The Committee of Detail draft assigned to Congress authority over boundary disputes between states (as had the Articles of Confederation), and specifically barred the
federal courts from hearing interstate disputes "regard[ing] Territory orJurisdiction." See
Pfander, supra note 13, at 615 & n.232 (tracing the evolution of the interstate dispute
jurisdictional grant, and concluding that something other than boundary disputes must
have led to its initial inclusion in Article III's predecessor).
143
Under the Articles of Confederation, the debts incurred in fighting the Revolutionary War were to be totaled and allocated to the states for payment according to an apportionment scheme based on the value of real property in each state. ARTS. OF CONFED. art.
VIII. The resulting balances were to be defrayed not through any payment to or from the
United States itself, but through payments from debtor states directly to creditor states. See
FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 211 n.16 (noting that settlement of state accounts originally
had nothing to do with federal debts, and that interstate payments were to cancel final
balances). Only later, when Hamilton proposed both the federal assumption of state debts
and the final settlement of state accounts did the two issues of assumption and settlement
become linked in the politics of the 1790s. See i&Lat 306-25 (discussing the manner in
which Hamilton's report on public credit in 1790 triggered a political debate over assumption of state debts and settlement of state accounts, but emphasizing the distinction between the two questions).
144
States had borrowed a good deal of money from both foreign nations and foreign
nationals. In addition to the loans procured by the Continental Congress, Virginia borrowed from Caron de Beaumarchais of France; Maryland borrowed from the Dutch banking family Van Staphorst; and South Carolina borrowed from the Chevalier of
Luxembourg. Dating from the Revolutionary War, these debts were still in existence at the
time of the framing and later resulted in litigation against the states in question. Beaumarchais brought suit against Virginia in the state's own courts, see Commonwealth v. Beaumarchais, 7 Va. (3 Call) 107 (1801), and the Van Staphorsts and the Chevalier sued Maryland
and South Carolina, respectively, on the Supreme Court's original docket, see sources cited
infra notes 246, 251.
140
141
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ity of the states. Unlike the State-party matters that appeared in early
drafts of Article 111,145 the provision for federal courts to hear "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party" did not become
a part of Article III until August 27.146 As enacted, the provision differed significantly from Charles Pinckney's original proposal that the
federal courts should hear "all" controversies involving the United
States, and it appears likely that the Convention's modification of the
47
Engagements Clause helps to explain this change in terminology.
As noted above, George Mason had persuaded the Convention on August 25 to abandon a provision mandating federal payment of the
debts of the United States. 148 Having decided to preserve legislative
authority to manage the claims of public creditors, it made sense for
the Convention to authorize the judiciary to hear suits against the
United States as Congress might direct, but to refrain from inflexibly
mandating the exercise of such jurisdiction over every conceivable
claim. This desire to preserve congressional control over federal government suability may also have underlain the Convention's decision
to omit U.S.-party cases from the Supreme Court's original
149
jurisdiction.

145 Included in the final Committee of Detail draft were controversies between two or
more states, those between a state and the citizens of another state, and those between a
state and a foreign citizen or subject, framed in terms essentially identical to those in the
final version of Article III. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 186.
146 See Pfander, supra note 69, at 949-50 & n.185 (tracing the U.S.-party controversy
provision to a proposal Charles Pinckney made to the Convention on August 20, several
days after the Committee of Detail presented its final draft of Article III).
147 See id.
at 950 (noting the distinction between the "all" controversies phrasing Pinckney proposed and the omission of "all" from the final version of Article III).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
149 The Convention briefly considered the addition of U.S.-party cases to the Court's
mandatory original jurisdiction, but ultimately abandoned the idea and returned to an
original jurisdiction clause that included only State-party (and ambassador) cases. See
Pfander, supra note 13, at 626-27. It may be that the decision (on August 27) to abandon
this mandatory source ofjurisdiction over claims involving the United States reflected the
Convention's desire to preserve some measure of congressional control over the suability
of the federal government. Perhaps the Convention abandoned the mandatory language
of the Engagements Clause in order to adhere to the Framers' decision (on August 25) to
leave Congress to manage existing debts. See Pfander, supra note 69, at 952-53; cf Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-36 (1816) (suggesting a two-tiered account of
Article III that posited mandatoryjurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties, and permissive jurisdiction over the controversies defined in Article III
by reference to the parties; and suggesting that the permissive phrasing of the U.S.-party
controversy grant may have been meant to avoid the implication of a power "to take cognizance of original suits brought against the United States as defendants in their own
courts"); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView ofArticle 1U.Separatingthe Two Tiers ofFederal
Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. Rxv. 205 (1985) (distinguishing between federal question and admiralty cases and diverse-party controversies, and arguing that Article III requires Congress to
vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over the former but gives Congress discretion over
the latter).
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In the end, the Convention gave the Court original jurisdiction
over State-party cases but excluded a similar grant for U.S.-party matters. As a consequence, the Court enjoyed jurisdiction over all cases
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States
brought by or against a state, and permissive jurisdiction over any
claim involving the United States as a party. This distinction in treatment did not mean that the Framers left the federal government free
of legal constraints. To the contrary, it was assumed that the federal
government would invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the
course of executing federal laws, and that the targets of these proceedings would challenge the legality of federal action as a defense to such
enforcement. 150 Similarly, suits against federal officers were expected
to provide a method of securing ajudicial determination of the legality of much executive action. 15 1 All such matters would come within
the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court, but would not necessarily appear as coercive suits brought against the United States as a party
defendant on the Court's original docket.
Although federal jurisdiction over State-party proceedings looks
broad in comparison to that over U.S.-party proceedings, state suability did not necessarily entail a judicial power to impose liability for
actions previously taken by a state in its capacity as an independent
sovereign under the Articles of Confederation. Unlike debt claims between private parties, which were routinely enforceable in debt or assumpsit actions, claims arising from contracts with the states had not
previously been thought to give rise to an ordinary right of action.
English practice recognized no original or routine right of action
against the Crown, but relied instead upon a series of extraordinary
proceedings, such as the petition of right, the monstrans de droit, and
the traverse of office. 152 Although the newly independent states had
codified some of the English procedure, many still required government contractors and other public claimants to submit petitions for a
legislative adjustment of their demands on the fisc. 1 53 In addition, the
150 See BERGER, supra note 116, at 49-81 (collecting statements the Framers made in
support of the existence ofjudicial review).
151 For a summary of the modes by which individuals might litigate a claim against the
federal government-by asserting a defense to government enforcement proceedings, by
instituting an affirmative claim against a government officer, and by instituting an application for one of the prerogative writs-see Pfander, supra note 69, at 948-49, 966-70.
152 For an overview of the modes of securing government accountability in Blackstone's England, see Pfander, supranote 69, at 909-26 (describing practice upon the petition of right, the monstrans de droi4 the traverse of office, scirefacias, and the prerogative
writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto; and distinguishing the Crown's immunity in ordinary tort and contract proceedings from its routine
suability through extraordinary remedies available upon petition).
153 For an overview of the evolution of American practice, from colonial reliance upon
legislative determination of public claims to greater reliance by the newly independent
states upon judicial modes of claims determination, see id. at 934-45 (describing the influ-
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actual payment of funds from a state treasury typically required a for54
mal appropriation.1
The traditional inability of individuals to make routine debt and
property claims against the states, and the difficulties associated with
the execution of a money judgment against a recalcitrant state legislature, created profound uncertainties about the meaning of state suability under Article III. One could argue (as did Edmund Randolph
before both the Virginia ratifying convention and the Supreme Court
in Chisholm) that Article III empowered federal judges to fashion any
mode of proceeding necessary to protect the natural-law right of every
(diverse) plaintiff against the debtor states. 5 5 Alternatively, one
could argue that the grants of jurisdiction authorized the federal
courts to exercise a kind of arbitral jurisdiction over any claims that
the governmental entities chose to submit for resolution. Public creditors often agreed to arbitrate their disputes with debtor states both
before and after the framing of the Constitution, and at least some
Federalists explained the "controversy" heads of State-party jurisdiction as contemplating this type of dispute resolution upon consent of
the government entity. 156 In the absence of a definitive resolution of
this question in the Convention, the ratification debates would leave a
decisive mark on the country's understanding of the function of these
diverse-party state suability provisions.
E. The Anti-Federalist Attack on Jurisdiction over Retrospective
Claims Against the States
The possibility that the diverse-party heads of jurisdiction might
effect a retrospective change in the rules governing the states' ability
to manage their own fiscal operations first appeared in New York.
There, the arguments of "Brutus" on the retrospective enforcement of
public debts led to Alexander Hamilton's detailed and well-known response in FederalistNo. 81. Similar arguments on related matters arose
in the Virginia and North Carolina debates. In this Section, I will
trace their outlines and show that the basis on which the Framers rejected the Anti-Federalist argument of retrospective liability strongly
supports the thesis of this Article.
ence of separation-of-powers thinking in the decision of the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to create ajudicial mode of determining claims against the state).
154 See id. at 940 n.144 (noting that both the English Parliament and the Virginia Assembly retained control over the appropriation of funds to pay judgments rendered by way
of petitions of right). But see id at 1013 (reporting that four states at one time or another
"treated... judicial decree[s] as a sufficient warrant for the payment of money from the

treasury").
155 See infra text accompanying notes 197-98.
156

See infra notes 477-81.
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Brutus's argument is significant both because it offers perhaps
the most cogent theory of retrospective liability and because it inspired a passage in The FederalistPapersthat has become a central text
in modem debates over the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
157
Writing in February 1788, Brutus made several important points.
First, he identified the state-citizen grant as the vehicle by which a
nonresident was likely to invoke federal court jurisdiction, suggesting
that he believed that suits to enforce existing state obligations would
present no federal question. Second, he assumed that the state contracts were legally binding instruments that would become enforceable merely through the creation of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Finally, noting that Article III confers original jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court in State-party matters, Brutus described individuals
commencing the actions he fears in the supreme court of the general
government.
Hamilton responded by attacking Brutus's assumption that the
grant ofjurisdiction over matters of pre-existing obligation would necBrutus's thirteenth essay appeared in the New York Journalon February 21, 1788:
I conceive the clause which extends the power of the judicial to controversies arising between a state and citizens of another state, improper in itself,
and will, in its exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive.
It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to
the suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no state ever submitted
to.
The states are now subject to no such actions. All contracts entered
into by individuals with states, were made upon the faith and credit of the
states; and the individuals never had in contemplation any compulsory
mode of obliging the government to fulfil its engagements.
The evil consequences that will flow from the exercise of this power,
will best appear by tracing it in its operation. The constitution does not
direct the mode in which an individual shall commence a suit against a
state or the manner in which the judgement of the court shall be carried
into execution, but it gives the legislature full power to pass all laws which
shall be proper and necessary for the purpose.... We must, therefore,
conclude, that the legislature will pass laws which will be effectual in this
head. An individual of one state will then have a legal remedy against a
state for any demand he may have against a state to which he does not
belong. Every state in the union is largely indebted to individuals. For the
payment of these debts they have given notes payable to the bearer. At least
this is the case in this state. Whenever a citizen of another state becomes
possessed of one of these notes, he may commence an action in the
supreme court of the general government; and I cannot see any way in
which he can be prevented from recovering....
And when the citizens of other states possess them, they may bring
suits against the state for them, and by this means, judgments and executions may be obtained against the state for the whole amount of the state
debt. It is certain the state, with the utmost exertions it can make, will not
be able to discharge the debt she owes, under a considerable number of
years ....
Essays ofBrutus, No. =T, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 173, 174 (Murray Dry ed., 1985) (footnote
omitted).
157
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essarily confer federal judicial power to enforce existing contracts
against the states. 158 Hamilton agreed with Brutus that the Court's
original docket provides a vehicle for the assertion of judicial claims
against the states; his digression began with a discussion of the originaljurisdiction. 159 He claimed, in essence, that the states enjoyed immunity from suit as an incident of their sovereignty under the Articles
of Confederation, and that the "plan of the convention" did not purport to waive that immunity. 60 He wrote that contracts between a
"nation" and an individual create "no right of action independent of
the sovereign will." 161 He refrained from explicitly discussing that

which Brutus himself had ignored: the possible impact of federal limitations on the states' power to retain these incidents of nationhood
into the future. Yet Hamilton's reference to the possible waiver of
state immunity in the "plan of the convention" reflected his explicit
recognition that the federal courts would have the authority to enter158

Hamilton wrote:

Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of
this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here, a supposition which has
excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds: It has been suggested that
an assignment of the public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for
the amount of those securities. A suggestion which the following considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the
general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the union.
Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must be
merely ideal.... A recurrence to the principles [of implied waiver of sovereign power discussed in an earlier paper] will satisfy us, that there is no
colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the adoption of that
plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own
way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of
good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign
will.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 27, at 548-49.
159 See Pfander, supra note 13, at 629-30.
160 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 27, at 549.
161 Id. In arguing that contracts between "a nation" and individuals have no compulsive force, Hamilton used language that may have temporal significance. He began his
discussion, after all, as a response to concern about the disposition of debts the states had
incurred under the Articles of Confederation. Because the states then enjoyed the status
of independent sovereigns, at least with respect to the disposition of their debts, his reference to national public faith fairly applies. Similarly, to the extent Hamilton stated a principle of enduring significance under the new Constitution, his affirmation of the immunity
of the "nation" seems appropriate in light of the broad fiscal powers that Article I confers
on the federal government. His reference to contracts with a "nation" does not clearly
apply to the situation the states were to occupy under the new Constitution.
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tain suits against the states to enforce the federal limits in Article J.162
On the whole, Hamilton responded to Brutus in terms that suggest, if
they do not explicitly adopt, a view that existing state debts lie beyond
the scope of the federal courts' role in enforcing the state restrictions
in the new Constitution.
A more explicit discussion of temporal and retroactivity issues
arose in ratification debates further to the south. North Carolina had
just floated a new emission of paper money;163 delegates to the Hillsborough Convention worried that a decision to ratify the Constitution
would threaten both the legality of the emission and their constituents' right to tender existing paper currency in payment of their debts
and taxes.' 64 These concerns first arose in discussions over the creation of a federal judiciary, which the Federalists had lauded as a bulwark against the dishonest laws that had impeded debt collection
during the 1780s. Matthew Locke, an Anti-Federalist who voted
against ratification, urged that paper money and tender laws, though

162 Id. Hamilton's reference to the waiver of immunity flowing from the "plan of the
convention" has earned an enduring place in modem Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (holding that foreign
nations may not sue states, notwithstanding the absence of any textual provision to that
effect in the Eleventh Amendment; describing the existence of certain "postulates which
limit and control," including the postulate that the states enjoy immunity from suit without
consent, absent a "'surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention'") (quoting
Hamilton in FederalistNo. 81).
The Court's use of this quotation to bolster its idea of an enduring principle of sovereign immunity takes Hamilton's terms out of context. In FederalistNo. 80, Hamilton had
expressly admitted the possibility of state suability:
The states, by the plan of the convention are prohibited from doing a vari-

ety of things; some of which are incompatible with the interests of the
union, and others with the principles of good government. The imposition
of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must
either be a direct negative on the state laws, or an authority in the federal
courts, to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of union.... The latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the former, and I presume will be most agreeable to the
states.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Here,
Hamilton argued that the Framers chose ajudicial negative on unlawful state action as the
mode of securing enforcement of the limits that appear in Article I, Section 10 (i.e., import duties and paper emissions). He specifically described these judicially enforceable
limits as part of the "plan of the convention." One can best understand FederalistNo. 81 as
a reference to Hamilton's admission in FederalistNo. 80 that the Constitution and Article III
contemplated state suability to enforce federal restrictions on the states as part of the plan
of the convention.
163
SeeJENSEN, supra note 49, at 319-20.
164 See4 ELLioT's DEBATES, supranote 84, at 169 (remarks of Mr. Locke); 4 id. at 173-74
(remarks of Mr. MacLaine); 4 id. at 183 (remarks of Mr. Davie).
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regrettable, were nonetheless justified by necessity.1 65 In response,
the Federalists acknowledged Locke's claim of necessity but denied
that the Constitution would affect existing currency. All the provisions of the Constitution that Locke feared were to have no retrospective effect.
Archibald MacLaine was the first to sound themes that would recur as the Federalists scrambled to allay popular fears that ratification
would undermine the recent emission of paper money:
With respect to our public security and paper money, the apprehensions of gentlemen are groundless. I believe this Constitution cannot affect them at all. In the 10th section of the 1st article,
it is provided, among other restrictions, "that no state shall emit
bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in
payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." Now, sir, this has no retrospective view. It looks to futurity.

.

.

. But it is said that, on adoption, all debts contracted

heretofore must then be paid in gold or silver coin. I believe that, if
any gentleman will attend to the clause above recited, he will find
that it has no retrospective, but a prospective view. It does not look
back, but forward. It does not destroy the paper money which is
1 66
now actually made, but prevents us from making any more.
MacLaine thus made the claim that the prospective operation of the
new federal restrictions would leave all existing emissions and related
state laws intact.
This argument did not persuade the Anti-Federalists, however. In
the course of a discussion of the Supremacy Clause, Mr. Bloodworth
argued that supremacy would destroy all state laws in "competition"
with federal law, and would therefore restrict the force of North Carolina's tender laws. 167 MacLaine rejoined with his claim that any clause
limiting the states "cannot possibly have a retrospective view." Retrospectivity, he urged, would be "contrary to the universal principles of
jurisprudence ....unless [the constitutional provision] expressly provided that it shall."'1 68 William Davie, a North Carolina delegate to the
Philadelphia Convention, also reaffirmed the prospective character of
the prohibitions. Davie explained that the members of the Convention knew of the existence of paper money and knew that any provisions threatening a circulating medium would preclude ratification. 169
Since the events of the past could not be repaired, he said, the Fram165 4 id. at 169 (remarks of Mr. Locke) (admitting that tender laws and paper money
were not defensible as "good law" but insisting that "necessity... justified [such laws] in
some degree").
166 4 id. at 173-74 (remarks of Mr. MacLaine).
167 4 id. at 180 (remarks of Mr. Bloodworth).
168 4 id. at 181 (remarks of Mr. MacLaine).
169 4 id. at 183 (remarks of Mr. Davie).
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ers decided to "form some limitation to this great political evil" by
placing "bounds to this growing mischief.' u7 0 Because the Framers
"could not put an immediate end to it, [they] were content with
prohibiting its future increase, looking forward to its entire extinguishment" through future actions of the state. 17 1 Davie closed with
the now-familiar claim that the limits contemplated were to have no
"retrospective operation.' 72
73
The Federalists also claimed that the Ex Post Facto Clause
guaranteed the prospective character of all new federal restrictions by
prohibiting the new Congress from enacting retrospective laws. 174
However, as the Anti-Federalists were quick to point out, although
such a claim tended to bolster the argument of general prospectivity
for acts of Congress, it did little to address the meaning of the constitutional provisions themselves. One opponent of ratification wondered whether executions in federal court litigation were payable in
paper or specie; 175 another wondered whether citizens of North Carolina could tender its paper in payment of any direct taxes that Congress imposed. 176 James Iredell joined his Federalist colleagues in
arguing for a purely prospective interpretation of all relevant restric177
tions on state authority.

In Virginia, the opponents of ratification relied upon the Ex Post
Facto Clause to argue that the federal government would have to levy
exorbitant taxes to retire the continental debt. Patrick Henry argued
that the new Congress would have to pay all existing debts and obligations on a shilling-for-shilling basis because Congress lacked power
under the Ex Post Facto Clause to scale back the debt in light of depreciation. 178 George Mason urged that the taxes necessary to pay the
nominal value of the debts would "ruin our people.' 79 Mason and
Henry both characterized northern speculators, who were said to have
170

4 id. (remarks of Mr. Davie).

4 id. at 183 (remarks of Mr. Davie).
4 id. at 184 (remarks of Mr. Davie).
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
174 See, e.g., 4 ELLioT's DEBATES, supranote 84, at 185 (remarks of Mr. Iredell); 4 id. at
184 (remarks of Mr. Cabarrus).
175
4 id. 184-85 (remarks of Mr. Bloodworth).
4 id. at 188 (remarks of Mr. M'Dowall).
176
177 Iredell argued:
171
172

There is nothing in the Constitution which affects our present paper
money. It prohibits, for the future, the emitting of any, but it does not
interfere with the paper money now actually in circulation in several states.
There is an express clause which protects it. It provides that there shall be
no ex post facto law. This would be ex post facto, if the construction contended for were right ....
4 id. at 185 (remarks of Mr. Iredell).
178 3 id. at 471, 473-76 (remarks of Mr. Henry).
179 3 id. at 472-73 (remarks of Mr. Mason).
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purchased devalued continental paper, as the primary beneficiaries of
this scheme of high taxation and specie redemption. 8 0 Mason's
claims were somewhat disingenuous, for it was he who had successfully
urged (on similar grounds) a loosening of the language of the Engagements Clause to leave the new Congress with some freedom to
decide how to pay off existing debts. 18 1
Federalists met these arguments with a variety of responses.
Madison characterized the Engagements Clause (but not Mason's role
in its drafting) as preserving the status quo of the United States's obligations on its existing debts. He argued that, to the extent the debt
had lost value and had previously been scaled back, a rule preserving
the status quo would not in itself "increase the demands on the pub-

lic." 18 2 Edmund Randolph attacked Henry's reliance upon the Ex

Post Facto Clause, arguing that it applied only to criminal cases' 8 3-a

18 4
conclusion the Supreme Court later adopted in Calder v. BulL

Whatever the merits of the technical question, 18 5 Randolph's comments appear to be consistent with the spirit of the Convention's decision to refrain from imposing new federal limits on Congress's power
l8 6
to deal with the problem of the continental debts.
At the heart of the Federalist reply was the claim that the new
Article III courts would lack the power to enforce government obligations issued under the Articles of Confederation, because those obligations had been created without the expectation of legal
enforceability. George Nicholas made this point first, noting that contracts were only to be as valid under the new system as under the old:
"There is no law under the existing system which gives power to any
tribunal to enforce the payment of such claims. On the will of Congress alone the payment depends. The Constitution expressly says
that they shall be only as binding as under the present Confederation."'1 8 7 Randolph echoed this claim, emphasizing that "[t] here is no
tribunal to recur to by the old government. There is none in the new
for that purpose." 8 Evidently, Randolph and Nicholas both saw a
180
181

3 id. at 471-72 (remarks of Messrs. Henry and Mason).
See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
182
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 472 (remarks of Mr. Madison).
183
3 id. at 477-78 (remarks of Gov. Randolph).
184 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91, 397, 399 (1798).
185 Although the rule of Calderv. Bull remains good law-that the prohibition against
the central government's passage of ex post facto laws applies only to laws of a criminal,
not civil, character-that legal conclusion has been debated as a matter of history. Justice
William Johnson announced his dissent from Calerin 1827 and Professor William GrosskeyjoinedJohnson's opinion 130 years later. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
286 (1827) (Johnson, J.); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 415-16 (1829)
(Johnson, J.); 1 CRossKEY, supra note 116, at 351.
186 See supra notes 92-97, 104.
187

3 ELuoT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 476 (remarks of Mr. Nicholas).

188

3 id.
at 478 (remarks of Gov. Randolph).
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connection between the power of the new Congress to deal with the
existing debts as a matter of public faith under the Engagements
Clause, and the absence from Article Ill of a mandatory grant ofjurisdiction over U.S.-party claims. As Randolph concluded, the federal
judiciary would lack power to "intermeddle with those public claims
without violating the letter of the Constitution." 8 9 In effect, Randolph denied that the federal government was subject to suit in federal court for any of its existing obligations. The absence of an
existing right of action, and the generally prospective character of the
constitutional restrictions on Congress, meant that "[t] hose who have
190
this money must make application to Congress for payment."'
The same logic would seemingly apply to all suits and proceedings against the states to collect existing obligations. To understand
the debate on this issue, we must first recognize that the leading antagonists in Virginia agreed that the states were subject to suit as defendants on the Supreme Court's original docket. Federalists such as
Madison, Pendleton, and Randolph freely admitted this in their comments on Article Ill and in their explanation of the function of the
Court's original jurisdiction; Patrick Henry made similar arguments. 191 In addition, the debate in Virginia left little doubt that federal restrictions on the states were enforceable in suits brought against
the states as such. Madison conceded such suability in FederalistNo.

189 3 id (remarks of Gov. Randolph).
190 3 id. at 476 (remarks of Mr. Nicholas). As they would later do in connection with
the discussion of the suability of the states, Henry and Mason accused Randolph of perverting the clear meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause and of the U.S.-party provision of
Article III.
The worthy gentleman has told you that the United States can be plaintiffs,
but never defendants. If so, it stands on very unjust grounds. The United
States cannot be come at for any thing they may owe, but may get what is
due to them. There is therefore no reciprocity.
3 id. at 480 (remarks of Mr. Mason). Although Mason's argument of reciprocity may have
some superficial plausibility, Randolph ultimately has the better of the debate as it relates
to Article III. As to future obligations undertaken by the United States, federal jurisdiction
would attach to any action arising under the laws of the United States to enforce the obligations in accordance with their terms in federal court; Randolph later contended that
Congress should authorize suits against the federal government in such circumstances. See
Pfander, supranote 13, at 639 (quoting Randolph's report to Congress to this effect). But
as Nicholas and Randolph observed, no such judicially enforceable federal law applied to
existing continental debts, and as to them, the federal courts would have no law to enforce.
See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. The lack of reciprocity thus flowed from
the nature of the underlying legal regime and not from the terms of the jurisdictional
provision.
191 For a summary of the Virginia debate on the subject of the enforceability of federal

restrictions in suits brought against the states on the Court's original docket, see Pfander,
supra note 13, at 633-36 (citing comments by Madison, Pendileton, Randolph, and Henry).
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39, and he reiterated the point in his opening remarks to the Convention. 19 2 Pendleton held similar views. 193
Although the Virginia delegates accepted that Article III established a regime of state suability to secure prospective enforcement of
federal restrictions, there was no consensus about the suability implications that flowed from Article III's grant ofjurisdiction over controversies between a state and the citizens of another state or the citizens
or subjects of a foreign country. The Anti-Federalists, following the
line Brutus had taken in New York, argued that this grant ofjurisdiction threatened the states with new federal liability on their existing
obligations. 19 4 Henry echoed these themes in noting that Article III
referred to the states as parties and not as plaintiffs. 195
The Federalists responded in two ways. Madison and John Marshall took the absolute view that the state-citizen diversity head of jurisdiction was meant to authorize states to sue individuals and not the
other way around. 19 6 Randolph, meanwhile, took the position that
192 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 84, at 532
(remarks of Mr. Madison) (affirming that cases arising under the Constitution would em-

brace "causes of a federal nature" brought against the states to enforce constitutional
prohibitions in Article I, Section 10).
193 3 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 84, at 549 (remarks of Mr. Pendleton) (noting the
necessity of a tribunal to hear claims against the states as party defendants; arguing that
states may emit paper money or enact tender laws in violation of the federal principles of
the Constitution and thereby necessitate a recourse to the "jurisdiction in the federal judiciary, to stop its pernicious effects").
194
For instance, George Mason said:
Let gentlemen look at the westward. Claims respecting those lands, every
liquidated account, or other claim against this state, will be tried before the
federal court. Is not this disgraceful? Is this state to be brought to the bar
ofjustice like a delinquent individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be
arraigned like a culprit, or private offender?
3 id. at 526-27 (remarks of Mr. Mason).
195 3 id. at 543 (remarks of Mr. Henry).
196 Madison argued: "It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.
The only operation [the state-citizen jurisdiction grant] can have, is that, if a state should
wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court." 3 id. at
533 (remarks of Mr. Madison). Marshall argued:
It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged
before a court. . . . I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which
does not prevent its being plaintiff... If an individual has a just claim
against any particular state, is it to be presumed that, on application to its
legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction?
3 id. at 555-56 (remarks of Mr. Marshall).
The comments of both Madison and Marshall reveal a certain ambiguity as to whether
the speakers really believed that the federal courts would lack jurisdiction over such matters or that the courts would enjoy jurisdiction but lack any coercive law to apply to claims
against the states. The simple fact that states were not routinely suable in such matters at
the time Madison and Marshall spoke, coupled with the fact that the federal government
lacked constitutional authority over the extent of state suability on state-law matters in the
future, suggests that they could flatly deny state suability without clarifying whether they
based their view on the absence ofjurisdiction or on the absence of any federal law limit
on state immunity.
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the states were freely suable by diverse parties as a matter of natural
law, and were thus subject to suits to enforce pre-constitutional obligations-a position he would later successfully advocate as counsel to
Alexander Chisholm in the suit against the State of Georgia. 197 However, Randolph was the only Federalist in the Virginia debate to assert
that Article III's simple grant of jurisdiction would confer power on
the federal courts to entertain suits against the states on their existing
98
obligations.
The ratification debates thus tend to confirm several broad
themes of this Article. First, the debate in North Carolina clearly
reveals the Federalist attitude toward the prospective character of the
federal restrictions on state action in Article I, Section 10. Second,
the debate in Virginia reveals that these federal restrictions were to be
enforceable in suits brought against the states as such on the Supreme
Court's original docket. As a consequence, much of the controversy
centered on state suability as it related to existing obligations. In New
York, Hamilton argued that the state-citizen diversity grant would not
create a new federal right of action against the states, and in Virginia,
the Federalists may have relied upon similar arguments in denying
suability. Only Randolph and the Anti-Federalists Brutus, Mason, and
Henry believed or feared that the diversity grant created a right to
enforce existing obligations against the states.
II
Tmi ELEvENTH AMNDMENT As AN EXPLANATION OF
ARTILE III

Despite the Federalists' protestations, suits to enforce obligations
that the states had incurred before the ratification of the Constitution
197

Randolph made the following argument in favor of the suability of the states:

[A]ny doubt respecting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, and
not defendant, is taken away by the words where a state shall be a party. But it
is objected that this is retrospective in its nature. If thoroughly considered,
this objection will vanish. It is only to render valid and effective existing
claims, and secure that justice, ultimately, which is to be found in every
regular government.
3 id. at 573 (remarks of Gov. Randolph). Randolph thus admits the suability of states in
ordinary debt claims, and addresses the issue of retrospectivity by arguing that existing
claims against the states ought to be rendered valid and enforceable in accordance with
the provisions of natural justice. Justice Wilson relied on similar natural-law reasoning in
his opinion upholding state suability in Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-66 (1793) (Wilson, J.). See WILIAM R. CAsro, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPuBuc: THE CuiF
JUSTICESHIPS OFJOHNJAY AND OuvER EuswORTH 192-95 (1995) (describing Wilson's opinion in Chisholm as based on natural law and the "principles of general jurisprudence").
198 At least, no one did in Virginia. James Wilson took a position quite similar to Randolph's in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. See 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 84, at
491 (remarks of Mr. Wilson) (applauding the impartiality of the diversity grant in allowing
individual citizens to stand "on a just and equal footing" with the states with which they
have a controversy).
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soon appeared on the Supreme Court's original docket under section
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.199 In Chisholm v. Georgia,20 0 the Court
famously affirmed its authority to assert jurisdiction over such matters,
and the Eleventh Amendment followed in due course. 20 1 In this Part,
I contend that we can best understand the Eleventh Amendment as a
constitutional analogue to a relatively common form of eighteenth
century legislation known as the "explanatory" or "declaratory" statute. Like an explanatory statute, the explanatory Eleventh Amendment sought to clarify the meaning of Article III and to make that
meaning applicable to pending claims.
This Part first defines the explanatory statute by reference to
nineteenth century treatises on legislative interpretation, and then explores the checkered career of the explanatory statute in American
constitutional history. After showing that the explanatory statute remained a vital part of the American legislative arsenal at the time of
Chisholm, this Part considers a wide range of evidence that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to explain the true meaning of Article
III.
A.

An Introduction to the Use of Explanatory Statutes in the
Eighteenth Century

Although explanatory statutes thrived in the early American
world of legislative supremacy that predated the ratification of the
Constitution in 1788, they have largely disappeared from the repertoire of the modem American legislative assembly. Modem treatises
mention them in passing, if at all, and modem legislatures rarely enact them, at least in such terms. 202 To find a working definition, we
must turn to leading nineteenth century treatises on legislative interpretation. One treatise writer gave the following account:
A declaratory or expository statute is one passed with the purpose of
removing a doubt or ambiguity as to the state of the law, or to correct a construction deemed by the legislature to be erroneous. It
either declares what is, and has been, the rule of the common law
199 Section 13 provided that the Supreme Court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusivejurisdiction." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13,
1 Stat. 73, 80 (Judiciary Act of 1789). Although the precise scope of this grant of original
jurisdiction has been widely debated, scholars and judges generally agree that the provision at least confers jurisdiction on the Court to hear controversies between states and outof-state citizens and aliens. For a summary of the ambiguities, see Pfander, supranote 13,
at 640-42.
200
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
201
See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
202
See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

(1975) (omitting any discussion of declaratory or explanatory statutes).
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on a given point, or expounds the true meaning and intention of a
20 3
prior legislative act.

Other treatise writers of the period agree that expository or declaratory statutes provide one vehicle that legislative bodies may use to cor204
rect or clarify ambiguities in the law.
Explanatory or declaratory statutes look odd to modem eyes because they claim a role for legislative assemblies in the business of
interpreting or expounding upon the law. It was precisely this task of
exposition-of saying "what the law is"-that Chief Justice Marshall
famously claimed for the judicial branch in Marbury v. Madison,20 5 and
few today would dispute that claim. By Marshall's account, and under
the American doctrine of separation of powers on which it rests, the
legislature makes general laws for future application and the judiciary
applies and interprets those laws in the context of a concrete dis-

203

HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF

THE LAWs 370 (St. Paul, West 1896). After so defining the "declaratory or expository" statute, the writer explained the operation of such statutes in the following terms:
"It is a matter of frequent occurrence that the common law, or previous
statute law, on a particular subject, is found to be ambiguous and uncertain,
and that the legislature passes an act declaring what the common law is and
has been on that topic, or explaining the meaning of the language employed in the former act, and the inferences to be drawn from its terms. A
declaratory statute in effect promulgates a rule of construction or interpretation. Such laws are usually enacted in consequence of the establishment,
by the judicial department, of a settled doctrine in regard to an ambiguous
law. But the legislative exposition is not always in affirmance of the view
taken by the courts."
RL (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST LEGISLATION IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, AND AGAINST RETROACTIVE

AND Ex POST FACTO LAWS § 194, at 246-47 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1887)).
204 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 110 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 6th ed. 1890) ("'A declaratory statute is one which is passed in order
to put an end to a doubt as to what is the common law, or the meaning of another statute,
and which declares what it is and ever has been.'") (quoting Bouvm's LAW DICTIONARY); I
JAMES lNt'r, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW [517] (*456) n.(c) (photo. reprint 1989)
(O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873) (defining a declaratory act as an "act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage"); THEODORE SEDGWIC, A TREATISE ON THE RULES
WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw 253 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1857) (defining a "declaratory act" as "an act declaring the true intent of a previous act").

For definitions that treat the "curative" and "declaratory" act as synonymous, see G-A.
291, at 395 (Jersey City,

ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES §

Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1888) (defining curative or declaratory laws as "acts declaratory of

former statutes or rules of law").
205 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). In describing the judicial
function in terms of defining the meaning of the law as applied to a particular case, Marshall doubtless meant to distinguish between the forward-looking function of the legislature and the backward-looking function of the judiciary.
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pute. 20 6 Courts following this conception of the separation of powers
will ordinarily refuse to give effect to laws of a retrospective character,
and will resist attempts by legislative bodies to interfere with the final
disposition ofjudicial proceedings between private parties. Only two
Terms ago, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 20 7 the Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles, refusing to give effect to Congress's proposed creation of an equitable jurisdiction to reopen final judgments.
These familiar principles of separation of powers help to explain
why state and federal courts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries mounted a sustained and largely successful attack on
explanatory statutes. Where the statutes purported to explain away or
repeal existing law, American courts viewed them as improperly retrospective and simply irrelevant to the determination of which law applies to a particular case. In Ogden v. Blackledge,208 the Supreme Court
followed that course in refusing to give effect to an explanatory act the
State of North Carolina adopted in 1799. By its terms, the 1799 act
proposed to "explain an act passed in [1789];"209 it recited that
2 10
"doubts have been entertained" as to the meaning of the 1789 act;

and declared that the 1789 act "shall not be considered" a repeal of a
previously existing statute of limitations. 211 The Court studiously ignored the proffered explanatory act and held that the 1789 statute
had indeed removed the bar of limitations. The report of the case, if
not the Court's opinion, makes clear that separation of powers principles informed its decision to ignore the legislative explanation.2 1 2 Following (and in many instances anticipating) the Court's approach,
state courts around the country based their refusal to give effect to
explanatory statutes on the ground that legislative interpretation in-

21 3
vaded the province of the judiciary.

206 For a rich overview of early Federalist thinking about the differences between the
legislative and judicial functions, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of
Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CoRNeLL L. REV. 393 (1996).
207 514 U.S. 211, 219-25 (1995) (noting that the Framers abandoned the regime of
"legislative equity" that had characterized practice during the colonial period in favor of a
system of separation of powers that precludes Congress from exercising judicial power).
208 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804).
209
Id. at 276 n.
210 Id.
211
212

Id.

During oral argument, counsel argued against giving effect to the explanatory act
of 1799 in the following terms: "To declare what the law is, or has been, is ajudicial power;
to declare what the law shall be,is legislative. One of the fundamental principles of all our
governments is, that the legislative power shall be separated from the judicial." Id. at 277.
According to the reporter's note, "[t]he court stopped the counsel, observing that it was
unnecessary to argue that point." 1d. The one-paragraph opinion ofJustice Cushing studiously avoids reference to the Act of 1799, apparently on the ground that such a retrospective explanatory act could not affect the decision of the case. Id. at 279.
213 See Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Me. 28, 32-33 (1822) (refusing to adopt a retrospective view of a curative act, citing concerns that a retrospective application of the law would
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In deciding to challenge explanatory statutes, American judges
self-consciously abandoned the principles of English jurisprudence on
which such statutes were based. 2 14 Eighteenth century English decisions by Lord Mansfield and others created a presumption of legislative prospecivity,2 15 and treatises such as V'iner's Abridgment recounted
a studied reluctance to give broad effect to retrospective explanatory
statutes. 216 European thinkers, such as Locke and Montesquieu, gen"sanction an interference of one department of the government with another and expose
the citizens to dangers"); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 217 (1818) (describing a legislative act that granted a new trial to plaintiff as "retrospective" and "judicial"and refusing
to give it effect); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 501, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent,
CJ.) (noting that the act in question had been adopted after the events in litigation took
place, and after suit had been filed; considering whether the act could apply "as declaring
the interpretation of the former statutes for the direction of the courts;" and rejecting any
possibility that the legislature intended to provide "an exposition of the former acts for the
information and government of the courts" on the ground that it would "tak[e] cognizance of a judicial question"); Osborne v. Huger, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 179, 196-206 (1791)
(refusing on constitutional grounds to give retrospective effect to an act of the legislature);
Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 128 (Vt. 1825) (reviewing the limited characters of the legislative powers conferred in the state constitution, and concluding that "[s]o far as an act of
the legislature is retrospective, or ex post facto, it is not a prescribed rule of conduct" and
thus exceeds the legislative power); Turner v. Turner's Ex'x, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (Ct.
App. 1792) (Pendieton, PJ.) ("It is the business of legislators to make the laws; and of the
judges to expound them. [Although legislators may amend the law prospectively,] they
cannot prescribe a rule of construction, as to the past. For a legislative interpretation,
changing tiles founded upon existing statutes, would be... ex post facto .... oppressive
and contrary to the principles of the constitution."); cf. Den v. Goldtrap, 1 NJ.L. 315, 319
(1795) (refusing to give effect to a retrospective law on the ground that such an interpretation would be "highly penal," but containing no discussion of separation of powers).
214
One NewYorkjudge explained the disparate approaches of the English and American authorities:
In England, where there is no constitutional limit to the powers of Parliament, a declaratory law forms a new rule of decision, and is valid and binding upon the courts, not only as to cases which may subsequently occur, but
also as to pre-existing and vested rights. But even there the courts will not
give a statute a retrospective operation, so as to deprive a party of a vested
right, unless the language of the law is so plain and explicit as to render it
impossible to put any other construction upon it. In this country, where
the legislative power is limited by written constitutions, declaratory laws, so
far as they operate upon vested rights, can have no legal effect in depriving
an individual of his rights, or to change the rule of construction as to a preexisting law. Courts will treat such laws with all the respect which is due to
them as an expression of the opinions of the individual members of the
Legislature as to what the rule of law previously was. But beyond that they
can have no binding effect; and if the judge is satisfied the legislative construction is wrong, he is bound to disregard it.
Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige Ch. 338, 344-45 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). As the judge's comment reveals,
the rise of the written constitution largely explains the American rejection of explanatory
statutes on separation of powers grounds; this development represented a dramatic departure from the attitude that had developed across the Atlantic.
215
See, e.g., Couch v. Jeffries, 98 Eng. Rep. 290 (KLB. 1769) (Mansfield, C.J.) (presuming that Parliament did not intend the law in question to operate retrospectively where
such operation would deprive litigants of vested rights).
216
See 9 MATTvHz BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 256 (Philadelphia, T. &
J.W. Johnson 1852) ("An explanatory statute should be construed strictly and literally.");
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erally agreed that the legislature should adopt only prospective
laws.2 17 But the English authorities nonetheless recognized the "abso-

lute [and] despotic" power of Parliament (borrowing Blackstone's
phrase),218 and held that Parliament could alter the law retrospectively if it chose to do so. A clearly phrased statement of the law by
Parliament thus disposed of the matter, even in circumstances where
the retrospective application of a newly crafted rule would offend the
widespread regard for legislative prospectivity. To illustrate Parliamentary supremacy, Lord Coke, for example, identified a series of retrospective statutes, ranging from those that transferred real property
to those that legitimated an otherwise illegitimate child. 219 Blackstone seemingly accepted Coke's account on this point, emphasizing
the supremacy of Parliamentary authority not only in the making of
2 20
laws, but also in the confirming and expounding of laws.

Others have traced the origins of Parliamentary supremacy to the
status of Parliament as the highest court in England, 22 1 and have
shown that similar ideas made their way into the practice of the British
colonies of North America. 222 These ideas of legislative supremacy
flourished in the years following 1776, as state legislatures claimed the
fruits of their independence from the Crown. 223 But the leaning of
19 CHARLEs VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQurrY 517 (London, G.GJ. &J.

Robinson 1793) ("Statutes of explanationshall be construed only accordingto the words, and not
with any equity or intendment.).
217 For a summary of their views, see Pushaw, supra note 206, at 400-07 (tracing the
influence of Locke's and Montesquieu's ideas on Americans of the founding generation).
218
1 WILLIAM BLACS'TONE, COMMENTARIES *156.
219
See CHARLEs
HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SuPREMAcY 140-41 (Archon Books 1962) (1910) (quoting Coke's description of Parliament

as a court with power to "adjudge an Infant, or Minor of full age"; "[to attaint a man of
Treason after his death"; "[t]o naturalize a meer Alien and make him a Subject born";
"[to] bastard a child that by Law is legitimate"; "[tio legitimate one that is illegitimate, and
born before marriage absolutely"). In all these instances, Parliament exercised a power of
lawmaking in particular cases that would come to offend American notions of separation
of powers.
220 1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 218, at *156 (describing Parliament as possessing "sovereign and uncontrolable [sic] authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws").
221

See MCILWMAN, supra note 219, at 109-256.

222 On the tendency of the colonial assemblies to model themselves on the precedents
of Parliament, see MARY PATrERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 263 (1943) (noting "that parliament was a court and that the [colonial] assembly, being modelled on parliament, was to some degree a court also"). On legislative
supremacy in the early Republic, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPuBLc, 1776-1787, at 132-43 (1969) (describing the tendency of the first American state
constitutions to place both the executive and judicial branches in positions of dependency
on the legislature).
223 For an account of the manner in which the legislative excesses of the period following the Declaration of Independence helped to prepare the way for separation of powers
and an independent judiciary, see Pfander, supra note 69, at 934-45 (tracing the evolution
of the right to petition from a right to seek redress from legislatures to a right to seek a
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state governments in the direction of legislative supremacy did not
long appeal to the Founding Generation; they instituted reforms with
a series of new constitutions that recognized the sovereignty of the
people, 224 separated the powers of government, and sought to exclude the legislative assemblies from the exercise of judicial powers.
This distrust of legislative retrospectivity underlies a range of constitutional provisions, including those banning bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, and those that empower Congress to enact uniform
225
rules of naturalization and bankruptcy.

Ultimately, the constitutional rejection of legislative retrospectivity led to the extinction of the baldest sorts of explanatory statutes.
But in the 1780s and 1790s, and well into the nineteenth century,
these statutes remained relatively common features of the legislative
landscape. Like that which the Court studiously ignored in Ogden,
many of these explanatory statutes shared a series of common elements. First, they frequently included titles or descriptions containing
language of explanation, declaration, or construction.2 26 Second,
they often recited in a preamble or elsewhere that the existence of
doubt or confusion in the current state of the law necessitated a legislative fix.2 2 7 Third, they almost invariably proposed to operate retro-

spectively by providing a rule ofjudicial construction in the resolution
of past or pending cases. In many instances, the statutes declared that
a previous law shall (or shall not) be construed in a particular manner.2 2 8 Such statutes were relatively common during the 1770s and

judicial determination of claims against the state, and showing the influence of separation

of powers thinking on this evolution); Pushaw, supra note 206, at 407-35 (tracing the impact of separation of powers thinking on provisions in the Constitution).
224 See Amar, supra note 11, at 1448-62 (describing the theory of popular sovereignty
that underlies the Preamble's reference to the "People of the United States").
225 See Pfander, supra note 69, at 946.
226 See, e.g., Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 276 n. (1804) ("An act to
explain an act passed in [1789]"); Turner v. Turner's Ex'x, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 234 (Ct.
App. 1792) (reviewing an act of 1787 "to explain and amend the acts for preventingfraudulent
gifts of slaves").
227 See, e.g., Ogden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 276 n. (reciting that "doubts have been entertained" as to the proper interpretation of an earlier statute); Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 234
(noting that an act of 1787 recites passage of an act in 1758 and asserts that "decisions
made conformably to it ... will multiply the mischiefs it was intended to remedy").
228 See, e.g., Ogden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 276 n. (declaring that an act "shall not be
considered" a repeal of one enacted earlier); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7Johns. 477, 484 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1811) (quoting the statute at issue as one declaring that "nothing contained [in
earlier statutes] shall be so construed' to prevent the defendant from raising a particular
defense); Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 234-35 (quoting a statute enacting that an earlier act
"shall, from and after the passing of this act, be construed" as restricted); cf. Brunmswick v.
Litchfield, 2 Me. 28, 29 (1822) (curative act declared that certain marriages, previously
celebrated, "shall be deemed and taken, and are hereby declared to be good and valid in
law").
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1780s, and appeared on the books of the States of Georgia, 229 New
233
32
Jersey,23 0 Maryland, 28 ' and Virginia,2 among others.
229

See, e.g., An Act to amend, explain and continue the "Act for regulating the judici-

ary departments of this State," No. 438 (Dec. 9, 1790), reprinted in 2 THE FiRsT LAWs OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 422 (Michael Glazier, Inc., photo. reprint 1981) (1800) [hereinafter
FiRST LAWS OF GEORGIA]; An Act to explain an act, entitled, "An act to establish an academy
in the county of Chatham, and for vesting certain property in Selina countess dowager of
Huntingdon," No. 453 (Dec. 20, 1791), reprintedin 2 FIRST LA wS OF GEORGIA, supra, at 434,
435 ("Be it enacted... That the true intent and meaning of the said act was, and the same
shall be construed to have been, a vesting of the said Bethesda college ... in the said
Selina, in trust for benevolent and literary purposes, only during her natural life, and no
longer."). The Georgia legislature also passed a number of statutes explanatory of the
meaning of the state constitution. See, e.g., An Act to carry into effect the sixth section of
the fourth article of the constitution, touching the distribution of the intestate estates,
directing the manner of granting letters of administration, letters testamentary, and marriage licenses, No. 429 (Dec. 23, 1789), reprinted in I FiRsT LAWs OF GEORGIA, supra, at 414
(enacting into law what the legislature considered to be the "true construction" of a particular constitutional provision); An Act to explain the fifty-first article of the constitution,
respecting intestate estates; and also concerning marriages, No. 307 (Feb. 22, 1785), reprinted in 1 FiRsr LAws OF GEORGIA, supra, at 313 (employing similar language).
230
NewJersey sought to suppress intercourse between its own citizens and the subjects
and troops of the British Crown, and enacted several statutes to specify exactly the kind of
regulation it sought See An ACT to prevent the Subjects of this State from going into, or
coming out of, the Enemy's Lines, without Permissions or Passports, and for other Purposes therein mentioned (Oct. 8, 1778), reprintedin THE FiRsr LAws OF THE STATE OF NEw
JERSEY app. at 8 (Michael Glazier, Inc., photo. reprint 1981) (1784) [hereinafter FIRsT
LAws OF NEW JERsEY]; An ACT to explain and amend an Act, intitled An Ac t to prevent the
Subjects of this State from going into, or coming out of, the Enemy's Lines, without Permissions or Passports, and for other Purposes therein mentioned (Dec. 11, 1778), reprinted
in FiRST LAws OF NEW JERsEY, supra, app. at 11 (seeking to clarify the scope of the permission granted in the prior act to those acting under "passports"); A Supplement to the ACT,
intitled, An Act to explain and amend an ACT, intitled, An Act to prevent the Subjects of
this State from going into, or coming out of, the Enemy's Lines, without Permissions or
Passports, and for other Purposes therein mentioned (Dec. 25, 1779), repinted in FIRsT
LAws OF NEWJERSEY, supra, app. at 13 (further broadening and clarifying the scope of the
prohibition).
231
See, e.g., An Act directing the manner of suing public bonds, and to aid proceedings
in the several courts upon such bonds (session of Oct. 26, 1778, ch. 20), reprinted in THE
FIRsT LAws OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND (unpaginated) (Michael Glazier, Inc., photo. reprint 1981) (1787) [hereinafter FIRST LAWs OF MARYLAND] (reciting that "it is doubted
whether suits can be maintained upon administration, testamentary, sheriffs, and other
public bonds, in the name of the late proprietary, and it is also doubted whether suits now
depending on such bonds can be prosecuted to judgment;" and enacting "That all suits
now depending upon such bonds, shall and may be proceeded on to judgment and execution, in the name or names of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in the original writs mentioned"); A
Supplementary ACT to an act, entitled, An act for the amendment of the law (session of
Oct 26, 1778, ch. 22), reprinted in FiRST LAws OF MARYAND,, supra (reciting that "doubts
have been conceived.., whether persons under the age of twenty-one years are intended
to be bound by any deed or conveyance made and executed by the guardian or guardians
only of such persons under age;" and enacting that "persons under the age of twenty-one
years ... shall [by order of the court of chancery upon petition,] be bound and concluded
by any deed.., made.., by the guardian;" and further enacting "That all conveyances and
deeds, heretofore made by the guardian or guardians of any infant... shall and they are
hereby declared to be valid and effectual"); An ACT to explain and amend the act to settle
and adjust the accounts of the troops of this state in the service of the United States, and
for other purposes therein mentioned (session of May 10, 1781, ch. 20), reprinted in FIRST
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Despite these common features, explanatory statutes varied in
terms of how grossly they invaded existing rights and how badly they
offended the rule of law. At one extreme were statutes aimed less 'at
explaining existing law than at altering its application retrospectively.
The North Carolina "explanation" at issue in Ogden offers a good illustration of such extreme retrospecivity. 23 4 At the other extreme were

explanatory statutes that applied to situations of genuine uncertainty
or ambiguity, where legal rights had not become "vested" in the parlance of the day, either through the passage of time, the issuance of a
final judicial determination, or the creation of contract or property
interests in reliance on the existing order. In Maryland, for example,
the legislature explained that its creation of a "six-month" limitation
LAws OF MARYLAND, supra (seeking to clarify the intention of a prior statute that the pur-

chasers of confiscated British loyalist property were to make their first installment payment
in specie only, and thereafter were permitted to make payment through certificates of state
indebtedness).
232
See, e.g., An act for explaining and amending an act entitled An act for adjusting
and settling the titles of claimers to unpatented lands, under the present and former governments, previous to the establishment of the commonwealth's Land Office (session of
Oct. 4, 1779, ch. 27), reprinted in THE Frsr LAws OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 113 (Michael
Glazier, Inc., photo. reprint 1982) (1785) [hereinafter FIRST LAws OF VIRGINIA] (reciting
that "doubts have arisen concerning the manner of proving rights for military service,
under the proclamation of the King of Great Britain, in [1763], whereby great frauds may
be committed," and declaring that no person may obtain a warrant for military service
unless they produce to the land office a certificate with evidence of actual service or residence); An act to explain and amend the act for calling in and redeeming the money now
in circulation, and for emitting and funding new bills of credit according to the resolutions
of Congress of the 18th of March last (session of Oct. 16, 1780, ch. 1), reprinted in FiRsr
LAws OF VIRGINIA, supra, at 130 (reciting that "Whereas various constructions have been
made, and doubts have arisen, on several parts of the act.., and it is necessary that the
same should be explained and amended;" further reciting that "whereas the money emitted by an act of the last session... hath not been declared a legal tender, and it is politic
and expedient that the money so emitted should receive all due credit among the good
people of this commonwealth;" and enacting "that the money emitted by virtue of the said
act, shall be received and passed as a legal tender in discharge of all debts and contracts
whatsoever, so long as the same shall continue in circulation, except specific contracts
expressing the contrary").
233
North Carolina and South Carolina also passed similar acts of an explanatory nature. See, e.g., An Act to explain, amend and supply the Deficiencies of an Act passed last
Assembly at Hillsborough, entitled, An Act to regulate the Descent of real Estates, to do
away Entails, to make Provision for Widows and to prevent Frauds in the Execution of last
Wills and Testaments, as for directing how Deeds of Gifts and Bills of Sales of Slaves shall
be executed, authenticated and perpetuated (session of Oct. 22, 1784, ch. 10), reprinted in 2
THE FrsT LAWs OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 529 (Michael Glazier, Inc., photo. reprint 1984) (1791) (reciting that "[d]oubts have been suggested that the Law ... leaves it
at least uncertain whether Brothers of the Half-Blood shall be entitled to succeed to the
Inheritance in the same Manner as Sisters do where there is no Brother, nor the Issue of
any such"); An Act to explain and amend and Act, entitled, "an Act to incorporate Charleston, and to enlarge the Powers of the City Council," No. 1342 (Mar. 26, 1784), reprintedin 2
THE FrsT LAws oF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROUNA 346-47 (Michael Glazier, Inc., photo.
reprint 1981) (1790) (reciting that "doubts have arisen ... so far as relates to the power of
the Court of Wardens to commit for penalties and forfeitures").
234
See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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period meant six calendar months, rather than six lunar months, and
so helped to settle property rights that an unpredictable interpreta235
tion may have threatened.
Viewed from a modem perspective, the latter type of explanatory
statute does not appear to present troubling retrospectivity problems.
The Maryland calendar-month explanation appears especially benign,
particularly if one sets aside any cases that had produced a final judgment on the merits, and focuses on pending claims that seek to rely
upon the "lunar" theory. The plaintiffs in such pending cases do not
appear especially deserving, and probably do not enjoy any vested
rights. 23 6 Rather, their rights may have been viewed as inchoate and
therefore subject to legislative alteration until such time as they
vested. The same can be said of claimants who would attempt to take
advantage of other parties' technical failures in the registration, conveyance, or recordation of their property interests. Legislative confirmation of technically defective instruments through the passage of
explanatory acts may appear to undermine the "rights" of sharp practitioners, but such claimants have few equities on which to draw in
237
arguing for the application of black letter law.

235 See An ACT to explain the several acts of assembly heretofore made relative to the
enrollment of deeds (session of Nov. 8, 1779, ch. 10), reprinted in FIRsr LAWS OF MARYLAND,
supra note 231 (reciting that "Whereas doubts have arisen in some of the courts ofjustice
of this state, whether the time limited by laws heretofore made for the enrollment of deeds
and conveyances should be computed by lunar or calendar months;" and enacting "That in
all cases where the enrollment of deeds is directed by law to be made within six months
from the day of the date of the same deeds, the said months shall be deemed and taken,
and are hereby declared to be calendar months").
236
On the distinction between retrospective invasion of vested rights and permissible
curative statutes, James Kent wrote:
A retrospective statute, affecting and changing vested rights, is very generally considered, in this country, as founded on unconstitutional principles,
and consequently inoperative and void. But this doctrine is not understood
to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and
only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects, and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations.
1 KENT, supra note 204, at [515-16] (*455-56) (footnote omitted).
237
Nineteenth century decisions upholding retrospective legislation tend to emphasize the absence of an invasion of a vested right and the absence of equities favoring those
who would propose to benefit from the law as interpreted before its retroactive alteration.
See, e.g., Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 149-50 (1874) (refusing to permit a
woman who had participated in the sale of real property later to challenge the sale as a
violation of her right of dower; emphasizing that a retrospective curative act had eliminated any defect in the woman's surrender of her rights of dower; noting that the only
right taken away by the curative statute "is the right dishonestly to repudiate an honest
contract or conveyance to the injury of the other party;" concluding that the "vested right
is usually unattended with the slightest equity;" and upholding the curative act as accomplishing only "what a court of equity, if called upon, would have decreed").
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These examples reveal that explanatory statutes may have performed a legitimate function in cases of genuine uncertainty in the
state of the law, or where the legislature's definitive answer might help
to settle, rather than unsettle, the rights of many parties. State judges
would of course remain free, under evolving notions of judicial independence, to ignore explanatory statutes that were simply a guise for
improper legislative retrospectivity. Even today, legislatures occasionally rely upon retrospective statutes to explain the law, or to clarify or
cure problems that have arisen from unanticipated or troubling interpretations of the law.23 8 Indeed, the modem-day curative statute is a
direct descendant of the explanatory acts of the eighteenth and nine2 39
teenth centuries.
B.

The Eleventh Amendment as an "Explanatory" Amendment
to Article III

For a variety of reasons, I believe that the Eleventh Amendment
can best be understood as an amendment explanatory of the meaning
of Article III. This interpretation helps to account for the addition of
the words of construction "be construed to" to the text of the Amendment; words of construction were a hallmark of the explanatory statutes of the day. 240

Moreover, many accounts from the 1790s

acknowledge that the ambiguity of Article HI lent some support to the
Supreme Court's decision upholding state suability in Chisholm, the
decision that triggered the movement toward an Amendment. Explanatory amendments frequently sought to clarify such ambiguities
before the judiciary entered a final judgment.2 4 ' Finally, a review of
238

For a discussion of more recent instances of curative or remedial legislation, see W.

David Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL.

L. REv. 216, 238-44 (1960).
Retrospectivity may present federal questions under the Contracts Clause, the Due
239
Process Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. For a general discussion, see Charles B.
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HRuv. L.
REv. 692 (1960). On the Court's recent developments in the world ofjudicial and legislative retrospectivity, see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An EquilibriumApproach,
110 HARv. L. REv. 1055 (1997).

See supra note 228.
241 The drafters of the Eleventh Amendment succeeded to a large degree in preventing many of the docketed claims against the states from proceeding to a final judgment.
Although New York eventually paid the judgment obtained against it on behalf of John
Holt in the Oswald case, see 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 66-67, other states secured the dismissal of the claims against them on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 136
(describing the dismissal of Chisholm v. Georgia immediately after ratification); id. at 289
(describing the dismissal of Hollingsworth v. Virginia); id. at 369 (noting that the Supreme
Court "never did hear" the case of Vassall v. Massachusetts); cf. id. at 459 (reporting on the
jury verdict rendered in Cutting v. South Carolina,but noting that final judgment was never
entered on the verdict); DavidJ. Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendmen 72 No240

TRE DAME L. REv. 935, 958 (1997) (contending that the Court dismissed the case of Cutting

v. South Carolinaon the authority of the Eleventh Amendment).
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the historical record reveals that many of the leading figures in the
framing and ratification of the Amendment described the provision as
explanatory, as did the attorneys who contested its retrospective appli24 2
cation in Hollingsworth v. Virginia.
1. Retrospective Liability and the Impetus for a Constitutional
Response to Chisholm
In considering the threat that the Chisholm decision posed, we
should recall the nature of Hamilton's solution to the problem of the
accumulated Revolutionary War debts. 243 Although Hamilton's plan
encompassed all "liquidated" state debts, it did not provide for the
assumption of debts that the states had not yet paid or agreed to pay,
or of those they had disavowed. 244 Suits against the states on the
Court's original docket to enforce these disputed obligations thus
threatened the shaky equilibrium that Hamilton's funding and assumption plan had achieved. 24 5 In Van Staphorst v. Maryland, Dutch
banking brothers brought suit in 1791 to recover the interest and
principal due on a 1782 loan to the State of Maryland. 246 In Oswald v.
New York, the heirs of John Holt brought suit in 1791 to recover unpaid salary that the decedent had earned as the official printer of the
State of New York between 1777 and 1784.247 Similar state obligations

were at issue in the following cases: Chisholm, an action brought in
1792 to enforce Georgia's promise to pay for goods purchased during
the war;2 4 8 Hollingsworth, an action in equity brought in 1792 to recover compensation for Virginia's refusal in 1779 to recognize the Indiana Company's tite to a large tract of land in what is now West
Virginia; 2 49 Vassall v. Massachusetts, a bill in equity brought in 1793 to
obtain an accounting of the proceeds of property Massachusetts had
seized in 1782 from an absentee British loyalist;250 Cuttingv. South CarDall.) 378 (1798).

242

3 U.S. (3

243

See supra Part L.A-B.

See infra note 253.
245 This equilibrium was shaky because the citizens who owned few federal securities,
primarily those in the southern states, would face the burden of high taxation to pay the
benefits to relatively wealthy public creditors in the north and east. See FERGUSON, supra
note 45, at 183 (noting that the South had 38% of the population but owned substantially
less than that proportion of the debt).
246 Van Staphorstv. Maryland is unreported. A good account, along with a collection of
pleadings and occasional commentary, appears in 5 DHSG, supra note 3, at 7-56. See also
GOEBEL, supra note 108, at 723-24 (discussing Van Staphorst).
247
Oswald v. New York is unreported. A good account, along with a collection of pleadings, newspaper commentary, and legislative reactions, appears in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
57-126. See also GOEBEL, supra note 108, at 724-25 (discussing Oswald).
248
For a good overview of the Chisholmlitigation, see 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 127-273.
249
A thorough account of the Hollingsworthlitigation appears in 5 DHSG, supranote 3,
at 274-351.
250 Vassall v. Massachusettsis unreported. An account appears in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 352-449.
244
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olina, an action brought in 1795 to enforce the state's agreement to
pay for the use of a vessel chartered in 1780 from the Prince of Luxembourg for use in cruising against British shipping;25 1 and Moultrie v.
Georgia,a bill in equity filed in 1796 seeking specific performance of a
1789 Georgia statute providing for the sale of the infamous Yazoo
25 2
lands to the South Carolina Yazoo Company.
These proceedings resembled one another in three respects: they
apparently invoked the Court's jurisdiction over controversies between a State and diverse parties; with the exception of Moultrie, they
arose from state action that predated the Constitution; and they involved debts for which the states would receive no credit in the final
accounting at the central treasury.25 3 They thus presented questions
similar to those with which the constitutional conventions of New
York, North Carolina, and Virginia had struggled in considering
whether the federal courts would have authority to impose liability on
the states for the wide variety of their pre-constitutional obligations.
As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists had expressed their fears about
this new federal liability, and the Federalists had attempted to deny

251
Cuttingv. South Carolinais unreported. An account appears in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 450-95.
252 Moultrie v. Georgia is unreported. An account appears in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
496-596.
253 Under the terms of Hamilton's plan for the assumption of state debts, creditors
were entitled to swap their state certificates of indebtedness for federal securities, but only
if the state security bore a date prior to January 1, 1790. See infra text accompanying notes
365-67. State indebtedness established after 1790 in litigation with the states would not
have been subject to federal assumption. Such obligations might conceivably have resulted
in a credit in the final settlement of state accounts, which was not completed untilJune 29,
1793, when the General Board of the Treasury rendered its final report. See FERGUSON,
supra note 45, at 332-33 (describing the final report). But the Court's only final disposition
of State-party indebtedness-the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in Oswald v. New
York-came on February 5, 1795, too late to receive a credit in the settlement of accounts.
See5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 119 (setting forth the jury verdict against the State of NewYork
in Oswald).
A variety of examples illustrate the linkage Americans drew between the funding and
assumption of state debts and the new, unsettling threat ofjudicially enforced liability. See
Edward Telfair, Address to the Georgia General Assembly, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 9, 1793,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 234, 235 (expressing concern in the wake of Chisholm
that creditors would bring suit in federal court to collect old emissions of paper money,
"which in good faith and upon constitutional principles is the debt of the United States");
The Rights of Man, N.Y.J., Aug. 10, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 234 (noting
Georgia's possible inability to pay its just debts in light of the burdensome federal impost
and proposing, rhetorically, payment of the debt out of the federal treasury and the subsequent abrogation of the state governments); Petition of Peter Trezevant, Executor of Robert Farquhar, to the United States Senate (Feb. 8, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 258,
261 (seeking payment from Congress of Georgia's debt to Farquhar, and noting in support
of the petition that the State of Georgia, if it had paid its debt to Farquhar, "would undoubtediy have charged to the United States the Amount of this Debt" for assumption in
accordance with Hamilton's plan).
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that diversity jurisdiction alone would suffice to impose it.254 Now the
specter of this new liability was closing in on the states.
The Court's decision in Chisholm accentuated this prospect of retrospective liability. In Chisholm, the Court initially faced a jurisdictional question-whether it could entertain a proceeding against one
of the United States. Presenting their opinions seriatim, four of the
five sitting Justices agreed that the Court had jurisdiction. 2 55 The
Court also faced the question whether the law recognized an action in
assumpsit against the State, although fewer Justices addressed this issue. Edmund Randolph, arguing for the plaintiff, had not addressed
the question at any length, recognizing that it would remain open
throughout the proceeding, and only Justices Wilson and Cushing
voted to affirm the State's suability in such an action. 25 6 ChiefJustice
Jay expressed a willingness to entertain further argument on the
point, as did Justice Blair. 257 In the end, a majority of the Court sug-

gested an evident willingness to entertain suits against the states and a
(perhaps more diffident) willingness to consider the possibility that
state suability entailed liability in assumpsit on obligations that predated the Constitution.
Justice Iredell; remaining silent on the jurisdictional question, focused instead on what he saw as the doubtful power of the federal
courts to fashion a rule of liability for pre-constitutional state obligations. Iredell, of course, had assured his colleagues at the North Carolina ratifying convention that the new Constitution would have no
retrospective effect. 258 The prospect of suits against the states for ac-

tions taken before ratification cast doubt on that assurance, and led
Iredell to highlight his concerns with retrospectivity in his dissenting
opinion. 2 59 After noting the absence of any congressional means for
254 See supra Part I.E.
255 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 452-53 (Blair, J.); id. at 465 (Wilson, J.); id. at 469 (Cushing, J.);
id. at 472-74 (Jay, C.J.).
256 Id at 466 (Wilson, J.) (holding that assumpsit would lie); id. at 469 (Cushing, J.)

(same).
257
Id. at 452-53 (Blair. J.) (stating that the issue of assumpsit would remain open); i&.
at 479 (Jay, C.J.) (holding that assumpsit would lie but suggesting openness on the ques-

tion whether state suability would necessarily "extend to all the demands, and to every kind
of action," and suggesting possible nonsuability in actions to enforce states' paper money
and debt instruments).
258
See supra note 177.
259 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50 (Iredell, J.). Iredell had expressed the same
concern with retrospectivity in reflecting on Oswald's suit against the State of NewYork. In
notes that he prepared in February 1792 for use in the Oswald case, Iredell made the following point:
No one will presume that either the Constitution or the act of Congress intended that the Judges of their Courts should do more than apply
former principles of law to new cases where such application could naturally be made; nor certainly, that they should devise new modes of suit unheard of or unrecognized before to carry a part of the Constitution into
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asserting claims against the, states, Iredell posed the following
question:
If therefore, no new remedy be provided [by section 14, the allwrits provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789] (as plainly is the case),
and consequently we have no other rule to govern us but the principles of the pre-existent laws, which must remain in force till
superceded [sic] by others, then it is incumbent upon us to enquire,
whether previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which period, or the period of passing [the Judiciary Act], in respect to the
object of this enquiry, is perfectly equal) an action of the nature like
this before the Court could have been maintained against one of
the States in the Union upon the principles of the common law
260

Iredell then undertook an elaborate inquiry into the English law governing petitions of right and monstrans de droit, concluding that all
such proceedings required leave of the Crown. 261 Finally, regarding
the question of a debt due from a state under the Articles of Confederation, Iredell observed what everyone already knew-that contracts
made with state legislative bodies were made on public faith alone,
and that the appropriate remedy lay in a petition to the legislature
effect, without the intervention of the Legislative Power.... [Without the
intervention of Congress, t he courts certainly cannot take up the business
... by making new laws for new cases; or, which I take to be the same thing,
applying old principles to new cases materially different from such to which
they were applied before.
The Constitution [and] Laws of the United States; for the reasons I
have given, not authorising at present at least, any new mode of proceeding, we must [word missing] for some other Law for our guide as to the
legality of the proceeding in question. What Law can that be, but the particular Law of the State of New York?
James Iredell's Observations on State Suability (Feb. 11-14, 1792), in5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 76, 84-85 (third alteration in original). Iredell initially assumed that state law would
govern the suability of the State of New York. He later modified that view in Chisholm to
take account of Randolph's argument that the all-writs act empowered federal courts to
issue any writs authorized by the "principles and usages" of law and thus incorporated
English common law. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 426 (argument of Randolph for the plaintiff).
260
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437 (Iredell, J.).
261
Id. at 437-44 (Iredell, J.) (tracing the origins of the petition of right and arguing
that its principal feature was its reliance on leave of the Crown to proceed to trial). I have
questioned that conclusion in earlier work, suggesting that although Blackstone sought to
portray Crown suability as a matter of grace, such relief really entered as a matter of
course. Pfander, supra note 69, at 921-26 (arguing that the supposed consent that made
Crown suability a matter of grace was largely fictional). New evidence supporting my interpretation appears in a letter from Edmund Pendleton, who criticized Iredell's opinion in
Chisholm for its portrayal of the remedies as matters of grace. Letter from Edmund Pendleton, Presiding Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals, to Nathaniel Pendieton, United
States Judge for the District of Georgia (Feb. 3, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 250
("what ever Courtly forms are used [in petitioning humbly for leave to pursue claims
against the Crown), it is an effectual compulsory mode").
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rather than in an action at law.2 62 In the end, Iredell believed that the

Court's assertion ofjurisdiction over an assumpsit action represented
the unwarranted creation of a new remedy for existing state contracts.
No part of the Constitution, he noted, authorizes the Court to
"mak[e] new laws for new cases, or, which I take to be [the] same thing,
apply[ ] old principles to new cases materially different from those to
26 3
which they were applied before."
Many of Chisholm's most articulate critics shared Iredell's concern
with the Court's apparent willingness to enforce these old state debts.
Of particular concern was the fact that the creditors in question had
contracted at a time when the state legislatures had complete control
over the payment of state obligations. 264 This was the reaction of Edmund Pendleton, the able Justice of the Virginia Court of Appeals and
the former president of the Virginia ratifying convention. Pendleton
acknowledged that the language of the Judiciary Act could bear the
Chisholm Court's interpretation in asserting jurisdiction over state defendants. 265 But Pendleton thought the Court went beyond congressional guidance in creating a "mode of Proceeding in so new a case, to
which no former process would apply." 2 66 In effect, the Court had

created "Parties defend[ant], not made liable by any existing law or
'267
Contract.
Pendleton's criticism of Chisholm's retrospective operation was
echoed by a host of commentators, including the pamphleteer "True
Federalist," who published a series of essays in the Boston newspaper
Independent Chronicle
There is no controversy now in existence, between an individual and state, excepting in that importunate speculation upon
Georgia lands [(i.e., Moultrie)], but what is founded in a contract,
which originated before the general government had an
existence....
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 444-49 (Iredell, J.).
Id at 433 (Iredell, J.).
264
In modem terms, we might articulate this concern as follows: State contractors who
depended on relatively unreliable state legislatures for payment of their contractual obligations would normally charge a premium to reflect the possibility of legislative disavowal.
Recognition of the routine suability of the states on the Court's original docket would
create an unanticipated regime of full and guaranteed payment of contract prices that
would provide a windfall to a state's creditors. Such windfalls would have been most obvious in connection with judicial decisions that required specie payment of the states' obligations on their old (depreciated) paper money; that concern, predictably enough, animated
the country's reactions to Chisholm.
265 Letter from Edmund Pendleton, PresidingJudge of the Virginia Court of Appeals,
to Nathaniel Pendieton, United States Judge for the District of Georgia (Aug. 10, 1793), in
5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 232, 233.
266 Id. Pendieton also criticized the "Policy" of the decision by noting its tendency to
.convulse the States." Id.
267 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton, supra note 261, at 250.
262

263
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As to those contracts, which were made before the establishment of the general government, there is no person on earth, who
can believe, that when the people of the United America adopted
the general government, they expected, that each state would be
liable to be sued on each negotiable note, and public security,
268
which had been given by it.
Similar concerns with the imposition of retrospective liability appear
in the remarks of a variety of observers, including the members of the
Georgia House of Representatives (anticipating the decision in
Chisholm),269 Governor Edward Telfair in his address to the Georgia
legislature following Chisholm, 270 Governor John Hancock in his prepared statement to the Massachusetts General Court, 27 ' and the mem272
among others.2 73
bers of the Virginia House of Delegates,

2.

The Debate over State Suability in Federal Question Cases

Although Chisholm's assertion of jurisdiction over diverse-party
claims triggered an outcry against its retrospective impact on state
treasuries, the reaction toward the prospect of state suability in other
matters was decidedly more mixed. A sizable body of opinion held
that the federal courts had no power to entertain suits or proceedings
268 "A True Federalist," Essay, INDEP. CHRON.(Boston), Mar. 2 & 6, 1797, reprintedin 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 629, 631.
269

Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 14, 1792,

reprinted in 5 DHSC, supranote 3, at 161, 161 (state suability would, if accepted, result in
"numberless law-suits for papers issued from the treasury thereof to supply the armies of
the United States, and perplex the citizens of Georgia with perpetual taxes").
270 Telfair, supra note 253, at 235 (expressing concern about liability on the emission
of paper during and after the war, "aconsiderable part of which is yet outstanding").
271 John Hancock, Address to the Massachusetts General Court, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 19, 1793, reprintedin 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 416, 418 (asking the legislature to
consider '[w] hether the provision in the Federal Constitution for the extention [sic] of the
Judiciary power to States, is intended to be exercised in matters of civil contract, or in
other matters which took place before the Government was formed").
272 Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates (Dec. 18, 1792), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 322, 322 (noting that Hollingsworth v. Virginiasought to reopen an issue that the
Assembly had settled at a time when, under the Articles of Confederation, tlie Commonwealth of Virginia enjoyed "perfect and unimpaired sovereignty as to all matters of internal
Government," and concluding that its action "cannot be again called in question, before
any other Tribunal than the General Assembly of this Commonwealth").
273 See Letter from Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to
Henry Lee, Governor of Virginia (Feb. 10, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 327, 327
(noting that the Virginia assembly had decided against the claim of the Indiana Company
in 1779, and declaring that "Virginia is impregnable; it being an axiom with me, that every
complete act of any State before the adoption of the federal constitution is uncontroulable
by any power upon earth"); Letter from William Vassall to John Lowell, Jr. (Aug. 3, 1790),
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 374, 374 (paraphrasing Lowell's assertion that a verdict in
Vassall's favor in any suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would "be a kind of
Retrospective Justice, [and] would be branded with the Odious Name of ex post facto
determination," because the forfeiture of Vassall's estate had been completed before the
Treaty of Peace took effect in January 1784).

1330

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1269

of any kind against the states. A second group accepted state suability
in proceedings the United States or sibling states brought, but objected to the prospect of individual plaintiffs' suits. 274 A third group
continued to support the idea that individuals could institute claims
against the states to enforce the federal-law restrictions embedded in
Article I, Section 10.275
Pamphlets and speeches in Massachusetts, in particular, express
this range of opinion regarding Chisholm and Vassall. Much of the
newspaper commentary lacked nuance; it either decried state suability
as an invasion of sovereignty 76 or defended suability as an appropriate remedy for occasional state injustices. 277 Other writers, such as the
author of The Crisisin the Anti-Federalist newspaper Independent Chronicle, offered accounts that distinguished between the rule of nonsuability that governed ordinary disputes and the necessity of suability
to enforce federal law:
Suppose then (for arguments sake) it is admitted, that an individual
can sue a State, it cannot be in any other case, than where the United
States, have an exclusive right of judging.
274

For example, Governor John Hancock of Massachusetts asked
[w]hether the provision in the Federal Constitution for the extention
(sic] of the Judiciary power to States, is intended to be exercised in matters
of civil contract,. . . or whether it is intended only to give a remedy for such
injuries as may take place by force, and may therefore have a tendency to
destroy the peace of the Union ....
Hancock, supra note 271, at 418.
275 As we have seen, the Framers of the Constitution appear to have deliberately structured provisions for state suability in federal question cases to secure state compliance with
the restrictions in Article I, Section 10. Madison, Randolph, and Pendleton defended the
Original Jurisdiction Clause on this basis in the Virginia ratifying convention, and Randolph's more elaborate 1790 report on the Judiciary Act of 1789 specified in some detail
his understanding of state suability in both State-party controversies as well as in federal
question cases. See Pfander,supranote 13, at 633-40. Randolph reiterated these themes in
his argument in Chisholm, explicitly calling the Court's attention to the need to secure state
compliance with the constitutional restrictions in Article I as support for the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over the diverse-party claim involved in that proceeding. Chisholm, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 421-23 (1793) (argument of Edmund Randolph).
276 See, e.g., "Brutus," Essay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston),July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 392 (urging that Chisholm threatened state sovereignty and independence);
"Democrat," supra note 43, at 393 (decrying Chisholm and the issuance of process in Vassall
as an invitation to "DIRTY TORY TRAITOR[S]" to file suit against the state); "Marcus," Essay,
MAss. MERCURY, July 13, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 389, 390 (calling upon
citizens of Massachusetts to "rouse" to fight the demon of despotism implicit in the threat
to state sovereignty).
277 See, e.g., "&," Essay, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), Aug. 17, 1793, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 409, 410-11 (criticizing Anti-Federalist denials of suability as internally incoherent); "Crito," Essay, SALEM GAZETTE, July 29, 1793, reprintedin 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 403, 404 (defending the issuance of process in Vassall as appropriate to secure
"justice and common honesty" from the state); "Crito," Crito to Sydney, SALEM GAZETT, Aug.
27, 1793, reprintedin 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 413, 413 (noting the suability of the King in
England by petition of right); "Veritas," supra note 43, at 390 (defending the decision in
Chisholm).
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For example, each State is forbid by the Constitution "from
coining money;". "emitting bills of credit;," "passing ex post facto
laws," [etc.]-Should a State presume to pay a creditor in a paper
currency, of its 6vwn issuing, or pass an ex post facto law, in all such
2 78
cases the individual has his remedy in the Federal Judiciary.
Anti-Federalists were quick to disavow this recognition of possible
state suability in federal question cases. For instance, "Hampden"
took the absolutist view that any admission of state suability, enforced
through compulsory process, would leave the state "no share of
'279
sovereignty.
Despite these disavowals, however, the argument for state suability to enforce federal restrictions did not disappear. In a speech
before the Massachusetts House of Representatives, John Davis joined
the general call for a constitutional amendment, but refused to condemn the Chisholm Court's decision.2 8 0 Davis rejected the appeal to
the historical immunity of nations from compulsory process, noting
28
that the Constitution established a new and unprecedented regime. '
Had any sovereign state in history, he wondered, "bound itself not to
coin money, emit bills of credit or lay duties on imports or exports"?28 2 Whatever the historical record of other nations, Davis
thought it clear that such surrenders of state sovereignty had occurred
with the ratification of the Constitution.2 8 3 In light of these federal
restrictions, it followed that the states' historical immunity from suit
could not provide a complete answer to the question whether the
Constitution authorized state suability. Although he ultimately argued for an amendment to curtail state suability, Davis's speech makes
it clear that he regarded the existence of federal restrictions as impor28 4
tant to an original understanding of the matter.
Other evidence reveals that the issue of state suability to enforce
federal restrictions was a matter of public dispute both before and
after Chisholm. A pamphlet issued under the name "Hortensius" ap278 "A Republican," The Crisis, No. X
INDEP.
I,
CHRON. (Boston),July 25, 1793, reprinted
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 395, 397-98.
279 "Hampden," Essay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 25, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 399, 400. Editorial notes indicate that Massachusetts Attorney General
James Sullivan may have been the author of the Hampden essay. 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
401.
280 Account of John Davis's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives
(Sept. 23, 1793), reprinted in 5 DHSG, supra note 3, at 431, 431.
281
Id.
282

Id.

283 Id.
284 Id. at 433. In rejecting state suability on grounds of expediency, Davis noted that
tort claims could go forward against responsible state officers, and that contract claims
would require an excessively cumbersome mode of execution. Id. Davis specifically noted,
moreover, that the judicial power could apply only to contracts formed after the adoption

of the Constitution. Id.
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peared early in the debate and expressly argued in favor of suability in
federal question cases. 28 5 Thought to be written by Timothy Ford, a
Federalist from South Carolina, the pamphlet noted the federal constitutional prohibitions on the states in Article I, Section 10, and then
argued that the Framers must have contemplated some effective mode
of enforcement. 28 6 Turning to the words of Article III, "Hortensius"
identified that mode in the provision that extends the judicial power
to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States, as well as in that which confers original jurisdiction on
the Supreme Court in State-party cases. Specifically, he argued that
states were suable to enforce both constitutional and statutory
287
restrictions.
The idea of state suability in federal question cases was far less
controversial than the prospect of state suability in matters that predated the Constitution. The concluding remarks of the author of The
Crisis,whose defense of federal question suability appears above, read
as follows:
But admitting still, (for argument sake) that the Constitution
does allow an individual to sue a State, in all cases, it will not follow
that he can in those cases that originatedbetween him and the Stateprevious
to the adoption of the Constitution-Forthe words are, "that the judici-

ary power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution."-Admitting then, that an individual may sue a
State it must be only in such instances, as took place after the adoption

of the Constitution;for this is the period when the States entered into
this political situation. No rational man can suppose, that the States
have made themselves liable to answer before the Federal Court, for
transactions they did, before they had surrendered this right.288
Between this condemnation of the retrospective features of Chisholm
and the grudging acceptance of state suability in federal question
cases lay the seeds of a compromise. Federalists mightjoin an amendment that curtailed state suability in suits over matters that predated
the Constitution. This curtailment would provide them with needed
political cover from the charges of the other party, and would pre285

See "HoRTENSIUS," AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE

CAPAcrY (Charleston, W.P. Young 1792), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 36. Professor Fletcher first
identified this pamphlet, believed by most scholars to have been written by Federalist
Timothy Ford, as contemporary evidence of an argument for state suability in federal question cases. Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 138 (submission of William
A. Fletcher).
286 "HORTENSIUS," supra note 285, at 39 (denying that the Framers meant to secure
these federal restrictions by remanding injured individuals to "the pitable remedy of petitioningto the courtesy of the state governments").
287 Id. at 44.
288
"A Republican," supra note 278, at 398 (footnote omitted).
SUPREME FEDERAL COURT, OVER THE SEVERAL STATES, IN THEIR POLITIcAL
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serve the essence of the Constitution's judicial negative in federal
question cases. In this way, Federalists might cede federal control
over matters of modest federal interest, but maintain a leading element of their victory in the ratification struggle of 1788. The Eleventh
Amendment adopts this strategy of compromise by explaining away
the provisions of Article III that gave rise to Chisholm.
3.

Evidence That the Eleventh Amendment Was Explanatory of
Article HI

What we know about the politics of state suability and the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment helps to confirm its status as an explanatory amendment. Shortly after Chisholm came down in February
1793, two members of the Massachusetts congressional delegationTheodore Sedgwick in the House and Caleb Strong in the Senateintroduced resolutions proposing the adoption of a constitutional
amendment to deal with the issue of state suability.2 8 9 The speed with

which they introduced these resolutions reflects the fact that both
Sedgwick and Strong had publicly stated their common view (in the
Massachusetts ratifying convention of 1788) that Article III of the
Constitution would not lead to debt collection suits against the
states. 290 One can glimpse Sedgwick and Strong's view of the political
289 See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 597.
290 Although a standard work on the Massachusetts ratifying convention does not include a discussion of state suability, see DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF
THE CommoN ALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS (Boston, William White 1856), the debates in that
state triggered by Chisholm and Vassall leave little doubt that Rufus King, Caleb Strong, and
Theodore Sedgwick had all denied the state's suability in supporting the ratification of the
Constitution. For example, William Martin stated:
[I]f the article did convey the meaning as determined by part of the Judiciary [in Chisholm], it was not the intention of the [Massachusetts ratifying]
Convention, nor was it understood to be so construed-nay, there were
several gentlemen then present, who signified their remembrance, that Mr.
SEDGWICK and Mr. STRONG, both in Convention, and now in the Senate and
House of the United States, had declared their minds to that purpose, and
that they disapproved of it, and would endeavour to bring on the question,
and get it altered if possible ....
Account of William Martin's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprintedin 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 434, 434 (footnotes
omitted). Essayist Marcus wrote: "This power in the Federal Government, would not have
been consented to by this commonwealth, but for Rufus King. Esq. who 'pledged his honour,' in the State Convention, 'that the Convention at Philadelphia never discovered a disposition to infringe on the Government of an individual State .... '" "Marcus," supra note
276, at 389. Essayist Brutus wrote:
Will you tamely yield to what is conceived to be an usurpation, and which
was apprehended by many of the Members of the Massachusetts Convention.... but which apprehensions were said to be groundless by the advocates of the Constitution, and the jealousies of the Members on that
subject, were laughed at, and treated as ridiculous by KING and others.
"Brutus," supra note 276, at 392. Other evidence of this apparent consensus at the Massachusetts convention appears in "A Republican," supra note 278, at 396 (stating that the
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threat that Chisholm posed in a letter that describes Mr. Sedgwick as
expressing support for an "explanation" of the Constitution to reject
the Chisholm Court's construction of Article III-a construction he
thought was so contrived as to have "risqued the reputation" of its
29 1
defenders.
Despite the speed with which they were introduced, neither
Strong's nor Sedgwick's more sweeping resolution was acted upon
during 1793. One year later, Strong reintroduced his resolution in
virtually identical terms; the only change was the addition of the
words "be construed to" that appear in the Eleventh Amendment's
final text.2 92 Meanwhile, Sedgwick did not reintroduce his more

sweeping resolution, apparently having decided to accede to the more
limited terms of the Strong proposal. OnJanuary 14, 1794, the Senate
adopted the Eleventh Amendment with only two negative votes and
sent it to the House, where it passed by an equally large margin on
March 4, 1794.293 Eleventh Amendment scholars have long sought to
explain why the Senate added words of construction to the Amendment in 1794, and why the Amendment sailed through a Congress
dominated by Federalists. The answer to both questions lies in the
states' political response to the Chisholm decision-a response that featured wide-ranging condemnation of its retrospective features and
broad support for the promulgation of an amendment explanatory of
Article III.
Although its actions were ultimately far less influential than those
of the Massachusetts legislature, the Georgia House of Representatives
was the first to announce clear support for the adoption of an explanidea of state suability "was agitated in the Convention" and was treated as a "visionary,
antifederalidea"); "Democrat," supra note 43, at 393-94 (referring to the "flowers of oratory"
in a speech by Rufus King to the Massachusetts ratifying convention that denied state suability); and "Hampden," supra note 279, at 399-400 (noting that in response to an objection
to Article III, the "great Lawyers in the Convention declared, that no such construction
could ever be made").
291
The account of Mr. Sedgwick's view appears in a letter from Georgia's agent, John
Wereat, reporting to that state's Governor on the decision in Chisholm:
This decision [in Chisholm] however is reprobated by the Legislature .... I
was in company with some of the New-England Delegates who were unanimously of opinion that an explanation of that part of the Constitution
should be made, even at this late time of the Session, to prevent the consequences that may arise before the next meeting of Congress. Mr. Sedgwick
who was of the company declared, that "he could not have beleived [sic]
that any professional Gentleman would have risqued his reputation on such
a forced construction of the clause in the Constitution."
Letter from John Wereat, Auditor General of Georgia, to Edward Telfair, Governor of
Georgia (Feb. 21, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 222, 222-23.
292 See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 600.
293 See 5 id. at 597-600 (recounting the events, including Strong's addition of the words
of construction, leading up to the one-sided votes in favor of the Eleventh Amendment); cf.
Nowak, supra note 14, at 1436-41 (assessing the strong Federalist support for the Eleventh
Amendment as suggestive of a political compromise).
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atory amendment. Meeting in December 1792, shortly after the State
had been served with process in Chisholm, the Georgia House adopted
a series of resolutions that clearly announced the perceived need for
an "explanation" of Article 111.294 In the course of its debate, the

House admitted to some need for state suability, but argued that the
diversity grant should be construed as embracing only those causes
"commenced by a state as plaintiff against a citizen as defendant."2 95
To clarify this construction of Article III, the Georgia House explicitly
called for an explanatory amendment of Article III. The House obviously expected that the "explanation" was to operate retrospectively
and declared that, in the meantime, it would regard the proceedings
296
of the Court as void.

Subsequent proceedings in Georgia were consistent with the understanding that the ratification of an explanatory amendment was to
address the problem of state suability. After the language of the Eleventh Amendment emerged from Congress in 1794 and went to the
states, Georgia ratified it by passing what it styled "An Act to ratify the
resolution of congress, explanatory of the judicial power of the United
States," that included the following terms:
Whereas congress... have.., deemed it expedient to propose
to the legislatures of the several States, an explanatory amendment
of the said constitution, in the words following: [quoting the Eleventh Amendment].
And whereas, this legislature doth entirely concur therewith,
deeming the same to be the only just and true construction of the
The two most important resolutions read as follows:
[T]hat [the assembly] do not consider the 2d section of the 3d article of
the federal constitution to extend to the granting power to the supreme
court of the United States, or to any other court having jurisdiction under
their authority... to compel states to answer to any process the said courts
or either of them may sue out the said constitution agreeably to the construction thereof by this legislature only giving a power to the said supreme
court to hear and determine all causes commenced by a state as plaintiff
against a citizen as defendant, or in cases where two states are parties or
between the United States and an individual state: The contrary construction thereof submitting the territory of the states and the treasuries thereof
to the distresses or levies of a Foederal Marshal, which is totally repugnant
to the smallest idea of sovereignty.
...[T] hat this legislature are of opinion, that the state of Georgia will
not be bound by any decree orjudgment of the said supreme court subjecting the said state to any process, judgment or execution it may issue, award,
pronounce or decree- against the same, except in the cases herein before
recited, but will consider the same until an explanatory amendment of the said
constitution takes place as unconstitutional and extrajudicial, and that the
same will and ought to be ipsofactovoid, and to be holden for none.
Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, supra note 269, at 161-62 (first emphasis
added). The failure to influence other states probably resulted from the refusal of the
Senate to accede to their terms.
294

295
296

Id. at 162.
See id.
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said judicial power, by which the rights and dignity of the several
States can be effectually secured:
I. Be it therefore enacted... That this legislature . . . by these
presents, do... assent to, ratify and adopt the aforesaid proposed
2 97
explanatory amendment in terms thereof.

The text and title of the act leave little doubt that Georgia, at least,
viewed the Eleventh Amendment as an explanatory amendment and
2 98
ratified it on that basis.
As did the House in Georgia, the state legislature in Massachusetts responded to Chisholm by expressing support for the adoption of
an explanatory amendment. In June 1793, a joint committee of the
Massachusetts General Court issued a report critical of Chisholm. The
report identified the State-citizen diversity clause as the provision at
issue and declared that the clause should either be "wholly expunged
from the Constitution, or so far modified and explained as to give the
fullest security to the States respectively."29 9 Following service of process upon the State of Massachusetts in Vassall, Governor Hancock
called into session a special meeting of the General Court, which then
adopted a modified version of that report. 30 0 Despite modifica297 An Act to ratify the resolution of congress, explanatory of the judicial power of the
United States (Nov. 29, 1794), reprinted in 2 FIRs LAWs oF GEORGIA, supranote 229, at 53738.
298
In contrast to Georgia's, other state ratifying resolutions do not contain language
that describes the Eleventh Amendment as explanatory of the Constitution. See 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 232-60 (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1976) (reproducing the ratifying resolutions of various states).
299 The report included the following resolutions:
5. Resolved, That the article in the Constitution which extends the Judicial
Power to controversies between a State and the Citizens of anotherState as applied
by the Judges of the Supreme Judicial Court in [Chisholm], is in its principle
subversive of the State Governments, inconsistent with the [ease] and safety
of the body of Free Citizens; and repugnant to every idea of a FederalGovernment and therefore it is
6. Resolved, That the Senators of this Commonwealth in the Congress of the
United States, be, and they hereby are instructed, and the Representatives
requested, to use their utmost influence that the article in the Federal Constitution, which refers to controversies between a State and the Citizens of
other States, be either wholly expunged from the Constitution, or so far
modified and explained as to give the fullest security to the States respectively against the evils complained of, and to remove their apprehensions
on this highly interesting and important subject; more especially as this
Legislature have the fullest assurance, that the late decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of the United States, hath given a construction to the Constitution, very different from the ideas which the Citizens of this Commonwealth en[tertained of it at the time it was adopted.]
Report of aJoint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, INDEm.CHRON. (Boston),
June 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 230, 230-31 (second and third alterations in original).
300 Interestingly, Hancock's proclamation does not rule out state suability altogether,
but instead admits the possibility of state suability except as to existing liability on civil
contracts. See Hancock, supra note 271, at 418. Hancock's address reads:
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tions, 30 ' the final report ultimately called for an amendment that

would "remove any clause or article of the said Constitution which can
be construed to imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable
to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of
the United States."30 2 After Hancock's death, his lieutenant governor

sent the Massachusetts resolution to the governors of the other states.
In Virginia, Governor Henry Lee presented the action of Massachusetts to the assembly in a letter that spoke of the need for a resolution
instructing the Virginia delegation to "press the passage of a law explaining and detailing the power granted by the constitution to the
Judiciary So far as States are affected."3 0 3 The Virginia General Assembly responded by adopting a resolution that affirmed state immunity from suits by individuals and urged the adoption of
such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will
remove or explain any clause or article of the said constitution,
which can be construed to imply orjustify a decision, that a state is
compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in
304
any court of the United States.
Similar language of instruction and explanation appeared in a resolution adopted by the State of North Carolina. 30 5 Other states, includYet in order to preserve the peace and safety of the Union, and to establish
in the bosom of other nations, a confidence in the rectitude of this, it is
very proper that there should be a tribunal ofjustice, independent of the
particular States, which may be resorted to in certain cases....
Whether the provision in the Federal Constitution for the extention
[sic] of the Judiciary power to States, is intended to be exercised in matters
of civil contract, or in other matters which took place before the Government was formed; or whether it is intended only to give a remedy for such
injuries as may take place by force, and may therefore have a tendency to
destroy the peace of the Union ...is of consequence enough to demand a
consideration.
Id.
301
For an account of the debate in the Massachusetts House, which featured an able
defense of Chisholm by Rep. John Davis, see 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 366-69 (describing
Davis as supporting a constitutional amendment but opposing a statement about what the
legislators "assumed" at the 1788 ratifying convention).
302 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), in5 DHSC, supra
'note 3, at 440, 440.
303 Letter from Henry Lee, Governor of Virginia, to the Speaker of the Virginia House
of Delegates (Nov. 13, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 334, 337. Although Governor
Lee called for an explanatory law, the House of Delegates recommended "amendments in
the constitution" to "remove or explain" clauses construed to authorize suits against the
state by individuals. See infra text accompanying note 304.
304 Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 28, 1793), in5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 338, 338-39. The Senate accepted the resolution and forwarded it to the Virginia
delegation and to the governors of the several states in early December. See 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 339 nn.2-3.
305 The North Carolina General Assembly instructed its state delegation to
obtain such amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will
remove or explain any clause or article of the said Constitution which can
be construed to imply orjustifT ...a decision that a State is compellable to
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ing Connecticut,3 0 6 Maryland,30 7 South Carolina,308 and New
Hampshire,3 0 9 adopted language that appears to track the Massachu310
setts resolution.
answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United
States.
Resolution of North Carolina General Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 615, 615.
306
The Connecticut General Assembly instructed its state delegation to secure
an alteration of the Clause or Article in the Constitution of the United
States on which the decision of the said Supreme Court, is supposed to be
founded so that in future no State can on any Construction be held liable
to any such Suit, or to make answer in any Court, on the Suit, of any Individual or Individuals whatsoever.
Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly (Oct. 29, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 609, 609.
307
See Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates (Dec. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 611, 611 (instructing the state's senatorial delegation to obtain amendments "as will remove any part of the said constitution which can be construed to justify a
decision that a state is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in
any court of the United States").
308
See Proceedings of the South Carolina Senate (Dec. 17, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 610, 611 (instructing the state's senatorial delegation to procure an amendment
to "remove any clause or Article of the said Constitution, which can be construed to imply,
orjustify a decision that a State is compelable [sic] to answer in any suit, by an individual,
or individuals in any Court of the United States"). The South Carolina House failed to act
upon the measure. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 611 n.3.
309 See Proceedings of a Joint Session of the New Hampshire General Court (Jan. 23,
1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 618, 618 (instructing the state's senatorial delegation to
obtain "such amendments in the Constitution of the United States, as to prevent the possibility of a construction which may justify a decision that a State is compellable to the suit of
an individual or individuals in the Courts of the United States").
310
It is possible that the states that adopted explanatory resolutions (Georgia, Virginia,
and North Carolina) intended to communicate a sharper rebuke to the Chisholm Court
than those that simply proposed to remove the clauses that gave rise to the suability interpretation in Chisholm (Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, Maryland, and New
Hampshire). An explanatory amendment may have suggested that the Court clearly erred
in adopting its suability interpretation; a removal amendment may have been a concession
that the Court had a sufficient basis for its finding of suability in the original terms of
Article III.
Evidence to support this theory appears in the records of Pennsylvania's response to
Chisholm. Instead of adopting language to support an amendment explanatory of the
meaning of Article III, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives recognized the United
States to be "vested with a power to compel a state to appear at the suit of an individual
citizen or foreigner," and resolved that "it would be conducive to the happiness and tranquillity of the states, if such alterations and amendments were made in the Constitution of
the United States, as would abridge the general government of that power." Proceedings
of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Dec. 30, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
612, 612. This amendatory resolution appears to admit the accuracy of the Chisholm determination and seeks to curtail the power in question. Even that resolution did not emerge
from the Pennsylvania House, see 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 613 n.3, and the state (which
had itself included language in its own constitution of 1790 that authorized suits against
the state in its own courts) ultimately declined to ratify the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at
603 & n.31; JAcoBs, supra note 11, at 181 n.99; see also Proceedings of the Virginia Senate
(Dec. 4, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 339, 339 (criticizing the House's proposal for
an amendment to remove or explain clauses of Article III on the ground that it "goes to
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This outpouring of state resolutions provides the background
against which Congress acted in adopting the Eleventh Amendment
in 1794. By the time Congress reconvened in January 1794, eight
states had expressed support for the adoption of a constitutional
amendment, and had done so in terms that suggested the need to
remove or explain any provision of the Constitution that could "be
construed" to make states subject to suits by individuals.3 1 ' Strikingly,
the lineup of state support appears to correspond closely to each
state's indebtedness following Hamilton's assumption plan. States
that remained heavily in debt tended to support the proposal for a
constitutional amendment, and states that had managed to reduce
their indebtedness were less enthusiastic. 3 12 It thus appears that, in
proposing a version of the Eleventh Amendment modified to declare
that the judicial power of Article III was not to "be construed to" extend to suits and proceedings brought by diverse party plaintiffs, Senator Strong acted to further both his state legislature's instructions and
its clear financial interest.
Post-ratification evidence confirms that leading members of the
legal profession regarded the Eleventh Amendment as an explanatory
amendment. Following President Adams's issuance of a report dated
deny what the Constitution expressly warrants, that foreigners have a right to sue a state in
the federal court").
311 These resolutions instructed the state's Senators to obtain the relevant amendment, but refrained from issuing similar instructions to members of the House of Representatives. This fact may help to explain why the Senate took the first action on the
amendment.
312
As the following table reveals, many states remained deeply in debt following the
implementation of Hamilton's plan to assume state debts, while others had managed to
pay off or retire a substantial portion of their debts:
Georgia
$400,000
$1,960,000
South Carolina
$349,000
$1,840,000
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Virginia
$1,170,000
NewJersey
$208,000
$196,000
$ 713,000
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
$ 500,000
New Hampshire
$100,000
-0$ 458,000
Delaware
Connecticut
Maryland
$ 430,000
See B.U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 60 (1941) (setting forth the amount of state
indebtedness that remained circa September 1791). All the heavily indebted states (South
Carolina, Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina) supported a constitutional amendment. In contrast, four of the five states that refrained from issuing resolutions in support
of a constitutional amendment (Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware) had
relatively low state indebtedness. The remaining nonsupporter, Pennsylvania, had a large
quantity of state debt but also had a substantial capacity to service that debt. Not only was
Pennsylvania the richest state in the union, but it also owned a substantial amount of federal securities. Professor Ferguson reports that, in the two year period beginning in 1789,
Pennsylvania succeeded in persuading its citizens to exchange nearly $5 million in state
securities for federal interest-bearing instruments. FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 330-31.
Even after that swap, in 1792 Pennsylvania retained $800,000 in federal securities-more
than enough to retire what little debt remained on its books following assumption. See id.
at 331.
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January 8, 1798, proclaiming the Amendment to be "a Part of the
Constitution, 313 the Supreme Court heard argument in Hollingsworth
v. Virginia,3 14 a case concerning the Amendment's impact on pending
cases. Counsel for the plaintiff, William Tilghman, argued that, in
keeping with a general rule of constitutional prospectivity, the
Amendment did not apply to suits instituted before its effective
date.3 15 Tilghman made this argument despite his admission that the
words "be construed" would normally tend to indicate retrospective
operation.3 16 Commonwealth's counsel, Charles Lee, met this contention head on, noting that the Amendment was intended to operate
as an explanatory provision and, as such, was meant to apply retrospectively to bar pending claims.3 17 The Court resolved the argument
in favor of the Commonwealth, holding that the Amendment applied
to bar pending claims.3 18 It thus appears that those who debated its
313 Report of John Adams to the United States Congress (Jan. 8, 1798), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 637, 638.
314 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 378 (1798).
315
See id. at 378 (argument of plaintiff's counsel). Although this argument appears
far-fetched to modem eyes, it apparently enjoyed more plausibility at the time. Counsel
for the Commonwealth, Attorney General Charles Lee, recommended in 1797 that Virginia refrain from entering a formal appearance in the Hollingsworth litigation until after
the Eleventh Amendment had been finally ratified and declared effective. Letter from
Charles Lee, Attorney General of the United States, to James Wood, Governor of Virginia
(Feb. 18, 1797), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 347, 347-48. Lee proposed the delay on the
ground that an objection to cognizance of the suit after ratification "will be made with
more efficacy, if the Amendment takes place before an Appearance is entered than Afterwards." Id at 348. Lee evidently believed that the Court might refuse to read the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to suits instituted before its effectiveness. Others shared that view.
See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Moultrie to John Nicholson (Nov. 3, 1796), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 557, 557 (suggesting that even if the "Resolve about Suability shou[lld be
adopted," Georgia's adoption of that resolve "can't by retrospect affect us").
316 See Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 378 (argument of plaintiff's counsel) (arguing
against retrospective application of the Amendment to bar pending claims, and noting
"that the jurisdiction being before regularly established, the amendment notwithstanding
the words 'shall not be construed,' . .. must be considered, in fact, as introductory of a new
system ofjudicial authority"). This argument plainly sees the words "be construed" as indicative of a legislative desire to secure a retrospective application of an explanatory
amendment.
317 Lee contended that
[t]he amendment, in the present instance, is merely explanatory, in substance, as well as language. From the moment those who gave the power to
sue a state, revoked and annulled it, the power ceased to be a part of the
constitution; and if it does not exist there, it cannot in any degree be found,
or exercised, else where.
Id. at 381 (argument of Charles Lee).
318 Id. at 382 (holding unanimously that "there could not be exercised anyjurisdiction,
in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by
citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state"). In addition to dismissing the pending claim in
Hollingsworth, the Court dismissed two other pending State-party claims. See 1 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 305 (reproducing minutes of the Court's session of February 14, 1798, in which it
dismissed Moultrie v. Georgiaand Brailsford v. Georgia; concluding that "on Consideration of
the Amendment of the Constitution respecting Suits against States, it has no jurisdiction of
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effectiveness before the Court in Hollingsworth took for granted that
the Amendment was intended to be explanatory and, consequently,
3 19
would ordinarily apply to pending claims.
The same conclusion appears to flow, albeit indirectly, from comments that appear in James Madison's defense of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798. Like the Kentucky Resolutions of the same year, the
Virginia Resolutions declared the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 unconstitutional, and proclaimed the Virginia legislature's power to "interpose" against usurpations by the federal government.3 20 Upon
circulation to the other states, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
triggered some negative responses from eastern states. Many of these
states argued that the meaning of the Constitution was a question for
federal judicial (not state legislative) determination, and many
doubted the constitutional propriety of Virginia's doctrine of interposition.3 2 1 Madison responded to these and other criticisms in a report
of a committee of the Virginia House of Delegates in early 1800.322
One part of his response sought to show that the Commonwealth of
Virginia was within its constitutional powers in declaring the statutes
unconstitutional and in communicating that conclusion to the other
states. To sustain this claim, Madison first sketched a variety of appropriate actions that the states might have taken to accomplish the goal

this Cause"). A third State-party proceeding, Cutting v. South Carolina,was tangled up with
an interpleader motion and was not the subject of any dispositive action by the Court. See 1
id at 305 (noting that Cuttingwas "Continued by Consent"); 5 id at 459-61 (indicating that
the dispute was not the subject of further action by the Court and was not resolved until
well into the nineteenth century). A fourth action, the well-known Chisholm v. Georgia was
not the subject of a dispositive order on February 14, but it remained on the Court's
docket throughout the February 1798 Term due to a series of continuances. See 5 id at
136. Other State-party litigation had been dismissed before the February 1798 Term. See 5
id at 20 (noting the discontinuation of Van Staphorstv. Matylandin February 1792); 5 id at
66 & n.73 (noting the 1795 payment of the judgment in Oswald v. New York); 5 id. at 369
(noting that Vassall v. Massachusettswas dismissed with costs in February 1797).
319
Cf CASTo, supra note 197, at 199-200 (noting that advocates of the Eleventh
Amendment occasionally suggested that it " ' does not import an alteration of the Constitution, but an authoritative declaration of its true construction'") (quoting the Commonwealth's argument in Respublica v. Cobbe4 3 Dall. 467, 472 (Pa. 1798)).
320
For background on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, identifying their authors as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Principlesof '98: An Essay in HistoricalRetrieua4 80 VA. L. Rxv. 689 (1994); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. Ray. 885, 927-35
(1985) (locating the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in the evolving constitutional
thought of the Founding Generation); H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early
ConstitutionalLaw, 71 N.C. L. REv. 949, 992 (1993) (same).
321
For the negative responses of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and other eastern
states, see 4 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 84, at 532-39.
322
For the text of the Virginia House committee's report, and its attribution to
Madison, see 4 id at 546-80.
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of "maintain[ing] what the Constitution has ordained. 3 28 He then
made the following comment:
It is no less certain that other means might have been employed which are strictly within the limits of the Constitution. The
legislatures of the states might have made a direct representation to
Congress, ...

or they might have represented to their respective

senators in Congress their wish that two thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the Constitution .... 324
At the least, Madison's comment reveals his understanding that the
states might propose constitutional amendments meant to explain the
meaning of certain provisions that federal courts had interpreted erroneously. Specifically, it appears that Madison meant to remind the
eastern states that they had just completed a process of constitutional
interpretation and communication in the course of coordinating their
call for an amendment to deal with the problem of state suability in
the wake of Chisholm. Of the eleven amendments in existence when
Madison wrote, only the Eleventh had emerged from a process-coordinated state legislative instructions to United States Senators followed by an amendment proposed in the Senate-that Madison here
characterized as resulting in the proposal of an "explanatory amendment.8' 25 In short, Madison appears to have viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as explanatory of Article III, and to have invoked that
326
widely held perspective in defending Virginia's actions.
Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's well-known account of the Elev0 2 7 provides additional support
enth Amendment in Cohens v. Virginia
to the explanatory account offered here. In the course of affirming
the Court's power of appellate review under section 25 of the Judiciary Act, Marshall gave the following account:
It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that
these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a
very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and
323 4 id&at 579.
324 4 id
325 Madison had himself proposed what ultimately became the first ten amendments
during the First Congress in 1789. For a summary of Madison's role in originating and
introducing before the House of Representatives the amendments that ultimately became
the Bill of Rights, see EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BiLL OF RiGHTs AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY
33-44 (1957).
326 Madison also described certain of the first ten amendments to the Constitution as
explanatory in his argument against the proposed Bank of the United States. See Speech to
the House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 1791), inANNALS OF CONG., 1st Cong., 2d Sess.
1894, 1901 (Feb. 1791) (remarks of Mr. Madison) (referring to the "explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves" in distinction to the "explanatory declarations
and amendments" that the several state ratifying conventions had proposed).
327 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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the Court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and,
to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained, this
amendment was proposed in Congress .... 328

In identifying state debts existing "at the adoption of the constitution"
as the concern that motivated the authors of the Eleventh Amendment, Marshall does much to confirm the thesis of this Article. Indeed, Marshall's account offers a nice precis of my thesis-that Article
III's suability provisions posed a threat of federaljudicial enforcement
of state debts, that the Framers of the Constitution offered assurances
against such debt collection, that the Court in Chisholm proceeded
nonetheless, and that the ensuing amendment placed pre-constitutional debts beyond the reach of the federal courts.
4.

The Eleventh Amendment's Effectiveness in ProtectingStates from
Debts Incurred Under the Articles of Confederation

Understood as an explanatory amendment that swept existing
and future diverse-party claims off the federal court docket, the Eleventh Amendment offered the states a virtually ironclad guarantee of
immunity from federally imposed liability on claims predating the
Constitution. Without a grant of jurisdiction over ordinary "controversies" brought against State parties, the federal courts would have
no mechanism through which to enforce existing state obligations.
These obligations, after all, had been incurred before the Constitution took effect, and did not implicate the body of supreme federal
law. The refusal of a state legislative body to pass an appropriations
bill to pay a debt contracted before the Constitution took effect may
have violated public faith, but it did not violate federal law.
Many scholars have missed this point. Based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Fletcherv. Peck,329 and on the subsequent discussion
in Hans v. Louisiana,3 30 many scholars have assumed that the Amendment simply placed claims like those in Chisholm and Hollingsworth"on
hold."33 1 Such claims might return to active litigation in federal court
once Congress chose to provide a general grant of federal question
jurisdiction. According to this argument, the plaintiffs could simply
have recast their breach of contract claims as claims for violation of
the constitutional prohibition against the passage of state laws "imId- at 406.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
330 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
331 See Massey, supranote 11, at 115 (stating that the Amendment placed these claims
"in hibernation"); cf. William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
CiticalEvaluation, 102 HARv. L. R.v. 1372, 1382 (1989) (suggesting that actions brought in
diversity to collect state debts might be recast as federal question claims, and suggesting
that such an easy way around the Eleventh Amendment represents a serious challenge to
the diversity explanation).
328
329
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pairing the Obligation of Contracts." 3 3 2 If it were widely assumed that

the states would violate the Contracts Clause by refusing to honor
their own contracts, then the framers of the Eleventh Amendment
would doubtless have worried about the prospect that the assumpsit
claim in Chisholm might one day return to federal court under a general grant of federal question jurisdiction, such as that provided in the
short-lived Judiciary Act of 1801.333

In contrast to these scholars, I do not believe that the framers of
the Eleventh Amendment perceived this revivification as a teal prospect. First, as Professors Fletcher and Field have observed, it was far
from clear that the Contracts Clause was understood to apply to a state
legislature's impairment of its own contracts with individuals.3 34 In
fact, until the Court held in Fletcher, that a state could not legislatively
revoke an executed contract by which it had granted land,3 35 it was

believed that the Contracts Clause applied only to agreements between private parties. 3 36 But Fletcherwas not decided until 1810, and
recent scholarship suggests that the Framers of the Constitution regarded the Contracts Clause as inapplicable to a state legislature's
mere breach of its own public contracts. 33 7 Under such an interpretation, the plaintiffs in Chisholm could not have successfully recast their
claims for breach of contract as claims arising under the Constitution.
Even granting that they conceived of the Contracts Clause as potentially applicable to a state's own breach of contract-a position that
Hamilton himself espoused as counsel to the South Carolina Yazoo
332

U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

333 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat.
132. For emphasis on the real, if short-lived, possibility of a general grant of federal questionjurisdiction in the 1801 act, see Marshall, supra note 11, at 1369; Massey, supra note 11,

at 115 n.280.
334 See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
CongressionalImposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1265-66 (1978) (suggesting that Hans may have been rightly decided on the theory that the Contracts Clause
does not apply to mere breaches of a state's own contracts); Fletcher, supranote 11, at 1055
n.97 (questioning whether, if the facts of Chisholm had arisen after Fletcherv. Peck, the contract claim in Chisholm could be recast as one arising under the Contracts Clause).
335 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810).
336 Today, the Contracts Clause represents a much less significant limitation on states'
legislative power than it once did. Even before the Court relaxed the strictures of the
Clause in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-44 (1934), it was clear
that a state's mere breach of its own contract did not come within the scope of the Clause.
See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1055 n.97.
337 See McDoNALD, supra note 48, at 270-75 (tracing the origins of the Contracts Clause
to a motion by Rufus King modeled upon language in the Northwest Ordinance that applied only to impairment of private contracts; noting the subsequent adoption of that language by the Committee of Style; and suggesting that the interpretation that Hamilton
advanced in the Yazoo matter and Marshall later adopted in Fletcherv. Peck departed from
the publicly understood meaning of the Clause).
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Company in anticipation of the Court's decision in Fletchei33 8-the
framers of the Eleventh Amendment had no reason to fear the revival
of diverse-party contract claims such as those in Chisholm. In Chisholm
and other similar public claims cases, the State had incurred its obligadons before the Constitution became effective. If the states were to
become liable as a matter of federal law for the impairment of their
own contracts, such a rule of liability would seemingly apply only to
contracts entered into after the effective date of the Constitution. In
Fletcher, for example, the impairments Hamilton and Marshall addressed as plaintiff's counsel and ChiefJustice, respectively, 33 9 were of
a series of contracts by the State of Georgia to sell lands under the
terms of a statute enacted after the Constitution had been ratified by
the requisite number of states and declared effective by the old
40
Congress.3
This understanding of the inapplicability of the Contracts Clause
(and other constitutional limits in Article I, Section 10) finds direct
support not only in the representations the Federalists made to the
ratifying convention in North Carolina, but also in the decisional law
from the period in the 1790s during which the Eleventh Amendment
was framed and ratified. In Vanhorne v. Dorrance,3 41 Justice Patterson,
riding the Pennsylvania Circuit, considered the legality of a series of
3 42
enactments by the Pennsylvania legislature concerning land rights.
In the course of his opinion, Justice Patterson considered two stat3 43
utes-one dated March 29, 1788, and another, April 1, 1790.

Although he admitted that the constitutional prohibitions against ex
post facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts might
conceivably apply to the latter act, as one "made after the adoption of
the constitution of the United States," he held that the 1788 statute
"was passed before the adoption of the constitution of the United
338 On the circumstances surrounding the issuance of Hamilton's opinion on the unconstitutionality of the Georgia legislature's action in passing laws impairing the obligation
of contracts they had formed with prior purchasers of the Yazoo lands, see 4 THE LAW
PRA'rICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DocuMENTs AND COMMENTARY 377-84 (Julius Goebel,
Jr. &Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980) [hereinafter LAw PRAariCE OF HAMILTON] (noting that
Hamilton's opinion foreshadowed Marshall's reasoning in Fletcher and that Hamilton's
views were widely circulated in the form of a pamphlet). For the text of the opinion, see id
at 430-31.

339

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-39 (Marshall); LAW PRAcrnCE OF HAMILTON, supra note

338, at 430-31 (Hamilton).
340 See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 496-508. The sales of the Yazoo lands occurred pursuant to legislative action taken by Georgia on December 21, 1789 andJanuary 7, 1795. The
latter act was repealed a year later, see id. at 507, and Hamilton's opinion focused upon the
legality of that repeal, see LAW PRACTICE OF HAMILTON, supra note 338, at 430-31.
341 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D.Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857).
342

Id. at 1019-20.

343

Id. at 1019.
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44 Patterson thus evidently
States, and therefore is not affected by it."
believed that the Constitution applied only to state laws adopted after
its effective date.
His view was widely shared. In the Maryland case, Donaldson v.
Harvey,3 45 counsel for the creditors mounted a federal constitutional
attack on a Maryland statute passed in 1716 that authorized a debtor
to tender certain property, appraised at a value equal to or greater
than the debt, in full satisfaction of a judgment.3 46 The creditors
based their argument on the provision of Article I, Section 10 that
prohibits a state from making "any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts.' 3 47 Counsel for the debtor argued in
reply that the constitutional limits could apply only to debts contracted after the effective date of the Constitution.3 48 In rejecting the
creditors' argument, the court went even further than the debtor's
argument had, ruling that Section 10's restrictions were in the "future
3 49
tense" and applied only to state laws made after its effective date.
Similarly, in Elliott's Executor v. Lyell, 350 the Virginia Court of Appeals

generally agreed with the presumption of legislative prospectivity and
held a 1786 act inapplicable to a bond executed in 1782. 35 1 President
Edmund Pendleton concurred, noting that laws impairing the obligation of contracts and other forms of retrospective lawmaking were
generally contrary to the principles of natural justice. 35 2 Pendleton
also noted in passing that "[t]he FederalConstitutionhas prohibited the
State Legislatures from passing any such laws," but clearly regarded
Section 10 as inapplicable on the ground that it took effect "subse353
quent to the present act" of 1786.

344
345
346

Id.

347

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl.1; see Donaldson, 3 H. & McH. at 14 (argument of John-

3 H. & McH. 12 (Md. 1790).
Id. at 18-19.

ston, for plaintiff).
See Donaldson, 3 H. & McH. at 17 (argument of Potts, for defendant).
Id. at 19. In effect, the court ruled that the Maryland statute of 1716 could continue to operate as to debts incurred after the effective date of the Constitution because
the provision in question applied to new "tender" laws rather than existing ones.
350
7 Va. (3 Call) 234 (1802).
351
Id.at 241-47 (seriatim opinions of Roane, Fleming, and Lyons, _U.).
352
Id. at 248 (Pendleton, P.J.).
353
Id (Pendleton, P.J.); see also Osborne v. Huger, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 179, 187, 190
(1791) (arguments of counsel) (noting that certain laws of South Carolina were enacted
.since the federal constitution" or "before the ratification of the federal government by
this state;" suggesting that states had "done wrong" in the past by interfering with private
contracts; and describing the ban on ex post facto laws as included in the Constitution "to
prevent it in future").
For additional evidence that the Constitution's restrictions were understood to apply
only to state action taken after its effective date, see Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DalU.) 14
(1800). In Cooper, the Court considered whether the State of Georgia had violated its own
constitution in confiscating property from a British loyalist in a bill of attainder passed in
1782, well before the Constitution's effective date. Id. at 16-17 (arguments of Tilghman,
348
349
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Pendleton's recognition in Elliott'sExecutorthatthe Constitution's
prohibitions applied prospectively to state action taken after its effective date connects nicely with his criticism of the retrospective features
of Chisholm. To Pendleton's way of thinking, the Supreme Court, by
interfering with state action taken prior to the adoption of the Constitution, had exceeded its authority. The vice of Chisholm, according to
Pendleton, lay in its creation of a mode of proceeding against the
states as parties defendant that had not been a part of the bargain
between the states and their contracting creditors at the time the obligations were incurred.3 54 With neither a constitutional basis for regulating these relationships nor specific congressional action to provide
political support for its creation of new forms of liability, the Court
had intervened in an area outside the realm of any federal interest.
The Eleventh Amendment reversed the Chisholm decision by withdrawing the jurisdictional basis for the Court's interference.
Pendleton's attitude about the prospective nature of the Constitution and the inappropriately retrospective features of Chisholm suggest that well-informed participants in the framing and ratification of
the Eleventh Amendment would have had little reason to worry that
claims such as those in Chisholm would reappear in federal court following Congress's creation of federal question jurisdiction. The prospective nature of the relevant constitutional restrictions would have
been thought to preclude such a revival. A state law that proposed to
abrogate an existing property right or state obligation, if enacted after
the Constitution's effective date, might have been challenged as an
impairment of a pre-constitutional contract. 355 But so long as the
for plaintiff, and Ingersoll and Dallas, for defendant). Although Article I, Section 10 of the
new federal Constitution had squarely outlawed bills of attainder, the loyalist Cooper based
his challenge on provisions of the Georgia state constitution in effect at the time of the
attainder. See id. at 16-17 (argument of Tilghman, for plaintiff). In general, the fact that
both the parties and the court chose to ignore the federal Constitution strongly suggests a
consensus that it did not apply to state action taken before its effective date. See CAsTo,
supra note 197, at 225-26 (drawing this conclusion). I agree with Professor Casto's conclusion, especially in light of a passing comment in the separate opinion ofJustice Chase that
reflects the Court's awareness of the issue of retrospectivity. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dail.) at 18
(Chase, J.) (expressing agreement with the general sentiment that federal judges may declare legislative acts unconstitutional, but refusing to address a "very different question,
turning upon very different principles;" namely, the question whether judicial review
"under the existing constitution, can be employed to invalidate laws previously enacted").
354
See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
355
Decisions such as Trustees ofDartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819), and NewJersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812), appear to confirm this
conclusion. In both cases, the Court held that the states in question had impaired the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution, Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 650-54; Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 167, and in both cases the contract at issue
had been created by legislative action that predated the Constitution, Dartmouth College 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 626, 641-44; Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 165. See also Vanhorne v.
Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1019-20 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857) (implying that, in a case
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state viewed its creditors' claims as matters for adjustment through the
legislative claims process, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs could
have recast claims like those in Chisholm or Hollingsworth in federal
question terms. 356 The notion of public faith that Hamilton invoked
in FederalistNo. 81 entailed an acceptance of the legislature's authority
over the appropriation of funds to pay public creditors. 357
The claim in Vassall stood on a different footing because it implicated rights under the Treaty of 1783.358 There, the plaintiff, a sub-

ject of Great Britain, claimed that the compelled forfeiture of his
property pursuant to an act of the Massachusetts legislature had taken
effect after the Treaty proclaimed an end to such confiscations. 35 9
The Framers of the Constitution understood that the state courts had
underenforced the Treaty, and explicitly provided for its federal judicial enforcement in Articles III and VI. 360 Therefore, it was reason-

able to expect Vassall to initiate a new claim in federal court following
the passage of appropriate enabling legislation.
But consider how difficult it would have been for Vassall to have
obtained the requisite legislation. Massachusetts did not then authorize suits against the Commonwealth, but instead handled public
claims through legislative petitioning. In the absence of a state court
of first instance, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 would simply have been unavailable. 361 Moreover, it is questionable whether Vassall's equitable claim
where rights vested before the Constitution's effective date, a post-effectiveness rescission
may have violated either the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Contracts Clause).
356 Both Chisholm and Hollingsworth involved plaintiffs seeking the payment of money
from the state's treasury. In contrast, DartmouthCollege involved rights in a corporate charter, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 626, Wilson involved rights to a tax exemption, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 165, and Vanhorne involved title to land in Pennsylvania, 28 F. Cas. at 1012-13.
Of course, it is far easier to portray private parties as enjoying vested rights in suits involving the judicial determination of record ownership than in suits seeking the payment of
public funds to a contracting party.
357 FEDERAUiST No. 81, supra note 27, at 548-49.
358 One might argue that the claims in Moultrie might also have reappeared following
the creation of federal question jurisdiction and notwithstanding the generally prospective
character of the Constitution, because those claims challenged action the Georgia legislature took after the Constitution's effective date. See supra text accompanying note 253. But
Moultrie did not appear on the Court's original docket until 1795, well after the politics of
the Eleventh Amendment had largely run their course.
359 See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 352-55.
360 U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
361 On the reluctance of the Massachusetts legislature to divest itself of control over
the determination of public claims, see Pfander, supra note 69, at 1009 (describing Massachusetts's "exceedingly strong" tradition of legislative control over the determination of
money claims against the state). Even if the Commonweaith of Massachusetts had recognized the justiciability of public claims and had provided a court for their determination,
that court may have taken the position that claims sounding in tort (such as Vassall's,
which sought to recover damages for a tortious invasion of his property rights) were not
judicially cognizable. In general, claims sounding in tort could go forward against a re-
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for an accounting would have been seen as one "arising under" the
Treaty, if that document failed to explicitly create any such right of
action. For Vassall's claim to succeed may have required both a grant
of original federal question jurisdiction and, perhaps, a statute authorizing suits against the states to enforce the treaty rights of British subjects. The political salience of the opposition to the claims of
"traitors" and "dirty tories"-terms that were used in the popular press
to describe Vassall 362-suggests that Massachusetts and other states
that feared the claims of British loyalists could safely rely upon Congress to take no steps to facilitate such litigation.363 It is therefore no
surprise that Vassall responded to the congressional proposal of the
'364
Eleventh Amendment by saying, "my Action falls of Course.
As a practical matter, the Eleventh Amendment's explanatory
elimination of diverse-party claims against state defendants provided
virtually airtight protection against further federal judicial interference with the state debts incurred in fighting the Revolutionary War.
Indeed, the political decision to end judicial interference operated in
tandem with the emerging political solution to the problem of existing state debts. Hamilton's financial plans for the country entailed'
both the funding of the national debts and the assumption of the state
debts. Under the assumption law that eventually resulted from the
famous deal between Jefferson and Madison to place the nation's capital on the Potomac, 365 all individuals who owned evidence of state
debt bearing a date prior to January 1, 1790 were entitled to exchange
their instruments at par for new federal securities. In January 1792,
sponsible officer, but plaintiffs could not state such a claim against the government entity.
See id. at 938-39 & n.141 (noting the distinction as a matter of agency law between a government officer's immunity from contract claims and his liability on tort claims). Accordingly,
the Pennsylvania courts took the position that only claims sounding in contract were cognizable in actions against the state; suits to recover tort damages for wrongful takings of
property were dismissed. See id (collecting cases).
362
"Democrat," supra note 43, at 394 (arguing that success by Vassall would open a
door for "every DIRTY TORY, TRAITOR to his countries liberties to enter").
363 This is not to say that Vassall was without a remedy. He might have brought suit
against the responsible parties who acted as the agents of Massachusetts in effecting the
confiscation. Indeed, at the time he initiated his action against the state, he could have
initiated an assumpsit action against the holder of the funds that the confiscation generated. Denial of his claim against these officers of Massachusetts would have been subject to
review under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
364 Letter from William Vassall to James Lloyd (Aug. 7, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 449, 449. To the extent Vassall's letter recognizes that his claims were politically unpopular, his recognition that the Amendment's passage by Congress was tantamount to the
rejection of his claims strikes me as well-founded, even though state ratification still remained a formal requisite to the Amendment's effectiveness. But see 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 369 (expressing surprise that Vassall would equate congressional proposal of the
Amendment to the termination of his claim, and noting that state ratification was still
required for its effectiveness).
365 For accounts of the deal, see ELKNS & McKTRrcK, supranote 108, at 153-61; FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 319-20.
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Hamilton reported to Congress that over $18 million in state debt had
been transferred to federal accounts in this manner; ultimately, this
amount reached roughly $22.5 million.3 6 6 According to Hamilton's
calculations in 1792, this latter subscription figure would leave only
about $4 million in outstanding state debts as of 1795.367
Hamilton's assumption plan thus substantially reduced the threat
to the states associated with Revolutionary War debts. The debtor
states retired the debt remaining after assumption using the kind of
currency or agrarian financial methods that had been common under
the Articles of Confederation. North Carolina, for example, bought
some of its paper money back at 15 shillings on the pound, and accepted more in payment for land sales.3 68 South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island retired debt throughout the 1790s at prices
substantially below par.3 69 Although these agrarian financial tactics
may have violated a strict reading of the Contracts Clause (if it had
been construed to apply to legislative action directed at obligations
issued before the Constitution's effective date), I have found no indication that claims challenging the implicit repudiation of state debts
involved in these below-par redemption strategies ever made their way
370
into the federal courts.
Seen from the perspective of Federalist financial policy, the combination of the Eleventh Amendment and the Hamiltonian assumption plan had a certain political appeal, even to supporters of specie
finance. The Eleventh Amendment ended the federal courts' role in
diverse-party litigation over Revolutionary War debts, but left intact
the federal judicial negative that the Federalists had secured in Article
III. The elimination of the federal judicial role left public creditors of
the states looking either to the federal government under its assumption plan-indeed, most eligible creditors took advantage of that option-or to the states themselves, for payment of their just
obligations. 3 71 In retiring the debts remaining after assumption, the
states did what most observers expected-they returned to the agra366 See RATCHFORD, supra note 312, at 59, 62.
367 See id. at 68.
368 See id.
369 See id at 70 (noting that South Carolina paid $449,000 to retire debts worth
$668,000; that Massachusetts paid $112,000 to retire debts worth $147,000; and that Rhode
Island purchased its obligations at prices ranging from 75 cents to 57.5 cents on the
dollar).
370 Apparently, one intrepid Rhode Island citizen tried to obtain ajudicial determination of the legality of repudiation. However, after he "purposely became indebted to the
state" and offered repudiated bonds as payment, the State refused to accept the bonds and
sued him for a balance due. The legislature then ordered the attorney general to discontinue the action. See id at 71 (recounting the tale ofJohn W. Richmond, whose tombstone
records his protest against the Rhode Island repudiation).
371 Although the Federalists may have preferred full specie payment of all just state
debts, as contemplated in the Chisholm decision, the Hamilton assumption program accom-
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rian financial strategies of the pre-constitutional period. Although
the Eleventh Amendment permitted the states to achieve this repudiation, that result was no more than the Federalists had promised them
37 2
during the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution.
To summarize, explanatory amendments in the eighteenth century often identified a provision in existing law that had given rise to
an unexpected or unsettling judicial interpretation. These amendments typically offered a new construction of the relevant law in terms
that were meant to apply retrospectively to pending cases. This model
of lawmaking helps to clarify that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment intended to explain and amend the diversity grant and to leave
other provisions of Article III untouched. Indeed, it was the diversity
grant that the Chisholm Court had relied upon in asserting jurisdiction
over the State of Georgia, and the diversity grant that the state legislatures had identified as having been "construed" to provide for state
suability. In effect, the Amendment explains or clarifies that the nominally reciprocal terms of the Article III diversity grant were not to "be
construed to" extend to suits and proceedings in which a State was a
party defendant. This account of the Amendment leaves other
sources of jurisdiction over suits against the states intact and unaffected, including the provision for the exercise of jurisdiction over
federal question claims against the states.
This explanatory account of the Eleventh Amendment properly
situates the debate over state suability within the larger context of the
public debate over the disposition of state debts from the war. We can
probably best understand the Constitution's treatment of state debts
as reflecting a decision to preserve the status quo of state control over
the treatment of public creditors, subject to a grant of legislative authority allowing Congress to assume and pay off the debts. If that
compromise emerged from the Philadelphia Convention and from
the ratification debates, as I suggest in Part I of this Article, then it
confers power on Congress to commit the nation to the repayment of
plished much of that goal by transferring all but $4 million of such debts to federal accounts. See supra text accompanying notes 366-67.
372 A similar strategy was used for the claims of the subjects of Great Britain whose
property the states had seized during and shortly after the war. Although the Eleventh
Amendment eliminated the only secure original federal tribunal for these suits, British
subjects had other modes available to them under the Treaty of 1783. One such mode was
deployed in Ware v. Hlton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), where a British plaintiff sued to
recover a debt from a Virginia defendant who claimed to have discharged the obligation by
payment of paper money into the state treasury. Id. at 220-21. For an account of the
plaintiff's ultimate success in Ware v. Hlton, see DWIGHrr F. HFNDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEv
NATION 81-82 (1971) (reporting that the plaintiffs eventually recovered nearly £3000).
British claimants eventually demanded the creation of a nonjudicial forum for their claims,
and they ultimately succeeded with the ratification of Jay's Treaty in 1795. As Professor
Gibbons reports, Jay's Treaty effectively assured that the Supreme Court would face few
cases implicating the Treaty of 1783. Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1939-40.
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state debts in specie (through the Engagements Clause), but does not
empower the federal government to oblige the states themselves to
pay their existing debts in specie. To the contrary, the Constitution
leaves the states free to address their existing debts by engaging in the
kinds of agrarian financial tactics that had been common under the
Articles of Confederation. The vice of Chisholmwas its attempt to impose a specie-repayment obligation on the states in contradiction of
the Federalists' assurances on that precise point. In overturning
Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment restored state control over existing state debts by removing the two sources of diversity jurisdiction
that had threatened that control.
III
ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPLANATORY INTERPRETATION

OF THE ELEvENTH- AMENDMENT

My explanatory account of the Eleventh Amendment sheds new
light both on the terms of the current scholarly debate over the meaning of the Amendment and on its proper judicial interpretation. In
this final Part, I first examine the cluster of subsidiary questions that
have arisen in the scholarly writing about the Eleventh Amendment.
Then I consider afresh certain implications of my study for the judicial application of the Amendment in the current constitutional
milieu.
The Explanatory Account and the Current Scholarly Debate

A.
1.

The Omission of Suits by In-State Citizens: Federal Cognizance

At the center of the debate over the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment lies the question why its framers failed to proscribe suits
brought against one of the states by citizens of that state. 373 Article III
contemplates suits by in-state citizens only where the plaintiffs case
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or
in admiralty; the alignment of the parties alone will not supportjurisdiction.3 74 Some scholars have suggested that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment may have simply overlooked in-state citizens as a
potential class of plaintiffs. 3 75 In any event, the Supreme Court's desire to close this loophole explains both the decision in Hans and the
373 See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1352-53 (identifying the omission of in-state plaintiffs
as the central anomaly of the Eleventh Amendment, and expressing doubt that any historical theory can fully explain the discordant evidence).
374 For an overview of the now well-known distinction between the subject-matter
heads ofjurisdiction (cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, and admiralty matters) and the party-alignment heads ofjurisdiction (controversies
involving an array of opposed parties), see Pfander, supra note 13, at 598-617.
375 See, e.g., Field, supra note 11, at 540 n.88.
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subsequent decisions that ignore the text of the Amendment and
ascribe to it a broad sovereign immunity purpose. 376 As a consequence, the Court now takes the position that the Eleventh Amendment forecloses both federal question and admiralty claims by in-state
citizens, despite the fact that the Amendment does not specifically ad377
dress such claims.
On the other hand, the diversity explanation views the omission
of in-state plaintiffs as confirming that the Amendment restricts suability in claims based on party-alignment jurisdiction, and leaves federal question and admiralty jurisdiction unaffected. 378 Under the
diversity account, the question of state suability had been a closely
contested question in the ratification era-Congress had supplied a
limited jurisdictional grant for diversity claims against State parties,
but had failed to address the extent of state suability in federal question and admiralty proceedings.3 7 9 Furthermore, the framers of the
Eleventh Amendment worried primarily about the direct threat to the
state treasuries that party-based jurisdiction posed, but were less concerned about what some diversity theorists have characterized as the
then-hypothetical possibility that Congress might confer general federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts, thus enabling them to
hear claims brought against a state by one of its own citizens. 38 0 The
Eleventh Amendment, therefore, addresses two instances of partybased jurisdiction, narrowing them to curtail proceedings against the
states, but does not otherwise address state suability in federal question and admiralty matters.
Literalists, as they have become known, reject the diversity account for a variety of reasons, and instead argue that the two disfavored or ineligible plaintiffs may not sue the state at all, even by
376

Hans,134 U.S. at 10 (observing that literal adherence to the Eleventh Amendment

would produce an anomalous distinction between in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs, and
rejecting the text on that basis).
377
See cases cited supra note 8.
378 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1060-63; Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1274; Gibbons,
supra note 6, at 1936-37.
379 Diversity theorists differ in their thinking about the clarity with which Article III
subjects the states to suit in federal question, treaty, and admiralty matters. See Fletcher,
supra note 19, at 1286-87, 1292 (expressing an unwillingness to press the evidence of state
suability in treaty matters as far as Judge Gibbons had, and arguing that the framers of the
Eleventh Amendment may have postponed the issue of state suability in federal question
matters generally).
380
We can trace the trajectory of the diversity account in the work of Professor'
Fletcher. He began with a relatively vigorous argument that the framers of the Eleventh
Amendment had no reason to fear federal question suits, and thus likely addressed only
diversity-based proceedings grounded in general common law. Fletcher, supra note 11, at
1077-78. Later, in response to critics and friends who had noted the existence of potential
federal question claims based upon the Treaty of 1783, Fletcher modified his views.
Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1291-93 (conceding that the framers may have been aware of the
possibility of federal question claims).
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invoking federal question jurisdiction.3 8 1 For literalists, the threat of
state suability was quite real, both in federal question and in partyalignment proceedings. 38 2 To support their account, literalists point
to evidence from the Article III ratification debates, 3 8 3 to the possibly
self-executing grant of original jurisdiction (a point emphasized by
Edmund Randolph in Chisholm),384 to the threat of federal treaty liability in party-alignment suits such as Vassall,3 8 5 and to the short-lived
grant of jurisdiction over federal questions in the 1801 Judiciary
Act. 386 To the literalists, these factors suggest that the elimination of
diverse-party jurisdiction would have sent existing claims into
"hibernation," but would not have prevented enterprising plaintiffs
from reasserting the claims as federal questions.3 87 They conclude
that the Eleventh Amendment must have been intended to curtail the
possibility of all such suits, at least by the two classes of ineligible plaintiffs. Otherwise, the Court might simply have nodded at the Amendment and reaffirmed state suability. The omission of in-state citizens,
on this account, simply represents a compromise, barring all suits by
those ineligible plaintiffs and preserving federal question claims by instate plaintiffs, the group most likely to have suffered an invasion of
3 88
their federal rights by a state.
381 The literalist school takes its name from the claim that the Eleventh Amendment
clearly and unambiguously bars all suits brought by the two disfavored classes of plaintiffs.
See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1343 (speaking of the "essentially unambiguous dictates of
the amendment's language"); Massey, supra note 11, at 65 (commenting on the "face
value" of the text). In effect, literalists argue that the Amendment precludes the assertion
of jurisdiction over all claims by disfavored plaintiffs, including those claims based upon
federal questions. See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1346; Massey, supra note 11, at 65.
382 See Massey, supra note 11, at 87-96 (tracing the history of government suability and
showing that it emerged as a distinct possibility from the framing and ratification of Article

III).
383 See id.
at 93-96 (contrasting Gibbons's view of the clarity of the evidence supporting
state suability with that of other observers, and concluding that a robust debate existed on
the issue).
384 See id.at 101 n.209, 107, 117 n.288 (linking debates about the nature of the Court's
original jurisdiction to those about state suability).
385 See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1356-60.
386
See Massey, supra note 11, at 115 n.280; Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 19, at 120 n.12 (submission of Calvin R. Massey).
387 Massey, supra note 11, at 115 (arguing that an Amendment along the lines suggested by the diversity account would have placed diversity-based federal question claims in
"hibernation," and that a grant of federal question jurisdiction would have permitted them
to "emerge from their slumbers"); accord Marshall, supra note 331, at 1381-82 (noting the
possibility that claims to collect state debts might be brought as federal questions and suggesting that this easy way around the Eleventh Amendment, if understood only as a curtailment of party-aligumentjurisdiction, represents a serious obstacle to scholarly acceptance
of the diversity account).
388 See Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 120 (submissiojt of Calvin
R. Massey) (describing the text of the Eleventh Amendment as badly drafted, and attributing this shortcoming to a political compromise); Marshall, supranote 11, at 1355 (describ-
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The debate over "federal cognizance," and over the extent to
which the framers of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment contemplated state suability in federal question matters lies at the center
of the literalist challenge to the diversity account. The Framers of the
Constitution may have contemplated state suability in federal question
cases to enforce the constitutional restrictions on state action in Article 1, Section 10. Indeed, many of the Framers, and particularly Hamilton, Madison, and Randolph, appear to have regarded the Original
Jurisdiction Clause as a grant of authority specifically designed to perfect the federal judicial enforceability of limits on the states.3 89 In addition, state suability was hardly the unthinkable prospect portrayed
by the defenders of the "profound shock" thesis; by 1790, at least
three different states had created means for the assertion of contract
claims and other entity-based proceedings, and other states had at
39 0
least experimented with judicial determination of public claims.

To the extent that this evidence suggests a less remote prospect of
state suability in federal question proceedings, it tends to support the
literal account and undermine the diversity view.
The explanatory account of the Eleventh Amendment can help
rehabilitate the diversity view by focusing attention on the effective
date of the federal limitations on the states. If I am correct that the
Framers maintained that the constitutional limits were to apply only to
state action taken subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution,
then the limits in Article I, Section 10 simply did not apply to the
kinds of suits and proceedings with which the framers of the Eleventh
ing the Amendment as a compromise between the dual purposes of immunity and
accountability that conformed to the political and fiscal realities of the day).
389 See Pfander, supra note 13, at 588-604.
390 See Pfander, supra note 69, at 939-42, 1003-06 (describing the provisions for the
judicial determination of public claims against the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia; and describing the experiences of the States of Georgia, New Jersey, and Delaware with judicial determination of certain kinds of claims against the state). Georgia's
statute for the determination of public claims read as follows:
[Any person having a claim or demand against the State, where (in like
cases) one citizen might sue and maintain an action against another, such
person shall be at liberty to file a bill or petition in the superior court of the
county in which the seat of government may be, making the governor for
the time being defendant thereto, a copy whereof shall be served on the
auditor, whose duty it shall be to make a special report to the court and
attend the trial, if thought necessary; the original shall be filed and docketted in court; the attorney or solicitor general shall appear to and defend
the same ... : Should either party... be dissatisfied with the determination, an appeal shall be entered and tried before a special jury; and the
final decision of the jury, if in favor of the plaintiff, shall be transmitted to
the succeeding legislature, who may provide, as they may think proper, for
payment of such judgment or judgments ....
An Act to amend, explain and continue the "Act for regulating the judiciary departments
of this State," No. 438 (Dec. 9, 1790), reprintedin 2 FIRsT LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 229,
at 422-23.
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Amendment were concerned. Certainly, the claims in Chisholm and
Hollingsworth involved state liability for obligations incurred and action taken before the Constitution took effect. As a consequence, the
Federalists who authored and supported the Eleventh Amendment
could have agreed to curtail state suability in diverse-party matters and
simultaneously meant to preserve the full range of state suability in
federal question proceedings. Put in other terms, Chisholm simply did
not present a case of potential federal liability, and so did not call for
a solution that curtailed a source of federal question jurisdiction.
Several features of this explanatory account of the federal cognizance debate fit neatly with what we know about the debate over
Chisholm. That debate featured wide-ranging condemnation of the
retrospective features of the Court's decision; elimination of the jurisdictional basis for such retrospective judicial intervention effectively
cut off any source of (federal) judicially imposed liability. Thus, the
cure to Chisholm, as understood in the explanatory account, fits the
mischief seen in that decision. Moreover, we can now better understand why the framers of the Eleventh Amendment chose to ignore
state suability in federal question cases. Such noncognizance of federal matters stemmed, in all likelihood, from the framers' perception
that plaintiffs simply could not recast their Chisholm-like claims in federal terms. In short, we can accept the diversity account without denying that the popular debate (both before and after Chisholm) did
include a recognition of the possibility of state suability in federal
question cases.
2.

The Debate over the Plausibility of Creating Two Classes of
Ineligible Plaintiffs

The evidence underlying the explanatory account of the Eleventh
Amendment also raises serious doubts about the plausibility of the literalist account of the threat these "hibernating" state debt claims
posed to the state treasuries of the day. In accounting for the policy
underlying the literal explanation of the Amendment, Professor Lawrence Marshall contends that it would have made sense for the framers of the Amendment to have foreclosed both federal question and
diverse party suits by nonresidents and aliens, and to have left federal
question state suability intact with respect to in-state citizens.3 9 1 Professor Marshall argues that the nonresidents who held claims against
the states were probably speculators, and were therefore likely to have
been thought undeserving of a federal forum.3 92 Moreover, Marshall

argues that alien claimants were likely to be loyalists whose property
was confiscated either before or shortly after the effective date of the
391
392

Marshall, supra note 11, at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366.
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Treaty of 1783. 3 93 Barring all federal question and common law
claims by such "disfavored" plaintiffs would have closed the courts to
both speculators and tories-a result compatible with the politics of
the day.
Yet it is doubtful that the framers would have drafted an amendment to deal with so modest a threat to the state treasuries as that
posed by out-of-state plaintiffs. In the only study I have found that
explores the residency of state debt holders in the 1790s, historian
James Ferguson disclosed information from which one can conclude
that the securities evidencing state debts, including those large blocks
of securities that speculators purchased, were overwhelmingly owned
by in-state citizens.3 94 Although Ferguson focused primarily on the
size of the speculative holdings, he also set forth data from which one
can surmise that residents of at least two of the states that had issued
them owned as much as 80-90% of the state securities outstanding as
of the date of Hamilton's funding plan.39 5 Unfortunately, Ferguson

was unable to study the lost or damaged records of the southern
393

Id. at 1356-60.

In his study, Ferguson consulted records from Massachusetts and Rhode Island and
determined the residency of those who owned state securities and chose to swap them for
federal securities under the terms of Hamilton's assumption plan. FERGUSON, supra note
45, at 273-75. The state debt instruments involved in Ferguson's study were exchanged for
federal instruments and were therefore unlikely to have been the subject of suits brought
against the states in federal court. Yet the distribution of these debts sheds some light on
the likely distribution of other state debts (which Hamilton estimated at $4 million) that
remained outstanding after assumption.
395
Ferguson notes that Boston residents held 61% of the Massachusetts state securities
exchanged in Hamilton's 1790 funding plan. Id. at 274. He also sets forth textual and
tabular information from which one can determine that 93 of the 107 largest holders of
public securities, or roughly 87%, were residents of Boston. Id. at 27-74. Since Ferguson
does not specify the residency of the non-Boston holders of securities, we can only guess
whether they lived in other cities within the state of Massachusetts or in some other state.
In placing the overall figure for in-state ownership at approximately 80-90%, I have assumed that Massachusetts issued the bulk of its securities to its own citizens in the first
instance; that many of these citizens still held these relatively modest blocks of securities;
that the speculators tended to hold the largest blocks, and that most out-of-state holdings
appear within the category of the 107 largest speculative holders noted above. If one
makes the conservative assumption that all of the non-Boston owners of these large blocks
(13%) actually lived outside the state of Massachusetts (rather than in other eastern cities
within Massachusetts), one might conservatively conclude that out-of-state holdings made
up no more than 10-20% of the total.
The same conclusion emerges from a review of Ferguson's data regarding security
ownership in Rhode Island. Id. at 280-81. Ferguson reports that 71% of the total was held
in Providence and Newport, the two mercantile centers of the state. Id. at 281. Ferguson
further reports that, aside from one speculative owner who lived in Boston, all of the nine
largest holders lived in one of those two Rhode Island cities. Id. By consulting tabular
information, id. at 280, one can thus conclude that out-of-state owners held $10,144 of the
$229,429 held in the largest speculative blocks, or less than 5%. In sum, it appears that the
speculative purchasers of Massachusetts and Rhode Island state securities tended to live in
the mercantile centers of the issuing states, rather than outside the states.
394
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states, where northern speculators had been busiest.3 96 Still, existing

records strongly suggest that in-state citizens owned the bulk of state
debt. If the framers knew this fact,3 97 then the literal account collapses. The literalists posit a concern with state suability on federal
question claims that were held predominantly by the in-state citizens
that they themselves view as eligible to bring such claims.
In short, this distribution of debt primarily among in-state citizens (and only secondarily among out-of-state citizens) tends to confirm that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment did not share the
literalists' concern with the assertion of federal question claims. Instead, they probably believed that the Constitution left the issue of
state debts in the hands of the states themselves, subject to congressional assumption. If the framers felt that repudiation or scaling by
the states violated neither federal law nor constitutional prohibition,
then the in-state debt holders posed no threat to state control; these
plaintiffs simply could not reassert their "hibernating" claims by invoking federal question jurisdiction.
3.

Suability Issues That the Assignment of State Debt Raises

Literalists make a similar mistake with respect to the assignment
of state debt. The literalist account perceives in-state citizens as potentially eligible to bring federal claims against the states to enforce state
indebtedness.3 98 Diversity theorists have rightly noted that a constitutional amendment that barred disfavored plaintiffs from bringing federal claims but permitted eligible in-state plaintiffs to do so would
have invited the sale of notes, indents, and certificates from (ineligible) out-of-staters to (eligible) in-staters.3 99 Under this view, all out-of396 rd at 272 (making this disclaimer).
397 Information about the distribution of debts should have been readily available to
the state officials responsible for servicing the interest on the debt. During the 1780s and
1790s, most states paid interest on their certificate debt either in specie or paper currency,
or by issuing "indents" as evidence of further indebtedness. Owners claiming interest had
to register their claims with the states; the process of registration offered the states a mode
of determining who owned state securities. Similarly, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York,
and NewJersey had recently begun to assume the federal debts of their own citizens; such
an assumption would have produced a state debt dominated by the claims of in-state citizens. See id. at 221-32 (linking state assumption of the debt to the use of currency finance
methods).
For confirmation that contemporary opinion understood that in-staters held most of
the state securities, see The True Federalist, Essay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Feb. 6, 1794,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 253, 255 (noting that the "greater part of the State

securities are in the hands of citizens of the States which have severally issued the notes").
398

399

See, e.g., supra note 381.
See Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supranote 19, at 134-35 (submission of Wil-

liam A. Fletcher) (describing the framers of the Eleventh Amendment as inept to have
permitted an end run around the rule of nonsuability through assignment to in-state plaintiffs); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1281 (noting that the possibility of assignment raises a
difficulty for the literal account).
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state debt would flow back to in-state owners, who would value the
debt nearly at the specie value they could collect in (hypothetically
40 0
available federal question) claims against the states.
Literal theorists admit that assignment presents a "perplexing
problem, '40 1 and their answers strike me as clearly inadequate. Professor Massey contends that the Supreme Court may have refused to
assertjurisdiction over debt claims brought by subsequent in-state purchasers, on the theory that these in-state purchasers had engaged in a
"sham" transaction for the purpose of manufacturing jurisdiction. 40 2
Professor Fletcher rightly characterizes this contention as a "daring"
assertion; 40 3 sales of government securities were genuine transactions
in which the purchaser bought the right to repayment of principal
and interest that the instrument evidenced. 404 It is difficult to liken
such purchases to the sham transaction exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction; in fact, that exception was a creature of statute. 40 5 Moreover, ajudge-made rule ofjurisdictional ouster would have established
a regime of discrimination in favor of original in-state holders and
against subsequent in-state purchasers. Such a rule of discrimination
had been rejected as a matter of Hamiltonian finance, and would have
40 6
been an extremely controversial judicial maneuver.
400
Diversity theorists have criticized this account on two grounds. First, they argue
that the framers were unlikely to have introduced a distinction between in-state and out-ofstate citizens with respect to the enforceability of federal limits on state action. Such discrimination was precisely the kind that the Constitution sought to suppress with the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article IV. See, e.g., Fletcher, supranote 19, at 1283 & n.111.
Second, the diversity theorists argue that the ineligible plaintiffs might have avoided the
jurisdictional problem by transferring or assigning their claims against the states to eligible
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 134-35 (submission
of William A. Fletcher).
401
Marshall, supra note 11, at 1367 n.113.
402 Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 120 (submission of Calvin R.
Massey).
403 Id. at 134 (submission of William A. Fletcher).
404 Hamilton's funding plan sought to create a market in federal debt instruments. See
McDoNALD, supra note 45, at 192-93. The purpose for creating such a market, at least in
part, was to assure the public debt holders that they could cash out by selling their instruments and obtain a price at or near par value. Hamilton thus proposed to use open market purchases to support the price of the debt and to assure the value of the investment.
See id. at 194.
405 Professor Massey argues, by analogy to section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, that
the bar to the creation of diversity jurisdiction through the assignment of choses in action
would have been applied to the quite different problem arising from an assignment intended to create federal question jurisdiction. Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 19, at 120 (submission of Calvin R. Massey). For a decisive argument against Massey's
view, see id. at 134-35 (submission of William A. Fletcher).
406 On Hamilton's proposal to avoid discrimination between original holders and subsequent purchasers, and on Madison's support for such discrimination and the eventual
decision of Congress to refrain from discriminating, see FERGUSON, supra note 45, at 29394, 297-305.
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Professor Lawrence Marshall has defended against this problem
by pointing to the prospect of assigning claims to the United States or
to another state, which then might sue the debtor state; Marshall suggests that such assignments would raise problems for diversity theorists. 40 7

But the

debate

Chisholm triggered

suggests

that the

generation that framed the Eleventh Amendment saw a fundamental
difference between claims brought against the states by individuals
and those brought byjural equals or superiors. In Massachusetts, Virginia, and Georgia, the public debate over Chisholm distinguished
sharply between state suability in claims brought by individuals and
that in proceedings brought by other governments. 40 8 Jurisdiction
over claims by government plaintiffs was defended on the ground of
its necessity to secure peace and harmony; if states lacked the power to
sue one another, they might rely upon the sword to settle their disputes.40 9 Therefore, there is good reason to believe that any problem
of assignment to "eligible" government-entity plaintiffs would have
been seen as raising an issue distinct from that addressed by an
amendment that focused on suits by individual plaintiffs.
At the end of the day, the problem of assignment offers strong
support for the diversity account. The absence of diversity over the
claims by in-state plaintiffs meant that these citizens looked primarily
to the state courts and state legislatures for debt service, or to the federal government under Hamilton's assumption plan. Chisholm created
a serious threat to the regime of state control by enabling out-of-staters to enforce their debt claims in specie; an assignment problem
may also have developed after Chisholm, resulting in the flow of certifi-

407 Marshall, supra note 11, at 1366 n.113.
408 For evidence that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment regarded suability by
individuals as different in kind from suability by jural equals or superiors, consider the
resolutions of the state legislatures that emphasize a concern with suits by "any individual,"
but refrain from mentioning suability by other government bodies. See supranotes 301-10
and accompanying text; see also Proceedings of the GeorgiaHouse of Representatives, supra note
269, at 161-62 (arguing against suits by individuals against the states but accepting the
suability of states "in cases where two states are parties or between the United States and an
individual state"); Hancock, supra note 271, at 418 (admitting the need for a tribunal independent of the states, doubting the availability of such a tribunal in suits against the
states in matters of civil contract, but admitting its application to "such injuries as may take
place by force, and may therefore have a tendency to destroy the peace of the Union, or
involve the nation in a war with a foreign power").
409
Letter from Henry Lee to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, supra
note 303, at 336 (deprecating state suability by individuals as a "prostitution of State Sovereignty" but admitting that states may have had boundary disputes with one another or
debts payable to foreign powers, and that such causes "might be productive of Serious
quarrels between States, and between States and foreign States"); see also The True Federalist, Essay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Feb. 11, 1794, reprintedin 5 DHSG, supranote 3, at 26465 (distinguishing controversies between states from those between a state and an
individual).
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cates out of state and into the hands of speculators. 4 10 The Eleventh
Amendment eliminated this possibility of assignment by curtailing
suits against the states by the two classes of plaintiffs that Chisholm had
made eligible to receive and enforce assigned debt claims. The
Amendment thus closed an assignment loophole that had threatened
the Federalist compromise on state control over existing debts.
4.

The GallatinAmendment and State Suability in Treaty Cases

The problem that the Vassalllitigationposes does not undermine
the diversity explanation of the Amendment. Vassall, a British subject,
brought a claim in diversity against the State of Massachusetts seeking
compensation for a confiscation alleged to have been perfected after
the effective date of the Treaty of 1783. 411 Literalists rightly point to
Vassall and other claims to enforce the Treaty as evidence that the
framers of the Eleventh Amendment must have contemplated the possibility that at least some disfavored plaintiffs-those whose claims
were based on violations of treaties-might recast their claims to invoke federal question jurisdiction. 412 The Treaty of 1783 was the one
body of law dating from the Articles of Confederation period that was
both binding on the states as such and clearly meant to remain so
under the retrospective language of the Supremacy Clause.4 13 But the
Eleventh Amendment swept these diversity-based claims from the
Court's docket, and refiling would have required unpopular enabling
414
legislation from Congress.
410 Contemporary opinion viewed in-state plaintiffs as having no right tojudicially enforce existing securities against the states and thus saw the Chisholm decision as creating an
incentive to assign the securities to eligible out-of-state plaintiffs. Commenting on Chisholm
in a Boston newspaper, The True Federalist noted that the greater part of the securities
were "in the hands of citizens of the States which have severally issued the notes." The
True Federalist, supranote 397, at 256. He further noted that these in-state plaintiffs "cannot by the Constitution sue in any Court." Id. It followed that Chisholm would lead to
fraudulent transfers: "[b]y a piece of artifice, the Securities may be nominally transferred
out of the State, for the purpose of supporting an action in the Federal Court." Id. at 25657; cf. Essays ofBrutus, No. XLII, supra note 157, at 174 (arguing that the bills of credit, which
were made payable to bearer and had been issued by the states to finance the Revolutionary War, would flow to nonresident holders for enforcement at par in federal court).
411
Vassall himself stated the nature of his dispute quite clearly in correspondence with
his American lawyers. See Letter from William Vassall to John Lowell, Jr. (Nov. 2, 1791), in
5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 381. In particular, Vassall understood that the legality of the
confiscation turned on the questions of whether it had been perfected before the effective
date of the Treaty of 1783, and whether a statute the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
passed in November 1784 to confirm the confiscation was to have retroactive effect. From
Vassall's correspondence, it appears that the Massachusetts law of 1784 was structured as a
declaratory or explanatory act and was intended by the legislature to operate retrospectively. See id. (arguing that the act of November 1784 would not be "a declaratory Act, but
would be a New Act to Confiscate de novo My personal Estate").
412
See Marshall, supra note 11, at 1357-60; Massey, supra note 11, at 114.
413
See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
414
See supra text accompanying notes 358-64.
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The historical record reveals that the framers of the Amendment
deliberately rejected earlier proposals that would have preserved suability in cases like VassalL4 15 The first proposal, which Senator Albert
Gallatin sponsored, would have made the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable to "cases arising under treaties, made under the authority of
the United States."41 6 Diversity theorists maintain, correctly in my
view, that this language would have preserved party-based jurisdiction
in treaty cases; 4 17 its rejection by the Senate reveals a preference for a
total repeal of the diversity clause of Article 111.418 Immediately after

the Gallatin amendment failed, another Senator anonymously proposed a substitute for the Strong language that reflects both an awareness of state suability in federal question cases and a desire to protect
415
The lone House proposal would have included a proviso limiting the rule of nonsuability to situations "[w] here such State shall have previously made provision in their own
courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect." Proceedings of the United States
House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 620, 620. The
House's resounding rejection of that proposal tells us little about the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment; but whatever its intention, the House was clearly unwilling to countenance a provision that imposed suability on the states in their own courts.
Professor V6.zquez has emphasized this history in arguing against the prevailing forumallocation understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. Vdzquez, supranote 20, at 1725-26.
Although I agree with Professor Vizquez that the framers did not intend to impose suability upon the states in their own courts, I disagree with his claim that this history may be
"most reasonabl[y]" interpreted to suggest that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment
meant to give the states the same protection from suit in state court as in federal court. -T&
Many states during the Federalist era made no provision for the judicial disposition of
money claims against them, and treated the matter instead as one for resolution upon
petition to the legislature. See Pfander, supra note 69, at 939-42 (noting that many states,
including those in New England, were slow to adopt judicial modes for the determination
of claims against the state). Adoption of the House provision would have required the
states to adopt ajudicial mode of claim disposition to avoid suit in federal court, and would
have made federal jurisdiction depend on state law. Many may have rejected such an approach, either from a desire to protect the state legislative role in the management of
public claims or a desire to refrain from making federal suability dependent upon state
judicial modes. Both accounts strike me as more plausible than a desire to establish parallel protections for the states in the state and federal courts.
416 Proceedings of the United States Senate (Jan. 14, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 617, 617. Senator Gallatin moved to amend Strong's proposal to read as follows:
The judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under
treaties, made under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States, by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state.
Id.
417
See Exchange on the Eleventh Amendmen supra note 19, at 135 (submission of William
A. Fletcher).
418
Rejection of the proposed Gallatin amendment thus suggests that the framers of
the Eleventh Amendment were aware that aliens might enjoy greater success in prosecuting claims against the states on the Court's original docket than out-of-state citizens. The
Chisholm decision suggests that plaintiffs might have had a better chance of succeeding on
the merits in circumstances where they were invoking party-based jurisdiction to secure the
adjudication of claims ultimately based upon federal law. See Pfander, supra note 13, at
649.
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that suability in the future while foreclosing state liability on pre-existing claims. 4 19 Although the substitute was also defeated, its evident
concern with the curtailment of existing claims suggests that issues of
420
retrospectivity informed the Senate's debate over state suability.
5.

The Addition of the Words of Construction, "Be Construed To"

Of the many subjects of academic speculation, Senator Strong's
decision to add the words of construction, "be construed to," to the
text of the Eleventh Amendment has been among the most fruitful.
Advocates of the profound-shock view see the addition of these words
as a confirmation that the Eleventh Amendment looked backward toward some supposedly broad-based constitutional consensus that the
states were immune from suit.421 Alternative accounts abound. Pro-

fessor Nowak, who has argued that the Eleventh Amendment leaves
Congress free to abrogate state immunity in areas within its legislative
competence, suggests that the addition of these words of construction
may have highlighted the framers' concern with the judicial assump419

The proposed substitute language read as follows:

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, where the cause of action shall have
arisen before the ratification of this amendment.
Proceedings of the United States Senate, supra note 416, at 617.
The first sentence of the substitute appears to confirm state suability in federal question cases by restating the relevant language of Article III; indeed, the substitute borrows
the language of the Original Jurisdiction Clause. Next, the substitute forecloses partybased suits where the cause of action accrued before the Amendment's ratification. The
substitute's appearance in the Senate records thus offers some support for the notion that
issues of suability in federal question proceedings and issues of retrospectivity informed
the Senate's deliberations on the final language of the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, rejection of the substitute does not necessarily mean that the Senate meant
to reject the substitute's evident desire to reaffirm suability in federal question cases. Some
Senators may have regarded a reaffirmation as unnecessary or impolitic. Others may have
opposed the limitation in the second part of the substitute, which leaves open the possibility of state suability in diverse-party controversies arising after ratification of the amendment. Such a limitation would have left the states subject to suit to enforce their public
obligations incurred after ratification, and would have threatened the states with the sort
of federal judicial enforcement of state law matters that had made Chisholm controversial.
We can perhaps best understand the rejection of the substitute as reflecting a desire to end
all federal judicial enforcement of state contracts, at least in the absence of a violation of
federal law.
420
The substitute proposed to modify the Eleventh Amendment by dropping the
words of construction, "be construed to." Elimination of the words "be construed to" may
reflect the drafter's recognition that the substitute was limited by its terms to claims in
which the cause of action accrued before ratification and thus would not apply to any
pending claims.
421
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-21 (1890).
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tion of jurisdiction. 42 2 Professor Tribe has made a similar claim. 423
Professor Amar sees the language as designed to clarify that the judicial power did not extend to diverse-party claims as such, but might
extend to them on the basis of an alternative (federal question) jurisdictional grant. 424 Professor Jacobs has suggested that the language
may have been "a gesture toward those state legislatures that.., had
called for an explanatory amendment" with retrospective
4 25
operation.
Like that of ProfessorJacobs, my explanatory account of the Eleventh Amendment views the addition of these words of construction as
designed to clarify the intention of its framers that the Amendment
would operate as an explanation or clarification of the meaning of
Article III. Explanatory amendments were common devices during
the eighteenth century by which lawmakers attempted to place a legislative gloss on the meaning of existing law and to give their new interpretation

or explanation

retrospective

effect. 4 26

Many

of the

explanatory statutes included the words "be construed"; the historical
record suggests that these words may have been terms of art that sig427
naled a legislature's desire to secure a retrospective application.
Moreover, many state legislatures responded to Chisholm by calling for
an amendment explanatory of Article III to clarify the scope of state
suability. 428 Finally, the attorneys in Hollingsworth apparently regarded
the words "be construed" as designed to secure the Amendment's retrospective operation. 4 29
This explanatory account of the words of construction ties together a number of threads in the alternative accounts. As the
profound-shock theorists suppose, the words of the Amendment look
back to a fairly broad consensus that predated the Constitution. But
rather than a consensus on full state nonsuability, the Eleventh
Nowak, supra note 14, at 1437.
Tribe, supra note 16, at 687 (portraying the words of construction in the Eleventh
Amendment as an admonition to the federal courts).
422
423

424

Amar, supra note 11, at 1482.

JAcoBs, supra note 11, at 68; see id. at 68-69 (suggesting that the words may have
been added "to correct an erroneous judicial interpretation;" or "to ensure retrospective
application of the amendment to suits already filed;" or "to soften any supposed rebuke to
the Court, by indicating that the Court's interpretation of Article III allowing suits against
the states, while tenable, was to be abandoned in favor of the opposite construction").
Although I agree with most of Professor Jacobs's interpretations, I doubt that the addition
of the words would have been seen as softening the rebuke. A direct amendment may have
been viewed as an admission of the accuracy of the Court's ruling and as a change in the
law for the future. An explanatory amendment, by contrast, may have tended to convey
the belief that the Court erred in adopting its construction. For evidence that this may
have been the understanding of the day, see supra note 310.
See supra Part II.A.
426
427
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
425

428

See supra Part II.B.3.

429

See supranotes 314-19 and accompanying text.
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Amendment sought to restore a world in which there were no federal
tribunals in which litigants could enforce pre-constitutional state obligations. Thus, the explanatory account tends to confirm the diversity
thesis. The diversity account sees the Eleventh Amendment as offering a rule of construction for Article III that overrules Chisholm and
establishes the diverse-party immunity interpretation that Madison
and Marshall proposed in the Virginia ratification debates. 4 0 Professor Fletcher offered exactly that explanation when he suggested that
the Eleventh Amendment required a narrow interpretation of the diverse-party grant rather than a strict prohibition against the assertion
of jurisdiction in federal question proceedings brought by disfavored
parties. 43 ' The words of construction confirm Professor Fletcher's as432
tute observation.
6.

On the Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment

Scholarly opinion divides on the question whether the framers of
the Eleventh Amendment could have accomplished their goals by way
of statutory, rather than constitutional, amendment. As the literalists
have noted, 433 the framers of the Eleventh Amendment could have
eliminated diversity jurisdiction and its threat of state suability by simply amending the text of section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.434 In-

stead, they went further and constitutionalized a rule of state
See supra note 196.
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1061-62.
By the same token, the appearance of the words "be construed" in the Breckenridge amendment tends to suggest an intention on the part of its drafters and supporters
to eliminate both pending and future claims. Supporters of the curtailment of diversity
jurisdiction introduced the Breckenridge amendment in 1805, 1806, and 1807. See Amar,
supra note 11, at 1482-83; Massey, supra note 11, at 118 & n.294. Scholars agree that,
although it did not pass, the amendment clearly meant to curtail only the federal courts'
diversityjurisdiction by constitutional amendment, leaving its-federal question jurisdiction
intact. That the framers of the Breckenridge amendment used the words "be construed"
in their proposed amendment of Article III has been seen by some as support for a diversity reading of the Eleventh Amendment, which uses similar language. See Amar, supra
note 11, at 1482; Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1276-79. But see Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment supranote 19, at 129-30 (submission of Lawrence C. Marshall) (cogently noting that
the distinction between the Eleventh Amendment's reference to suits and proceedings and
the Breckenridge amendment's reference to "controversies" makes the latter more clearly
restricted to diverse-party claims). I do not see the Breckenridge amendment as adding
much to our knowledge of the Eleventh Amendment, aside from its confirmation that
legislative drafters in the early nineteenth century may have sought to ensure retrospective
application of their jurisdictional curtailments by framing them as explanatory amendments and including the words "be construed" to confirm their intention in this respect.
433 See Massey, supra note 11, at 115-16.
434
Section 13 provided that the Supreme Court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13,
1 Stat. 73, 80 (Judiciary Act of 1789). Although the Court now regards its own original
jurisdiction as mandatory and self-executing, see Pfander, supra note 13, at 563, it is less
430
431
432
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nonsuability. Literalists argue that the constitutional language represents an effort to "permanently inter" the prospect of state suability and
to place it beyond the power of future Congresses to restore. 4 5 Without a constitutional amendment, the prospect of federal question suability in actions brought by disfavored plaintiffs would remain capable
of overcoming mere statutory prohibitions against diverse-party
4 36
claims.
Diversity supporters have answered this point in a number of
ways, perhaps most cogently by noting that the puzzle of constitutional amendment exists for all accounts, not just for the diversity account.43 7 Professor Fletcher has also noted that the possibility that the

Court would regard its original jurisdiction as mandatory and self-executing may have necessitated a constitutional amendment. Under
such a view, the Court might simply reaffirm Chisholm if section 13
were repealed. 43 8 Professor Gibbons has noted that a constitutional
amendment may have quieted the outcries of the Anti-Federalists and
staved off a constitutional convention. 439 Professor Nowak, though
not strictly a diversity theorist, sees the constitutional response as one
designed to curtail further judicial innovation and to preserve congressional primacy in issues of state suability.4 0
We should also consider the possibility that a constitutional
amendment was necessary to eliminate the federal judicial role with
respect to existing claims. The explanatory account sees the Eleventh
Amendment as driven by the retrospective features of Chisholm and
the need to foreclose state suability as to all claims arising from preconstitutional debts. Once the Court agreed to hear the claim in
Chisholm and others like it, there was at least some prospect that it
would refuse to give effect to a mere statutory change; such a statute
might have been viewed as improperly retrospective itself. During this
period, courts often ignored explanatory statutes with retrospective
clear that the framers of the judiciary Act so regarded the Court's original jurisdiction in
the 1790s, see Massey, supra note 11, at 115-16.
435
Massey, supra note 11, at 117.
436 See Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 122 (submission of Calvin
K1 Massey) (referring to federal question jurisdiction as "the joker" that could trump the

mere repeal of diversity jurisdiction).
437
See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1288.
438
1a at 1288-89 (positing that merely repealing section 13 of the Judiciary Act may
have invited a reaffirmance of Chisholm); see also Jackson, supra note 11, at 45 & n.184
(concluding that a constitutional amendment may have been necessary to overcome the
mandatory language of the Original Jurisdiction Clause).
439 Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1931-32, 1938 (characterizing the Eleventh Amendment,
which was adopted in the midst of calls for a new constitutional convention, as a "tub
thrown to the whale of republicanism").
440
Nowak, supra note 14, at 1440 (expressing doubt that Federalists would have supported a flat ban on state suability, but noting that they may have supported an amendment that left Congress free to grant jurisdiction over state defendants in the future).
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effect,44 1 and the framers of the Eleventh Amendment may have
feared that the statutory repeal of section 13 would have been so regarded. 44 2 After all, the Constitution itself foreclosed Congress from
passing ex post facto laws, and the Eleventh Amendment was framed
before Calder v. Bull44 3 limited application of this prohibition to crimi-

nal and penal statutes. 44 4 The constitutional force of the Amendment's curtailment of the judicial power made it far more difficult for
the Court to sustain its jurisdiction over existing claims.
B. The Explanatory Account and Recent Developments in
Constitutional Federalism
Just as it calls for a reassessment of historical scholarship, the explanatory account raises serious questions about recent Supreme
Court action taken in the name of the Eleventh Amendment. This
Section highlights the areas in which the Court's work appears least
faithful to the framers' conception of the Amendment's function.

441
See supra text accompanying notes 208-13 (discussing Ogden v. Blackledge and its
siblings).
442
For evidence that the debate over the proper response to Chisholm included a discussion of the possibility that the Court might ignore a retrospective federal statute, see
Essay, GENERAL ADVERTISER (Boston), July 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
391, 391 (criticizing the decision of the Massachusetts governor to call a special session in
response to Chisholm; noting that "it has been determined by the first judicial tribunal in
the country, that a state is liable to be sued;" arguing that the "only way to get rid of the
difficulty is by an amendment to the constitution of the United States-no act of this free
commonwealth, no act of congress-no alteration of the constitution can affect an action
already commenced;" and concluding that "Ex rosT FACTO laws are prohibited"). A similar
suggestion appears in the records of Virginia. There, Governor Henry Lee initially proposed to the Virginia House of Delegates that they send a memorial to Congress urging its
members "to press the passage of a law explaining and detailing the power granted by the
constitution to the Judiciary [in Article III]." Letter from Henry Lee to the Speaker of the
Virginia House of Delegates, supra note 303, at 337. The apparent purpose of proposing
the passage of a law, rather than a constitutional amendment, was to secure a judicial test
of the dispositive nature of such legislation. Governor Lee put the matter as follows:
I consider the eligibility of the plan [to seek passage of an explanatory law]
very much enhanced, because . .. the Sooner it is known to the people
whether an Act passed by Congress be a law when passed, or only be a law
when affirmed by a Judiciary decree made under its authority, the better.
Id.at 337-38. Lee here appears to have contemplated the possibility that the Court might
refuse to give effect to an explanatory statute; he welcomed a test of that possibility. But
calmer heads prevailed and the Virginia General Assembly enacted and published a resolution calling for an explanatory amendment of the Constitution instead of an explanatory
law. See supra text accompanying note 304 (quoting the language of the Virginia resolution
calling for "amendments in the constitution").
443 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
444
Id. at 390-91 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 397 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 399
(opinion of Iredell, J.).
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1. Seminole Tribe and the "Principle"of Sovereign Immunity
According to the Court, the Eleventh Amendment operates less
as a technical explanation of one aspect of the jurisdictional menu of
Article III than as a constitutional affirmation of the principle of sovereign immunity. Through the development of this "principle" of immunity in a series of cases beginning with Hans, the Court has moved
steadily away from any sense that the text of the Amendment limits its
operation. In Hans, the Court refused on Eleventh Amendment
grounds to assert jurisdiction over a claim arising under federal law.
brought by an in-state citizen against the State of Louisiana-a claim
clearly outside the restrictive language in the text.445 The Court has

since extended the sovereign immunity principle of Hans to bar both
suits brought by foreign states and proceedings in federal admiralty
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the text's inapplicability to these matters. 44 6 As the Court explained most recently, these decisions see the

importance of the Eleventh Amendment "'not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition [of sovereign immunity] which it
confirms.'"447
Yet the history of the Eleventh Amendment casts serious doubt
on the historical synthesis that underlies the Court's claim that the
Amendment embodies a "principle" of sovereign immunity. Rather
than reaching an agreement about the states' immunity from suit
under the Constitution, the Founding Generation appears to have
recognized that state suability would result from Article III. What the
Framers debated was not the question of suability generally; as discussed above, the Original Jurisdiction Clause plainly provides for the
states' appearance as parties defendant. 44 8 Instead, they debated the
scope of state suability with respect to the identity of proper plaintiffs.
Entity suits-those initiated by the United States or by another statewere the least controversial; suits by individuals to enforce federal law
were perhaps more controversial but regarded as regrettably necessary; and actions by individuals to enforce existing state obligations
were the most controversial of all. Indeed, many Federalists, and particularly Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, disavowed suability as to
existing obligations based on their understanding that federal-law limits on state action would operate prospectively. 449 When Chisholm
placed these assurances in doubt, the framers restored the principle
of state nonsuability in party-based matters and thereby "immunized"
445
446

Hans v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
See cases cited supra note 8.
447
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
448 See supra text accompanying note 138.
449 See supra Part I.E.
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the states from the threat of federal judicial liability for any existing
(or future) nonfederal obligations. No broader "principle" of sover450
eign immunity was entailed.
Although one driving force behind the Eleventh Amendment appears to have been the desire of its framers to restore the states' power
to manage their Revolutionary War debts in accordance with agrarian
financial methods, the Federalists did not abandon their goal of making the states fiscally responsible for the future. 45 1 The constitutional
prohibitions against the emission of bills of credit, the impairment of
contracts, and the passage of tender laws remained enforceable
against the states pursuant to the Article III grants of federal question
jurisdiction. From all appearances, the Federalists were temporizing,
overcoming the difficulty Chisholm posed by the means least likely to
inflict lasting injury on the judiciary's ability to enforce the constitutional limits on state power.4 52 Most issues of state accountability were
left for resolution in light of the politics of another day and in accordance with the portion of Article III that the Eleventh Amendment left
unaffected.
There is little historical support, therefore, for the Court's controversial assertion in Seminole Tribe that the Eleventh Amendment re450 In portraying the Eleventh Amendment as a fairly limited expedient of the day, I
do not mean to suggest that it was to have no prospective effect Its curtailment of diversity
jurisdiction in actions against the states left a lasting mark on the state suability provisions
of Article III. Federal courts were no longer able to assertjurisdiction in suits and proceedings against the states solely on the basis of party alignment; instead, they were limited to
claims in which some federal question or ingredient made the case one arising under
federal law or admiralty. See supratext accompanying notes 373-77. We need not diminish
the significance of this jurisdictional curtailment to recognize that it had greater force
early in the nineteenth century. Today, with the flight away from the common law and the
rise of the administrative state, constitutional law and federal statutes now impose more
restraints on the states than they once did. In a world inundated with federal law, the
Eleventh Amendment has virtually no modem role to play in defining the power of the
federal courts to hear claims against the states as parties defendant.
451
Recall that the Hamiltonian assumption plan had resulted in the transfer of much
state indebtedness to federal accounts, and most of what little remained had been retired
early in the nineteenth century. See supra text accompanying notes 366-70. Similarly, the
Jay Treaty created a commission to handle the claims of British creditors. See supra note
372. Federalists, in short, sought to protect state creditors from the worst consequences of
agrarian finance.
452
Similar arguments appear in Amar, supranote 11, at 1482 (noting that the Amendment leaves federal-law rights enforceable against the states as such); Fletcher, supra note
11, at 1077-78 (noting that the issue of state suability in federal question matters was unresolved at the time of the Eleventh Amendment's ratification and was not addressed by
the framers of that Amendment); Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1938 (noting that the Amendment "made no real change in the nature of the federal union or the supremacy of federal
law"); Marshall, supra note 11, at 1367-68 (noting that the Amendment preserves state suability by in-state citizens and thus preserves as much accountability as was politically possible); Nowak, supranote 14, at 1440 (noting that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment
intended that Congress retain the power to abrogate immunity "to effectuate federal
power and goals").
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stored a broad principle of state sovereign immunity. Yet precisely
that claim lies at the heart of the Seminole Tribe Court's conclusion that
the federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over rights of action
legislated into existence by Congress pursuant to the grants of authority that were in force on the Amendment's effective date. 4 53 This tem-

poral synthesis effectively precludes Congress from authorizing
original federal court suits against the states to enforce rights under
the bankruptcy, copyright, and trademark laws, as well as laws enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. It does leave intact the possibility
of congressional abrogation pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the Court's most recent pronouncement on the
scope of this congressional power may have narrowed even that possibility.45 4 A host of factors may account for the Court's decision to

place these limits on Congress's power, but the Court simply cannot
justify them by reference to the Eleventh Amendment.
2.

The Mistaken Equation of U.S.-Party and State-Party Immunity

Although he acknowledges that the text of the Eleventh Amendment provides little support for the approach taken in Hans and Seminole Tribe,455 Justice Antonin Scalia has nonetheless defended the
retention of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Building on a
distinction he first proposed as an academic, 456 Justice Scalia argued
in his separate opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.45 7 that state
453 The majority in Seminole Tribe reaffirms the view of Hans, 134 U.S. at 9-19, that the
Constitution implicitly incorporated a principle of sovereign immunity, which the court
had improperly ignored in Chisholm, and which the Eleventh Amendment subsequently
restored. 517 U.S. at 54. On this account, the restoratioh of a pre-existing conception of

immunity qualifies all grants of legislative power and thus curtails Congress's power to
abrogate state immunity pursuant to Article I. See id. at 73 (reconfirming the rule of Hans
that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon
federal jurisdiction").
454
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66, 73-76 (overruling Union Gas and that decision's
affirmation of congressional power to abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, and treating the congressional abrogation power pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment as presenting a distinct question); cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997) (interpreting Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as limited to situations in which Congress seeks to define new remedies for
existing constitutional rights, and finding no general power in Congress to create new
rights binding upon the states).
455 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (admitting that the diversity account offers the best comprehensive explanation of the text of the Eleventh Amendment, assuming that the framers did
not intend to recognize immunity outside its express terms).
456 Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative
Action: Some Conclusionsfrom the Public-LandsCases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867, 886 (1970) (noting
the "regrettable equation" between domestic and foreign sovereign immunity, i.e., the immunity of a state before its own tribunals and that before the tribunals of another sovereign, such as the federal government).
457
491 U.S. at 2945 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sovereign immunity derives much of its force from its similarity to the
well-accepted doctrine of federal sovereign immunity.458 Justice Scalia

admits the necessity of keeping the states honest, but argues that
other means will suffice. 459 In particular, he notes that it has long
been thought that the states waived their immunity from suits brought
by the federal government and by other states in the "plan of the convention," and may be subject to suits for prospective relief aimed at
their responsible officials. 4 60 In view of this array of remedial options,
Justice Scalia sees no necessity for the recognition of an individual
right to sue a state itself, especially in light of the Constitution's failure
46 1
to effect a similar waiver of immunity for the federal government.
Although one cannot deny his influence-after all, he provided
the swing vote to retain Hans and overrule Union Gas, stating a position that doubtless coincides with that of the Seminole Tribe majorityone can question the historical accuracy of Justice Scalia's attempt to
equate U.S.-party and State-party immunity. Initially, one can certainly contest his major premise that the United States enjoys constitutional immunity from suit in its own courts. 4 62 Even granting Justice
Scalia's major premise, however, it does not necessarily follow that a
similar immunity extends to the states. The Framers of Article I
458 Id. at 33-34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
absence of a requirement that the federal courts entertain suits that individuals bring
against the federal government undermines any similar claim of necessity as to the suability
of states).
459 Id at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
Constitution "[u]ndoubtedly ... envisions the necessary judicial means to assure compliance with the Constitution and laws").
460 I1d at 33-34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
waiver of state immunity in the "plan of the convention" includes waiver of suits the United
States brings as a plaintiff and those another state brings as a plaintiff, and noting the
existence of suits by individuals to obtain appropriate damages and injunctive relief against
state officers responsible for violations of the federal Constitution).
461 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
constitutional immunity of the federal government "strongly suggests that state immunity
exists as well").
462 The Petition Clause of the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I, appears to
provide a constitutional guarantee of the right of individuals to seek judicial redress of
their claims against the United States government. See Pfander, supranote 69, at 899-900,
937-40. Although this argument is premised on the language of the First Amendment's
Petition Clause, which apparently did not become an issue during the debates over the
Eleventh Amendment, others of the day argued against the federal government's immunity. See Pfander, supra note 13, at 639-40 (quoting the argument of Edmund Randolph in
his report on the Judiciary Act of 1789 in favor of the routine suability of the federal government, as well as of the state governments, in all federal question cases); see also "Crito,"
Crito to Sydney, supra note 277, at 413-14 (contending that the principle of equal justice that
underlay the Constitution argued for the creation of a lawful mode of enforcing claims
against the United States as well as against the states); "Solon," Essay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 421, 422 (arguing that the U.S.party controversies provision authorizes the creation of a judicial remedy against the
United States).
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drew a careful distinction between the suability of the state and federal governments by making State-party cases a subject of mandatory
original cognizance and leaving U.S.-party controversies to the discretion of Congress. 463 If, as I believe, the Framers deliberately drew this
distinction between State- and U.S.-party suability because they worried more about state legislative dishonesty, then a textual predicate
justifies different treatment of the two levels of government.
Structural factors help to explain why the Federalists may have
believed that the states presented a greater threat of expropriation
than the federal government. In working out their restrictions on
state authority, the Constitution's Framers built upon their own experience with the passage of unjust state laws. Madison's famous disquisition in FederalistNo. 10 had argued that these unjust laws were the
product of gusts of faction that were more likely to sweep through the
state legislative councils. 4 64 Important recent work by Professor Jack
Rakove notes the centrality of Madison's thought in understanding
the rise of the doctrine of judicial review. 465 Professor Rakove concludes, in a work that points largely in the same direction as my argument here, that the Framers were far more willing to contemplate a
judicial role in policing state than federal legislative action. 4 66 The
Framers' distinction in Article III between state and federal suability
thus reflects a deep understanding that the state legislatures represented the more significant threat to the rights of the minority and to
the principles of good government.
The Framers' plan also appears to place emphasis on the ability
of an individual to enforce state obligations on her own initiative,
without instead having to persuade the central government to bring
suit against the state on her behalf. Most observers regard the Court's
original jurisdiction over State-party cases as mandatory and self-executing. 46 7 This understanding of the Court's original jurisdiction may
have reflected the Framers' desire to secure a constitutionally
mandatory forum for the enforcement of the constitutional restric-

See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (famously suggesting that an extension of the sphere of the national government to include
more interests and parties would make unified action by a single faction more difficult).
465 Jack N. Rakove, The Origins ofJudicialReview: A Pleafor New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REv.
1031, 1040 (1997) (calling "the constitutional theory of [the Democratic-Republicans']
pre-eminent leader, James Madison," a "central plank in their party platform," i.e., the
.need to erect fences around the legislative power").
466 Id. at 1041-50 (arguing that the Framers constructed ajudicial negative primarily as
a check on improper state laws, and discussing Madison's worries about the effectiveness of
this judicial check).
467 See Pfander, supra note 13, at 611 n.220.
463
464
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tions on the states in Article I, Section 10.468 If I am correct, and the
Court's mandatory original docket reflects the Framers' plan to make
the enforcement of state obligations independent of decisions that
the political branches of the federal government make, then Justice
Scalia's argument against state suability carries less weight. Scalia argues that suits which other parties, such as the United States or another state, bring can adequately substitute for suits that an affected
individual brings against the states. 469 Scalia's model of U.S.-party enforcement thus posits a dependence on Congress's willingness to authorize, and the executive branch's inclination to commence, actions
against the states, a model that is difficult to reconcile with a conception of the original docket as mandatory and self-executing.4 70
3.

The Curious Idea of State Consent to Suit

Of the many debatable features of the Court's Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence, perhaps none can match the curious notion that
suits against the states, though nominally placed beyond the 'Judicial
power" of the federal courts, may nonetheless be brought back within
that power by the state's consent to suit.4 71 Classical jurisdictional

doctrine views the federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction, with
power to hear cases and controversies that affirmatively come within
the defined limits of Article Im,but without power to hear matters
that extend beyond the scope of that grant.4 72 This strong rule
468 See Pfander, supra note 13, at 59-94 (arguing that the Framers may have created a
mandatory original docket for State-party cases to address the possibility that Congress
might choose to implement the Madisonian compromise by refraining from authorizing
lower federal courts to hear suits against the states).
469 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 33-34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
470 Ultimately, Justice Scalia and I agree that a provision for state suability did emerge
from what Hamilton called the "plan of the convention." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra
note 27, at 544. We disagree only as to the scope of Article III's provision for suability.
Scalia sees state suability as limited to suits by the United States and other states, in keeping
with the classic understanding of the scope of the Original Jurisdiction Clause as driven by

the alignment of the parties. See Union Gas,491 U.S. at 33-34 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He thus apparently views the Original Jurisdiction Clause, as I do,
as the vehicle through which the provision for state suability emerged from Article III. I
simply disagree with this limited assessment of the scope of the Court's original jurisdiction, seeing it instead as encompassing all State-party "cases" that arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Pfander, supra note 13, at 577-97 (arguing that
the barrier of sovereign immunity required the Framers to create a mandatory original
docket to secure the enforcement of federal rights against the states); id. at 598-640 (arguing on textual, structural, and historical grounds that the scope of the Court's original
jurisdiction extended to federal question claims against the states).
471
SeeJackson, supra note 11, at 37-39 (criticizing the Court's consent doctrine).
472

See CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 27-28 (5th ed. 1994) (tracing

the existence of a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction to the conception of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction, and showing that the presumption
emerged in the early Federalist era by citing cases that required the parties to include
allegations affirmatively revealing the existence of jurisdiction).
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against the expansion of federal judicial authority ordinarily applies
473
even where the parties "consent" to the federal courts' jurisdiction.
But in the realm of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has taken a
different view. Since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
held that the states may consent to suit in federal court, and that such
consent, if sufficiently unambiguous, can authorize the federal courts
to proceed to judgment notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar of the
Eleventh Amendment that would otherwise apply. 474
The history of the Eleventh Amendment raises profound questions about the Court's notion that state consent can empower the
federal courts to proceed in the face of a constitutional amendment
that clearly sought to curtail the 'Judicial power." Justice Iredell,
whose views the Court otherwise purports to follow in Hans and Seminole Tribe, clearly understood the classical view of federal jurisdiction
as limited by Article III, and steadfastly refused to countenance an
expansion of that jurisdiction through some form of consent. During
pretrial proceedings in Oswald v. New York 4 75 Justice Iredell apparently argued to his brethren against the issuance of process to the
State, on the ground that the plaintiffs complaint had failed adequately to allege the existence of diverse citizenship. Accordingly, the
Court quashed the summons and directed the plaintiff to plead
again. 47 6 Only after Oswald filed an amended complaint did the
473 See id. at 28 (noting that the parties cannot waive lack ofjurisdiction, whether by
express consent, by conduct, or even by estoppel).
474 The Court invoked the idea of state waiver of sovereign immunity, or consent to
suit, in the nineteenth century. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Waiver
took on new life in the 1960s, when the Court constructed a doctrine of implied waiver,
through which a state might impliedly waive its immunity from suit by agreeing to participate in or act pursuant toa federal regulatory scheme. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 190-98 (1964), overruledby Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468 (1987). Later decisions curtailed this idea of implied waiver by adding a requirement
that Congress expressly state its intention to subject the states to suit. See Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
284-87 (1973). Even later decisions abandoned implied waiver altogether and shifted to a
construct of congressional abrogation. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-78 (1987) (overruling Parden, and allowing congressional abrogation of state immunity only where Congress speaks with unmistakable clarity in a statutory text). For a complete review, see Kinports, supra note 20, at 796-807.
475 Oswald is unreported. See sources cited supra note 247.
476 During pretrial proceedings in Oswald,plaintiffs counsel moved for a writ to compel the State's appearance. Justice Iredell questioned whether the pleadings would support the Court's jurisdiction. He noted in particular that the summons failed to identify
Oswald as a citizen of "any other State but New York." James Iredell's Observations on
State Suability (Feb. 11-14, 1792), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 76, 77. Iredell also suggested
the possibility that New York might waive this objection, but expressed his own view (and
now the classical view) that plaintiffs wishing to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts were obliged to show it affirmatively through the pleading of special matters,
and the Court itself had an obligation to notice defects in its own jurisdiction and to refrain from proceeding in a cause over which it lacked power. Id. at 79 (describing the
Court's jurisdiction as "a special Jurisdiction, grounded on a written Constitution [and)
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Court proceed with the issuance of process, and only then did New
York agree to enter an appearance to defend on the merits. There is
no reason to believe that the Court would have proceeded to judgment on the merits, as it did, solely on the basis of the State's appearance, and without pleadings adequate to show jurisdiction. The
State's appearance clearly served some function other than resolving
4 77
jurisdictional issues.
Clearly, prior to Chisholm, the Founding Generation displayed a
measure of uncertainty about the proper role of state consent in the
exercise ofjurisdiction over matters otherwise within the terms of Article 111.478 But this uncertainty stemmed from the debate over the
written Laws" and distinguishing that jurisdiction from "that of a Court having primafade
general Jurisdiction over all Persons"). Iredell's argument apparently persuaded the
Court, which refused to grant the requested writ and called for the submission of a second
summons that was identical to the first except that it clearly identified Oswald as a citizen
of Pennsylvania. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 61.
477
This apparent distinction between consent andjurisdiction can help to explain the
function that the Framers of Article III may have envisioned for the grant of jurisdiction
over diverse-party proceedings involving the states. If these provisions did not contemplate
coercive proceedings against the states, as Madison and Marshall argued in Virginia's ratification debates, why did they appear in Article III? A hint may appear in Madison's suggestion that if the states consent, "provision is here made." 3 ELuOT'S DEBATES, supranote 84,
at 533 (remarks of Mr. Madison) (referring to controversies between a state and a foreign
nation). The jurisdictional grant of Article III could not operate coercively on a foreign
power in view of the law of nations. Yet such foreign states might consent to suit before an
Article III court. Similarly, although federal tribunals might not entertain coercive proceedings against the states to collect existing obligations, the states might consent to the
resolution of disputes there, as did the State of Maryland in Van Staphorst. See 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 7. The States had had some experience in the arbitration of their disputes
with private individuals and foreign states, both before and after the Constitution took
effect.
478
Cdnsent, of course, has a long history in the world of sovereign immunity. Sir
William Blackstone explained the suability of the Crown in England as the product of a
(fictional) consent to suit. See Pfander, supranote 69, at 923 & n.87 (noting that obtaining
redress from the British Crown was said to depend on the King's consent to petitions seeking relief as a matter of grace). Similarly, Hamilton spoke of the possibility that a state
might waive its sovereign immunity from suit through provisions contained in the "plan of
the convention." See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text Finally, it was a recognized feature under the law of nations that a state might waive its immunity from suit and
agree to have a particular tribunal adjust its claims. For example, the State of Virginia
agreed to arbitrate its dispute with Simon Nathan, following Nathan's unsuccessful attempt
to secure ajudicial decree against the state in the courts of Pennsylvania. For an account,
see Pfander, supra note 13, at 585-87 & n.126 (describing the law of nations immunity, its
invocation to defeat Nathan's suit in Pennsylvania state court under the Articles of Confederation, and the subsequent submission of the dispute to an arbitral panel in Maryland-a
venue chosen for its neutrality). Similarly, the State of Maryland at one time proposed an
arbitral resolution of its dispute with the Dutch banking family van Staphorst, and identified neutrals at the nation's capital to undertake the task. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 1415 (reporting on the identification of arbitrators in the autumn of 1786, but noting that no
decision emerged in light of the Maryland assembly's decision to seek a negotiated resolution of the dispute).
Concepts such as consent help to explain the commonplace idea that a state legislature ordinarily controls the scope of the state's suability in its own courts, and may either
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function of the Court's jurisdiction and the power of the Court to
entertain coercive, rather than consensual or arbitral, proceedings
against State-party defendants. Consider the history of Van Staphorstv.
Maryland.479 Following the initiation of suit and service of process on
the State, the legislature decided to enter an appearance in the litigation through its attorney general, Luther Martin. 480 Anti-Federalists
criticized Maryland's entry of appearance, fearing that it might signify
the State's consent to the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction and thus set
a damaging precedent for the future of states' rights. 4 8 1 Other evidence suggests that the states worried about how to enter an appropriately limited appearance in litigation, to preserve their ability to argue
48 2
that the Court lacked power to hear the claims against them.

consent to such suit or withhold consent. In all these instances, immunity from suit bears
some relationship to the government's failure to issue an effective consent. Even where
the state legislatures created modes for the judicial determination of claims against the

state, they typically retained control over the payment of any specie from the treasury by
requiring an appropriations bill to support such a payment and refusing to treat ajudicial
decree as a sufficient warrant for payment. See Pfander, supra note 69, at 940 n.144.
479
Van Staphorst is unreported. See sources cited supra note 246.
480
See 5 DHSG, supra note 3, at 16-17 (describing the decision of the Maryland assembly to "appear" in the action and to direct the state's attorney general, Luther Martin, to
effect the appearance).
481
SeeJAmES SuLLvAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERIcA, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supranote 3, at 21, 22-23 (noting that Maryland was said
to have consented to suit in the Supreme Court; arguing that "the state of Maryland can, by
no means, give a jurisdiction to the supreme court of the United States, which that court
does not possess by the constitution of their power from the people of all the states;" and
noting that the state might "refer their dispute, by arbitration, to the [Court,] but they
cannot, if they exist as a state, find a power lodged any where, to compel a performance of
the award on their part").
482 James Iredell, sitting as circuit justice in the Federal Circuit Court in Georgia, presided over a petition in equity in 1791 in which Alexander Chisholm set forth the same
claims he later refied in the Supreme Court. See Petition, in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 137
(reprinting the original petition). Georgia entered an appearance through counsel and
filed a plea to the court's jurisdiction. In doing so, Georgia risked a waiver of its jurisdictional argument, in light of the established rule that a party wishing to challenge jurisdiction was obliged to enter an appearance in propriapersona (in one's own proper person)
rather than through counsel. See5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 129-30 & n.22. Iredell's opinion
dismissing the action for want ofjurisdiction indicates that he had little regard for this rule
of waiver through appearance by counsel:
[T]his rigid rule of law, not permitting a Man to plead to the Jurisdiction by
an Attorney, with great deference, seems to me to have originated from the
Courts eagerly grasping at as much Jurisdiction as they could, a disgraceful
disposition which I hope never will appear in any Court of the U. S.
James Iredell's Circuit Court Opinion (Oct. 21, 1791), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 148,
153. When Chisholm refiled the action in the Supreme Court in February 1792, Georgia
adopted a different course and refused to appear through counsel. That puzzling refusal
may have been grounded in a fear that the Court would invoke this rule of waiver.
Attorneys involved in the litigation in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 378
(1798), also worried about the possibility of waiver through entry of an appearance. See
Letter from James Wood, Governor of Virginia, to Charles Lee, Attorney General of the
United States (Feb. 1, 1797), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 347, 347 (requesting Lee "to take
Such Steps as will bring the Suit to trial on these principles, without the Voluntary appear-
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Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that the Framers viewed the
entry of an appearance as the kind of act that might deprive the state
of its ability to question the Court's power to proceed.
Yet the uncertainty displayed in cases involving the entry of the
State's appearance was short-lived. In 1792, the Justices made clear in
opinions issued on circuit that they would not undertake to decide a
dispute in circumstances where their action was subject to legislative
or executive revision. 48 3 In 1793, Chisholm essentially ended any prospect that the states might retain the power to refrain from consenting
to suits within the jurisdictional scope of Article 111.484 The framers of
the Eleventh Amendment accepted that aspect of Chisholm and decided to clarify the extent of the Court's jurisdiction to foreclose the
possibility of further suability in diverse-party proceedings. The
Court's subsequent decisions drove home that lesson by treating the
existence of jurisdiction-over controversies between two or more
states, for example-as a sufficient warrant for the exercise ofjudicial
power, notwithstanding a state's purported refusal to consent. 48 5 On

the whole, the framers of the Eleventh Amendment appear to have
regarded state suability in jurisdictional terms, and to have placed a
ance of the State, if such measures can be taken; but if not that you will be pleased to enter
an appearance for the Commonwealth, and defend the Suit"); Letter from Charles Lee to
James Wood, supra note 315, at 347, 348 (noting that Lee had conferred with John Marshall and that they had "Concurred in Opinion that it [would] be most prudent not to
enter an Appearance for the State until a future term of the Court;" noting the pendency
of the Eleventh Amendment and suggesting that an objection to jurisdiction through
counsel "will be made with more efficacy, if the Amendment takes place before an Appearance is entered than Afterwards"). Evidently, Virginia had resolved to defend on the merits and to save its jurisdictional objection if possible. Lee and Marshall agreed that the risk
of waiver through appearance counseled a delay to preserve the jurisdictional argument.
483
Prior to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), three circuit courts advised
President Washington that they could not constitutionally entertain proceedings under
provisions of a 1792 statute. The statute in question obliged these courts to determine the
pension eligibility of disabled veterans, and authorized review of each decision by both the
Secretary of War and Congress. The Circuit Justices viewed the prospect of revision and
control of their opinions as inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers and the
requirement of judicial finality. See id. at 410 n.t (reprinting the circuit opinions). See
generally Pushaw, supra note 206, at 438-41 (locating Hayburn's Case in the context of early
Federalistjudicial thought). This attitude of opposition to nonjudicial revision cannot easily coexist with an arbitral conception of the Court's jurisdiction, if such a conception
would leave the states free to disavow a decision or award and refuse to pay the resulting
judgment.
484 After its decision asserting jurisdiction in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court granted a
motion to show cause why it should not enter a defaultjudgment against the state for nonappearance. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 134-35. The Court followed a similar strategy in
other cases. See 5 id. at 62 (reporting that the Court granted a motion to show cause why it
should not enter a default judgment in Oswald v. New York).
485
See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 716, 719 (1838) (upholding the power of the Court to entertain coercive proceedings against a state, and following Chisholm in allowing service of process on the state's governor and attorney
general).
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modest portion of state suability in diverse-party matters beyond the
reach of the federal courts.
The wide divergence between the framers' understanding and
the Court's construct of state consent underscores the point that Hans
and Seminole Tribe extend the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
well beyond the Eleventh Amendment's textual limits on the judicial
power. State consent can thus be seen as a judicial response to this
judge-made expansion of the Eleventh Amendment, one that permits
the federal courts (again) to hear those matters that the framers of
the Amendment had intended to leave unaffected.
4.

The Problem of ProtectingState Treasuries

Modem cases often characterize the protection of state treasuries
from retrospective liability as one of the cornerstones of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. In Edelman v. Jordan,48 6 the Court articulated this concern with retrospective liability in its clearest form by
refusing to permit the federal courts to entertain suits-otherwise permitted under the fiction of Ex parte Young4 7-that would require state
officers to pay state money to remedy past violations of federal law.48 8
Since then, the lower courts have developed an elaborate distinction
between prospective and retrospective provisions that shapes the extent to which federal courts may monitor state compliance with federal law.4 89 Seminole Tribe reinforces this body of law and further limits

the availability of officer suits as an alternative to entity suability. 490
The framers of the Eleventh Amendment were also concerned
about retrospective liability in suits for damages payable by the state
treasurer, but the similarity ends there. Chisholm threatened liability
on a series of obligations that states had incurred before the federal
limitations of Article I had binding force. The treasury liability
threatened in Edelman, by contrast, would have made individuals
whole for losses they suffered as a result of a state's violation of federal-law limits that were already in place at the time the states took the
486
487
488

489

415 U.S. 651 (1974).
209 U.S. 123 (1908); see Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-68.
415 U.S. at 662-63.
For an overview of the leading cases, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION

395-99 (2d ed. 1994).

490 Apart from its decision that Congress lacks power to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I powers, the Court in Seminole Tribeheld that
the plaintiff could not enforce the congressional scheme through a suit aimed at compelling the governor of Florida to comply. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-76. The Court

distinguished Ex parte Young on the ground that the statutory scheme involved in Seminole
Tribe evidenced Congress's desire to secure enforcement of the federal rights at issue
through some mechanism other than an officer suit. See id at 74 (citing Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988)). For comments on this aspect of Seminole Tribe, see
Meltzer, supra note 20, at 33-46.
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allegedly unlawful action.49 1 The unanticipated federal judicial liability at issue in Chisholm differs significantly the more routine allowance
of benefits that the State of Illinois improperly withheld in Edelman.
5.

The Absence of a Forum-AllocationPrinciple

Many scholars see modem Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
as reflecting a forum-allocation principle. 4 92 The Court has long held
that the Eleventh Amendment has no application to its exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over State-party proceedings first instituted in
state court.493 As a consequence of the steady expansion of the
Court's scope of review, many questions the Eleventh Amendment
presents now have less to do with whether the Court has the ultimate
power of review than with which court-state or federal-should operate as the court of first instance. 4 94 Recent developments suggest
that state courts may owe a positive duty to entertain suits against
themselves to enforce federal-law rights, a duty that applies with
greater force in situations where the Eleventh Amendment bars the
495
plaintiff from proceeding in a lower federal court.
The forum allocation principle has no obvious basis in the history
of the Eleventh Amendment. First, it is far from clear that the framers
of the Amendment intended to preserve the Court's appellate jurisdiction over matters excepted from the 'Judicial power" under Article
I1.496 Second, it is equally doubtful that the framers recognized a
state court obligation to provide a forum for the assertion of federal
491 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-74 (refusing to permit the equitable restitution remedy
to operate in favor of the plaintiff class on the ground that it would impose a retrospective
liability payable by the state in violation of the Eleventh Amendment).
492 SeeJackson, supra note 11, at 73-75; see also Monaghan, supranote 20, at 125 (contending that the Eleventh Amendment operates in large measure "as a forum selection
clause").
493
See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 2627 (1990) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the Supreme Court from asserting appellate jurisdiction over claims that individuals bring against the states in state courts). On the evolution
from Cohens to the modem view, see Jackson, supra note 11, at 25-32.
494 For an overview of the forum-allocation principle, see James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: FederalAppellate Court Review of State CourtJudgments
After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. Rxv. (forthcoming Oct. 1998).
495 See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110-14 (1994) (holding that states may not
deny individuals a constitutionally compelled remedy in their own courts); see also
Monaghan, supra note 20, at 125 n.161 (describing as "plainly wrong" the suggestion that
the states may withhold their consent from suit in their own courts to enforce federal-law
claims that the Eleventh Amendment displaces from federal court). But seeV
Wzquez, supra
note 20, at 1690-91 (noting expressions in a variety of recent decisions that emphasize the
idea of state consent to suit, and suggesting that such a requirement of consent might
permit the states to refrain from hearing federal claims in their own courts).
496
SeeJackson, supra note 11, at 25-39 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment may
have been intended to restrict the judicial power in its entirety, as applied both to its original and appellate exercise).
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claims against the states themselves. The framers were aware that a
handful of states had created a mechanism for the judicial resolution
of debt claims, but they were also aware that other states, including
Massachusetts, had no such mechanism. 49 7 The absence of an assured
original forum for the adjudication of claims against the states helps
to explain why the Framers of Article III included State-party cases
within the Court's mandatory and self-executing grant of original jurisdiction. 49 8 Federal judicial power existed, at least in part, to secure
state accountability to the rules of federal law, on the theory that state
courts were inadequate to that task. 499 The notion that the Eleventh
Amendment shifts otherwise viable federal law claims into state
courts-courts that the framers believed were inadequate-strikes me
as one that would have surprised Senator Strong.50 0
CONCLUSION

Like other constitutional amendments that have shrunken in size
to matters of essentially historical significance, the Eleventh Amendment was meant to accomplish a limited set of goals. The Constitution established a series of restrictions on the states, and Article III
included a mandatory grant of original jurisdiction in State-party cases
to facilitate their judicial enforcement. But the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for these constitutional limits to operate retrospectively; instead, they were to apply only to legislative action the
state governments took, after the requisite number of states had ratified the Constitution. With the exception of matters controlled by the
rules of general common law and the rules of law specified in existing
treaties, the Constitution followed the general preference for prospective rulemaking, as the language of the Supremacy Clause makes
clear.
See Pfander, supra note 69, at 939-42.
498 See Pfander, supra note 13, at 592-97 (arguing that a grant of original federal jurisdiction was seen as necessary to secure a forum for the adjudication of claims against the
states, and noting the absence of assured suability in state courts); Pfander, supra note 69,
497

at 939-42 (summarizing provisions of state law that allowed some, but less than universal,

state suability in state courts).
499
Others have expressed doubt that the Court's current regime of broad immunity in
lower federal courts and narrow immunity in state courts makes sense in light of the Framers' distrust of statejudges. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11, at 1477 (stating that the enforceability of federal restrictions only in state court represents an "inexplicable throwback" to
the Articles of Confederation).
500 Senator Strong presumably knew that Massachusetts had no provision for suits
against the state in its own courts, and would have been puzzled by the notion that the
Commonwealth had an obligation to create such a mode in order to facilitate enforcement
of federal rights. Cf Pfander, supra note 13, at 595-97 (arguing that the Framers of Article

III were unlikely to have secured the enforcement of federal law by imposing suit on the
states in their own courts).
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The diversity grant of jurisdiction, over disputes between states
and out-of-state citizens and foreign nationals, threatened this general
rule of constitutional prospectivity by empowering the federal courts
to entertain suits to enforce obligations that the states had incurred
under the Articles of Confederation. This prospect ofjudge-made retrospectivity became an issue in the ratification debates in New York,
North Carolina, and Virginia, and in each instance, the Federalists
disavowed any such federal judicial intervention in the states' management of their own pre-constitutional obligations. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court in Chisholm concluded that the scope of its diversity
jurisdiction extended to actions in assumpsit to enforce existing state
debt obligations. Many Federalists, including Senator Strong of Massachusetts, had difficulty defending the decision because it ran
counter to the representations they had made in the ratification conventions a few years earlier. So the Federalists joined forces with the
Anti-Federalists on the terms of an amendment designed to explain
away the Court's power to entertain these proceedings.
History has largely eliminated the problem that confronted the
framers of the Eleventh Amendment. Few federal judges today would
invoke the principles of natural law that Edmund Randolph urged
and the Court adopted in Chisholm. Furthermore, the Erie doctrine
teaches that the federal courts, sitting in diversity, must ordinarily apply the rule of decision specified by the law of the state in which they
sit. 50 1 Although the doctrine has no obvious analogue in matters initi-

ated on the Supreme Court's original docket, the underlying logic of
Erie suggests that federal judges no longer view themselves as competent to fashion new rules of law to govern tort and contract claims
against the states of the kind that troubled the Eleventh Amendment's
framers. State liability on such claims, as Nevada v. Hall starkly illus50 2
trates, has become a matter that state law controls entirely.
With the demise of general common law, and the rise of a host of
potential sources of federal liability in actions arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, issues of state suability
in federal court now focus almost exclusively on suits to enforce rights
under federal law. Much else has changed in the intervening two
hundred years, not the least of which has been most states' gradual
abandonment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in their own
courts, and the Supreme Court's willingness to direct the states to
make appropriate remedies available in those courts. Whether these
changes justify the Seminole Court's shift away from first-instance reliErie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 804 U.S. 64 (1938).
502 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-21 (1979) (holding that California may constitutionally impose tort-based liability on Nevada without regard to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
501
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ance on federal judges to keep the states honest is a question for another day. It is not, however, one that the Eleventh Amendment
answers.

